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SHIVAJI AND HIS TIMES

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Shivaji (Valentyn portrait)

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SHIVAJI
(drawn by Mir Muhammad
before 1686)

MODERN STATUE

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PORTRAITS OF SHIVAJI

We have reliable information about Shivaji's personal appearance in 1664, when he was seen by some Englishmen at Surat. The chaplain Escaliot writes, "His person is described by them who have seen him to be of mean [=medium] stature, lower somewhat than I am erect, and of an excellent proportion. Actual [=active] in exercise, [he] seems to smile, a quick and piercing eye, and whiter than any of his people." The cultured Frenchman Thevenot, who travelled in the Deccan from November 1665 to February 1667, says of him, "The Rajah is small [in size] and tawny [in complexion], with quick eyes which indicate abundance of spirit." It is a pity that neither the English factor of Rajapur whose wig Shivaji examined with his fingers in curiosity (March, 1675), nor Henry Oxinden, the English envoy present at Shivaji's coronation (1674), has left any description of his personal appearance. The latter only says that he weighed about 16,000 pagodas, (according to Le Feber, 17,000 pagodas or about 160 pounds). The best old portraits of Shivaji are described below.

1. An engraving in F. Valentyn's *Oud-en Nieuw Oost-Indien* (1724-26), the pictures in which were most probably acquired by the Dutch E. I. Co.'s mission to the Mughal Court in 1712. My frontispiece. The fine steel engraving given in Orme's *Fragments* (1782) is this portrait as retouched by a European etcher.

2. The Italian traveller Manucci in 1706 presented to the Venetian Senate a volume of 56 portraits drawn for him by Mir Muhammad, an artist in the household of Shah Alam, *before 1688*. This volume (now in Paris) contains a portrait of Shivaji (No. 39 in Blochet's list) which Mr. Irvine has reproduced by photography in his edition of the *Storia do Mogor*, Vol. III., picture No. XXXV. Second portrait in my book.

3. There is a contemporary and authentic portrait of Shivaji preserved in the British Museum, *viz.*, MS. Add. 22,282 (Picture No. 12.) It bears a Dutch inscription, 'Shivaji the late Maratha prince.' This volume of Indian portraits evidently belonged to some Dutch owner who had written the name of each person in Dutch on the portrait *before 1707*, as Aurangzib's portrait is inscribed, 'the *present Great Mughal*.' Mr. Irvine holds that the portraits were true to life so far as the artist could make them. They are well executed, in the usual style. The following description of this Shivaji portrait is supplied by Mr. Irvine:—

"Three-quarter length, looking to right,—same face as in Orme's *Fragments*. Black beard and moustache—long hair at sides—gold *pagri* —jewelled aigrette—black plume—white *jigha* (pearls)—flowered coat with white ground—purple silk scarf thrown across shoulder—worked sash—*peshqabz* (dagger) sticking out from waist on left side—right hand hidden it hilt of a *pattah* or rapier—left hand holding a *dhup* or straight sword."

4. A miniature of Shivaji on horseback, hunting a lion with the sword, now preserved in the P. W. Museum, Bombay. (My conjecture of date, about 1725.)

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SHIVAJI AND HIS TIMES

CHAPTER I.

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE.

1. Extent, rainfall, soil and crops.
2. Isolation of the people.
3. Poverty, simplicity and equality of society.
4. Maratha character.
5. Religious teachers.
6. Literature and language.
7. Maratha soldiers and peasants of today.
8. Defects of the Maratha character.

§1. *Extent, rainfall, soil and crops.*

The Census of 1931 showed nearly twenty-one and a quarter millions of people speaking the Marathi language, including its Konkani dialect (the latter being the speech of less than half a million of souls only). Marathi is the language of a little less than one-half (exactly 42·23 per cent) of the population of the Bombay Presidency,* over one-fourth (26·23 p.c.) of that of the Nizam's Dominions, and slightly below one-third (31·22 p.c.) of the inhabitants of the Central Provinces and Berar. Its other speakers are found mostly in the Indian States. This language has been steadily gaining ground since the days of the Peshwas, and its peaceful annexation of the children of ruder and less literary tongues has gone on unabated even during the British period.

But the Marāthā country is not co-extensive with the land where the Marāthi speech prevails to-day. Four centuries ago the name *Mahā-rāshtra* was confined to the western edge of the Decçan plateau, *i.e.*, to a tract bounded

* In 1911 Marathi was spoken by above 86 p.c. of the population of the Konkan division, 85 p.c. of the Deccan division, of the Bombay Presidency, and nearly 54 p.c. of Bombay city.

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on the north by the Tāpti, on the south by the upper courses of the Krishnā (probably the Warnā), and on the east by the Sinā* The cradle-land of Mahārāshtra was, therefore, formed by the Nāsik, Punā and Sātārā districts, parts of Ahmadnagar and Sholāpur, and probably the western corner of Aurangābād,—a rough total of 28,000 square miles. The Marāthā race was also settled in Konkan or the narrow land between the Western Ghāts and the Indian Ocean. Here the districts of Thāna, Kolābā and Ratnagiri and the State of Sāvant-vādi,—with a total area of over 10,000 square miles,—are now predominantly Marāthi-speaking; but in the 16th century a considerable portion of the population, probably one-half, belonged to other races and spoke other tongues.

Four centuries ago the population of Mahārāshtra was very thin and forests covered much of the land. The western edge of the Deccan plateau is subject to a low and uncertain rainfall, cultivation is poor and precarious, and it is only along the narrow margins of the few rivers that the peasant is assured of a good return for his labour. From nearly the whole of the Western Deccan the heavy clouds of the S. W. monsoon are either shut out by the Ghāt range, or, if they surmount this barrier, they sail away to the east leaving the land unwatered and untilled, so that "the Deccan, generally speaking, yields to much labour a bare measure of subsistence."† (*Moral and Mat. Prog.* 1911-12, p. 10.)

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* "The word Dekkan expresses the country watered by the upper Godāvari and that lying between that river and the Krishnā. The name Mahārāshtra also seems at one time to have been restricted to this tract. For that country is, in the Purānas and other works, distinguished on the one hand from Northern Konkan and from the regions on either side of the Narmadā and the Tāpti, as well as from Vidarbha" or Berar. (*Bom. Gaz.* i. pt. ii. pp. 134, 587; xxiv. 81.)

† The rain is precipitated on the coast-line [*i.e.*, Konkan] at an average of 100 to 120 inches [in the year.] Once the crest [of the Western Ghāts] is passed, the precipitation decreases very rapidly, until a belt is reached only 35 miles from the hills where the rainfall is very precarious and averages only about 17 inches. Further east again, the S. W. monsoon is nearly

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In such a soil rice cultivation is impossible, and wheat and barley grow in very small quantities. The staple crop of most of this region is the hardy millet,—*jawāri, bājra* and *rāgi* or maize. But even these cannot always be depended upon. One year the rain would fail, the sprouting plants would be scorched by the sun or the young heads of grain would shrink and wither before they can grow to fulness and ripen, and there would be famine throughout the length and breadth of the land. The soil, covered with bare rock at places and with only a thin layer of mould at others, would be baked to a brown dust, not a green blade would be seen anywhere, and in addition to the human victims the cattle would perish by tens of thousand.

§2. *Isolation of the People.*

The broken rocky nature of the country and its abundance of forests, while it kept the population down, also made travelling difficult and unprofitable. There were no rich courts, populous cities or thriving marts to attract merchants. Nor were there regular occasions for the march of large bodies of soldiers, as from one province of a compact and mighty empire to another. The country was cut

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spent, but the influence of the N. E. monsoon begins to be felt and the rainfall improves.....South of Khāndesh we get the Deccan proper divided into three tracts [running parallel to the Ghāts and called] the *Dāng* or *Māval* to the west, the *Transition* in the centre, and the *Desh*, or black-soil plain to the east. The soil, however, is not fertile, and there are ranges of bare rocky hills running east and west, spurs so to speak of the Ghāts, which neither store water for cultivation nor attract the rainfall.....The Karnātak [*i.e.*, the Dhārwar, Belgāum, and Bijapur districts] has a more certain and more copious rainfall and more fertile soil." (*Census of India*, 1911, vii. pt. I, pp. 4-6.) The western hilly belt is called *Dāng* in the north (*i.e.*, Baglāna), *Māval* in the centre (*i.e.*, the Nāsik, Punā, and Sātārā districts), and *Mallād* in the south (*i.e.*, Karnātak.) The Konkan, on the other hand, is an area of certain and heavy rainfall, with rice for the predominant crop, "and along the sea-coast, wherever there is any soil.....a fringe of palms, mango-groves and plantain orchards add to the beauty of the landscape and the wealth of the inhabitants. Thāna and Kanārā are forest-clad districts." (*Ibid.*)

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up by Nature into small compartments in which the natives lived isolated self-contained lives, the world forgetting and by the world forgot.

This was true in a special degree of the belt of land lying immediately east of the Ghāts. The empires of the central and more level portion of the table-land, both in Hindu times and Muslim, had sent forth their conquering hosts westwards, but the flood of invasion had been broken at the foot of the hills or their numerous spurs, or, where a thin stream of it had poured through the passes, it had retired after a short and unprofitable stay. In their rugged and inhospitable nooks the natives had found safety and peace, while the richer plains had been the scenes of revolution and rapine.

This natural isolation of the western belt was no doubt occasionally broken by the pilgrim, the trader, and the soldier of fortune. Across this rugged tract lay all the routes from the ocean-ports of our western coast to the rich capitals and marts of Central Deccan. Through it alone could the stream of recruits from Persia, Arabia, Turkey, Abyssinia and even Central Asia reach the welcoming Muslim Courts of Kulbargā, Bidar, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkondā. Through Mahārāshtra alone could the cloth, metal-ware and spices of the upper Godāvari and Krishnā valleys reach their ports of embarkation for Europe.

Then, again, the sterile soil discouraged its sons from the thankless task of tilling it. Strong muscles and stout hearts found greater rewards and a higher position by serving in the armies of the mighty monarchies of the central plateau. An able partisan leader was sure of high pay, noble rank, and it might be the proud position of a king-maker, at any of these Courts, which were constantly at war with their neighbours, and prepared to bid high for the lances of useful *condottieri* from the Desh tract.

But such occasional visitors only brought a breath of the outer world to the sequestered vales of Mahārāshtra; they did not disturb the noiseless tenor of the life of the

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natives, for the natives themselves had hardly occasion to move. Even when they went abroad as soldiers, they usually settled there in the fiefs given to them and rarely returned to their barren ancestral homes.

The Marāthā people's inborn love of independence and isolation was greatly helped by Nature, which provided them with many ready-made and easily defensible forts close at hand, where they could quickly flee for refuge and whence they could offer a tenacious resistance. Unlike the Gangetic plain, this country could not be conquered and annexed by one cavalry dash or even one year's campaigning. Here the natives had the chance of making a long struggle against superior numbers and, as often happened, of recovering their own when the invader was worn out. "The whole of the Ghāts and neighbouring mountains often terminate towards the top in a wall of smooth rock, the highest points of which, as well as detached portions on insulated hills, form natural fortresses, where the only labour required is to get access to the level space, which generally lies on the summit. Various princes at different times have cut flights of steps or winding roads up the rocks, fortified the entrance with a succession of gateways, and erected towers to command the approaches; and thus studded the whole of the region about the Ghāts and their branches with forts." "In many of them there are springs of the finest water, and in all a supply can be secured, in tanks or reservoirs, during the periodical rains from May to October." The soft trap rock dissolving has exposed the hard basalt in steep scarped precipices and smooth tops, which form natural forts.*

§3. *Poverty, simplicity and equality of society.*

In such a country no man can afford to lead a sheltered life. There was no parasite class in ancient Mahārāshtra. Even the village headmen, besides attending to their demesne fields, had to work as collectors of revenue, local

* Elphinstone's *History*, 6th ed. 615. Duff. I. 7. *Bom. Gaz.*, xviii, pt. 1, pp. 9-10; xix 16.

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judges and parochial policemen, to earn the fee on which they lived. There was hardly a rich man, except the trader who was also the only banker of this primitive society. Even the landlords were rich rather in grain-heaps and armed retainers than in gold and silver. Some temples, especially at the chief centres of pilgrimage, had accumulations of wealth, but their income was precarious, entirely dependent on voluntary gift, and incomparably smaller than the riches of the grand temples of Madras.

In a society so circumstanced, every man, and often every woman, has to work and work with the hand. Elegance and refinement cannot grow here. If culture can be rightly defined as the employment of the intellect in pleasure, then there is no room for culture among men who have to sacrifice pleasure to the bare necessaries of life. Where Nature enforces a Spartan simplicity, there can be no luxury, no learned leisure (except among the priests), no æsthetic development, no polished manners even.

The Marāthās, when they rose to political power, did not impress the subject population favourably. To the over-polished decadents of the Mughal capitals, the warriors from the South appeared as a race of upstarts, insolent in prosperity, and lacking in grace, refinement and even good manners. They had no taste for the fine arts, no elegance of address, no aptitude for the amenities of social life. Even their horsemanship was awkward and graceless, though eminently practical. The period of Marāthā ascendency has not left India richer by a single grand building, or beautiful picture, or finely written manuscript. Even the palaces of the Peshwās are low, mean-looking, flimsy structures, with small rooms and narrow staircases—relieved from utter insignificance only by their richly carved wooden *facade*.

§4. *Marāthā character.*

But such a country and climate have their compensating advantages, too. They develop self-reliance, courage,

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perseverance, a stern simplicity, a rough straightforwardness, a sense of social equality and consequently pride in the dignity of man as man. As early as the 7th century of the Christian era, a learned Chinese traveller thus noted the character of the Marāthā people living in the more prosperous Central Deccan: "The inhabitants are proud-spirited and warlike, grateful for favours and revengeful for wrongs, self-sacrificing towards suppliants in distress and sanguinary to death with any who treated them insultingly." "If they are going to seek revenge, they first give their enemy warning." (Beal, *Si Y. K.* ii. 256; Watters's *Yuan Chwang,* ii. 239.)

This racial character was somewhat modified in the course of the next ten centuries. The disappearance of the protective influence of the large Hindu monarchies of the province, the growing rigour of the Muslim occupation of the country, and the ravages of constant warfare between rival States, forced the remnant of the Marāthā population to be more cunning and less chivalrous. Shivāji did not "first give warning" to Āfzal or Shāista Khan.*

But the basis of their character remained the same,—activity, courage, self-reliance, self-respect and love of equality. With the loss of their own cities and capitals on the Godāvari and the Krishnā in the 14th century, they were pressed back to the sterile western edge of the plateau and became poorer and more isolated. In the lonely struggle with Nature and beasts, they developed greater cunning, without losing their valour and hardiness. Indeed, in their combination of courage, cleverness and power of endurance,—in their ability to plan and execute surprises and night-attacks, in the skill of their soldiers to extricate themselves from a tight corner or vary their tactics accord-

* In 1880 an English observer wrote of the Marāthā peasantry (of the Kunbi caste), "They are hard-working, temperate, hospitable, fond of their children and kind to strangers. At the same time they are cruel in revenge, and seldom scruple to cheat either Government or their creditors." (*Bom. Gaz.,* xviii. pt. I, 288.)

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ing to the changing phases of a battle, without waiting for guidance from a superior,—the Marāthās resemble the Afghāns most among all Asiatic races.

Social distinctions were fewer and much less sharp among the 16th century Marāthās than among richer and more civilized communities. The rich man was not immeasurably above the poor in such a simple society ; and even the poorest man had his value as a fighter or indispensable labourer ; at least, he preserved his self-respect, because where few had anything to spare, none was tempted to lead the pampered life of the professional beggars and hangers-on of Agra or Delhi. Poverty and immemorial custom alike preserved the womankind of Mahārāshtra (except among those castes that aspired to be Kshatriyas) from seclusion in the harem, and thus the effective strength of society was doubled, while life gained in health and sweetness from the activities of women in public.

§5. *Religious teachers.*

The same sense of equality was fostered by religion. The Brāhmans, no doubt, tried to maintain their monopoly of the sacred lore and their aloofness from other castes as a sort of spiritual aristocracy. But strong religious movements arose and swept through the length and breadth of the land, teaching the sanctity of conduct as nobler than mere birth, the superiority of a living personal faith to mere ritual, and the oneness of all true believers before God. These popular movements were hostile to the haughty claims of the Brāhman hierarchy, and their chief centre was Pandharpur, one of the most famous seats of pilgrimage in the land.

"Like the Protestant Reformation in Europe in the 16th century, there was a religious, social, and literary revival and Reformation in India, but notably in the Deccan in the 15th and 16th centuries. This religious revival was not Brāhmanical in its orthodoxy ; it was hetero-

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dox in its spirit of protest against forms and ceremonies and class distinctions based on birth, and ethical in its preference of a pure heart, and of the law of love, to all other acquired merits and good works. This religious revival was the work also of the people, of the masses, and not of the classes. At its head were saints and prophets, poets and philosophers, who sprang chiefly from the lower orders of society,—tailors, carpenters, potters, gardeners, shopkeepers, barbers, and even *mahārs* (scavengers)—more often than Brāhmans. The names of Tukārām [born about 1568], of Rāmdās [b. 1608], of Vāman Pandit [b. 1636], and of Eknāth [b. 1528] still retain their ascendency over the minds of the people of Mahārāshtra." (Rānādé, 10; also *Bom. Gaz.* xx. 473.)

The fairs held at the chief places of pilgrimage on particular holy days tended to foster a sense of Hindu unity, like the national games of ancient Greece, though to a lesser extent, because caste has always remained with us a disintegrating force. These shrines became distributing centres of cult and culture, and tended to break down tribal or parochial narrowness, though imperceptibly.

§6. *Literature and Language.*

Literature afforded another bond of union in Mahārāshtra. Its themes were taken from the ancient scriptures and epics which are the common heritage of all the Hindus. The devotional songs and moral maxims of popular teachers like Tukārām and Rāmdās, Vāman Pandit and Moro Pant, made their way to every home where Marathi letters could be read. "In every town and village in the Deccan and Konkan, especially during the rains, the pious Marāthā will be found enjoying with his family and friends the recitation of the *Pothi* of Shridhar [b. 1679], and enjoying it indeed. Except an occasional gentle laugh, or a sigh, or a tear, not a sound disturbs the rapt silence of the audience, unless when one of those passages of supreme pathos is

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reached, which affects the whole of the listeners simultaneously with an outburst of emotion which drowns the voice of the reader." (Acworth's *Ballads,* xxvii.)

The simplicity and uniformity of early Marāthā society are also reflected in the language. Their poetry consisted of short jingles and apopthegms or monotonous metrical couplets as in the epics,—with no lyric outburst, no long-flowing sonorous verses, no delicate play on the whole gamut of sounds. Like the other daughters of Sanskrit, the Marāthi vernacular had no literary prose till well into the 18th century. The prose that was created by the official class in their letters and chronicles, was a barbarous jargon composed nearly three-fourths of Persian words and grotesque literal translations of Persian idioms. The highly Sanskritized, elegant and varied prose that is now used, is a creation of the British period. (Rājwādé, viii, Intro., fully discusses the Persian element.)

"On the whole it may be said that the written [Marāthi] poetry, consisting as it does in such very large measure of moral disquisitions and reflections, and the praises of this deity or that, is little known to the ryots and the Māvalis of Mahārāshtra, and that it would not command their attention or admiration if it were known..... In Mahārāshtra, where the immense majority of the peasantry can neither read nor write, it is a mere truism to say that the literature of their country is absolutely unknown to them.* It is not to be supposed, however, that they are without a poetry of their own. With the Marāthās, the feelings of the commons have taken shape in the ballads, which are the genuine embodiment of national enthusiasm. .... Over the plains of the Deccan, and the deep valleys and bold ridges of the Sahyādris, from village to village, the humble *Gondhāli* (minstrel) still travels, and still to rapt and excited audiences sings of the great days when the

* But the entire mass of legends and traditions of the race was the common property of all classes of people throughout the land and gave them cultural homogeneity.

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armed fathers of the men around him gave laws at the spear's point to all the princes of India, or retreated wounded and dismayed before the sword of the sea-dwelling stranger." (Acworth and Shaligrām, *Powādās,* i and ii.) But this national ballad literature was the creation of the age of Shivāji and his successors.

Not only was their literature poor, but their popular spoken tongue was a rough practical speech, incapable of expressing the ceremonious courtesy, indirectness, and delicate shades of meaning of the highly developed Urdu language. The democratic temper of the Marāthā people is shown by their having no respectful mode of address like the *āp* ("your honour") of Northern India; all ranks are *theed* and *thoued*.

Thus, a remarkable community of language, creed, and life was attained in Mahārāshtra in the 17th century, even before political unity was conferred by Shivāji. What little was wanting to the solidarity of the people was supplied by his creation of a national State, the long struggle with the invader from Delhi under his sons, and the imperial expansion of the race under the Peshwās. Thus, in the end a tribe,—or rather a collection of tribes and castes,—was fused into a *nation,** and by the end of the 18th century a Marāthā *people* in the political and cultural senses of the term had been formed, though caste distinctions still remained. Thus history has moulded society.

§7. *Marāthā soldiers and peasants of to-day.*

The backbone of Shivāji's army was composed of the peasantry, who belonged to two low castes, named *Marāthā* and *Kunbi*. The Marāthā caste,—a name which should not be applied to all Marāthi-speaking people in general,—numbered five millions and the Kunbis (of the Bombay

* "The Marāthās are a nation, and from the Brāhman to the ryot they glory in the fact." (Acworth and Shaligram's *Powadas, iii.*)

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Presidency alone), two and a half millions, in 1911, and they bear the following character in our times:

"As a class, Marāthās (*i.e.*, the caste so called) are simple, frank, independent and liberal, courteous, and, when kindly treated, trusting. They are a manly and intelligent race, proud of their former greatness, fond of show, and careful to hide poverty. . . . Stronger, more active, and better made than the Kunbis, many of the Marāthās, even among the poorer classes, have an air of refinement. (They take animal food, including fowls, and drink toddy and other liquors, like the Kunbis.) No caste supplies the Bombay army with so many recruits as the Ratnagiri Marāthās. Others go into the police or find employment as messengers. Like the Kunbis, orderly, well-behaved, and good-tempered, the Marāthās surpass them in courage and generosity. Very frugal, unassuming, respectable and temperate, . . . they are a very religious class."

"The Deccan Kunbis are [now] all cultivators, steady and hard-working. . . . . A very quiet, easy-tempered and orderly class, singularly free from crime, they have much respect for the gods. In the Deccan they are strong, hardy, enduring and muscular, [but in Konkan, smaller, darker and more slightly made.] The Kunbi women, like their husbands, are strong and hardy, but the veiled Marāthā women are generally weak. . . . . Widows are generally allowed to marry." (*Bom. Gaz.*, xxiv. 70; x. 123, 121; xviii. pt. i, 285, 307.)

§8. *Defects of the Marāthā character.*

We shall now turn to the other traits of the Marāthā character. When a Government lives on plunder as a regular source of supply, its officers naturally see no immorality in taking bribes for themselves. The ethics of the servant easily slides into the ethics of the master. These Indian Spartans with their simplicity, hardiness and sense of equality, were no more proof against corruption than the

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Spartans of ancient Greece. Contemporary travellers have noticed how greedy of bribes the Brāhman officers of the Marāthā State were, even under the great Shivāji.

The chief defect of the Marāthās, which has disastrously reacted on their political history, is their lack of business capacity. This race has produced no great banker, trader, captain of industry, or even commissariat organizer or contractor. Hence, on the economic side, in the broadest sense of the term, the Marāthā administration was very weak. The Peshwās, in spite of the dazzling brilliancy of their political success, were bankrupts from the days of the great Bāji Rāo I onwards. Even Shivāji had repeated money difficulties during his short reign—though in his case it was due not so much to real insolvency, as to his aversion to touch his hoarded treasure for the normal expenses of his army.

But the Marāthās have a historic advantage of unique importance in the India of to-day. Their near ancestors had faced death in a hundred battle-fields, had led armies and debated in the chamber of diplomacy, had managed the finances of kingdoms and grappled with the problems of empire; they had helped to make Indian history in the immediate and not yet forgotten past. The memory of these things is a priceless asset to their race. In the combination of intellectual keenness, patient industry, simplicity of life, devotion to the nobler ideals of man, in the courage necessary for translating thought into deed, in the spirit of sacrifice, grit of character, and a diffused sense of democratic equality, the vast middle class of modern Mahārāshtra have no superior and hardly any equal among the other races of India. Would that they possessed also the organizing skill, the spirit of team work, the tact in the management of instruments and colleagues, the foresight, and the saving common sense of the Anglo-Saxon race!

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CHAPTER II.

BOYHOOD AND YOUTH, 1627-1656.

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§1. *Shivaji's ancestors.*

The Bhonslé clan of the Maratha caste was made up of many families, scattered over various places in Western India. Unlike a Rajput or Scottish clan, they had no union under a common and generally-recognized chieftain, nor even social solidarity, but merely bore the same surname and married into other Maratha families. Agriculture was their original occupation, as with most members of the Maratha caste. But the break up of the large monarchies of Western India, (namely, the Bahmani at the end of the 15th century and the Nizam Shahi at the beginning of the 17th) opened to the ablest men among them the chance of rising to military power and lordship over land. The history of Shivaji's family illustrates this transformation of the tiller of the soil by successive stages into the bandit, the captain of mercenaries, the feudal baron, and the sovereign ruler, which was so frequent in India during the troubled times that followed the downfall of central powers like the Bahmani or the Delhi empire and ended only with the establishment of British paramountcy and British peace.

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In the middle of the 16th century, a Bhonslé named Bābāji was living peacefully on the humble gains of agriculture and the dues of his office as headman (*patil*) of the villages of Hingani Beradi and Diwalgāon in the Punā district (Patas sub-division,) which was then under the Nizām Shah of Ahmadnagar. His two sons, Māloji and Vitoji, happened to disagree with the other people of the place and migrated with their wives to the village of Verul (Ellorā) at the foot of the Daulatābād hills. The prospects of agriculture here were unpromising and the two brothers went in search of employment to Jādav Rao of Sindhkher, a Nizām Shahi noble, and entered his service as common soldiers (*bārgirs.*) The tradition runs that at a festive gathering in his house, Jādav Rao praised the beauty of Māloji's little boy Shāhji and his own daughter Jijā Bāi, drew them together on his knees, and cried out in admiration that they would form an excellent match, and that Māloji immediately stood up and called upon the other guests to witness that his master had betrothed his daughter to his son,—for which presumptuous claim he was forthwith dismissed by Jādav Rao.

So, the two brothers came back to their home at Ellorā and lived there by agriculture for the next few years. One night Māloji, while watching his crops in the field, noticed a big snake coming out of a hole, and following the popular belief that snakes guard buried treasure he dug the place up and discovered seven pots full of gold coins underground. Here at last were the means of gratifying their ambition. Lodging the treasure with an honest banker named Pundé at Chamārgundā, they bought horses, saddles, arms and tents and equipped a force of one thousand troopers, at whose head they offered their swords to any master that would pay them. Joining a leader of banditti named Nimbālkar (of Phaltan), they soon gained so much importance and power that the decadent Nizām-Shāhi Government was glad to enrol them among its captains. This happened at the beginning of the 17th century, when

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Akbar's conquest of the capital Ahmadnagar had thrown that monarchy into confusion and disruption, which raised the value of able mercenary bands and offered unlimited opportunities of advancement to their captains. Jādav Rao had no objection now to giving his daughter in marriage to the son of the newly-exalted Bhonslé.

Māloji wisely spent a portion of his treasure trove in building temples, giving alms to Brahmans, and excavating a large tank on the arid Shambhu Mahādev hill, in the Sātārā district, which was a great boon to the tens of thousands of pilgrims who annually flocked to that shrine. These pious investments of his money brought him a good return by raising him immensely in social esteem. When he died, the family contingent of troops,—now greatly increased in number from the original thousand men,—was commanded in the Nizām Shāhi service by his younger brother Vitoji, and after Vitoji's death (probably in 1623), by Shāhji, the eldest son of Māloji.*

§2. *The Rise of Shāhji Bhonslé, 1625-36.*

Shāhji's name first occurs in recorded history in 1628, two years after the death of Malik Ambar, when he was sent forth by Fath Khan, the son and successor of that Nizām Shāhi *wazir*, to raid East Khandesh in the rear of a Mughal invading force. Soon afterwards, the plots of the Nizām Shāh and his new wazir against each other, the imprisonment of Fath Khan by his king (*c.* April 1630), the murder of Lakhji Jādav Rao at Court (*c.* 1630), the treacherous surrender of the Mughal portion of Ahmadnagar territory by the viceroy Khan-i-Jahān Lodi, (1627), a fresh Mughal invasion of the country (1628), and the Bijapuri efforts to

* The accounts of the family given in the Persian histories of Delhi and Bijapur have been summarized in my book *The House of Shivaji*. The exaggerations of Marathi Court-poets, in Sanskrit, have been rejected. Of the eight sons of Vitoji (the younger brother of Maloji I.) four are found in the Mughal service at the beginning of Shah Jahan's reign, *viz.*, Kheloji Pārsuji, Māloji II and Mambāji. [Abdul Hamid, i.A.]

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seize as much of the wrecks of the Ahmadnagar kingdom as possible,—all combined to throw the Nizām Shāhi Government into unspeakable weakness and confusion. This was a golden opportunity for an able enterprising and ambitious man like Shāhji. After the murder of his father-in-law Jādav Rao, he left the Nizām Shah, got a band of men together, and tried to seize the country from Junnar to Ahmadnagar, creating a great disturbance at that ill-defined and ill-guarded meeting point of three kingdoms. Then he entered the Mughal service with his eldest son and younger brother (end of 1630), but deserted after a year and a half (June 1632) and went over to the service of the Ādil Shah of Bijapur, where he completely fascinated Murāri Jagadev, the right-hand man of the wazir Khawās Khan.

The murder of Burhān Nizām Shah (*c.* Feb. 1632) by his wazir Fath Khan and the Mughal capture of Daulatabad (the new capital) with his successor Husain Nizām Shah in it (17th June 1633), were followed by the final dismemberment of the once glorious Ahmadnagar kingdom. Its local governors declared their independence. Shāhji now seized all the Nizām-shahi territory from Punā and Chākan to the environs of Ahmadnagar and Nāsik, and plundered right and left. With Bijapuri assistance he crowned a boy Nizām Shah in Premgarh (renamed Shāhgarh) in August 1633, and carried on the government in the name of this puppet for three years,—seizing districts (including North Konkan), enlisting soldiers (especially 12,000 Nizām-Shahi troopers who had been disbanded after the fall of Daulatabad), and raiding the country as far as Bidar and Daulatabad, to the great harassment of the Mughals. In 1634 we find him possessed of one-fourth of the total territory of the old Nizām-Shahi kingdom (with an annual revenue of 20 lakhs of *hun*), and in concert with the Bijapuris thwarting the Mughal siege of Parenda.

But the imperialists launched vast forces against him in February 1636. The campaign, after much hard riding and fighting, ended next October in the completest defeat

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of Shahji, who was compelled to surrender to the victors his puppet Nizām Shah and seven of his forts, enter Bijapur service, and transfer his irrepressible ambition and disturbing activity to regions far away from Mahārāshtra proper. He next carved out a vast estate for himself on the Mysore plateau and the Eastern Karnātak and rose to be the foremost Hindu vassal of Adil Shah. [See my *House of Shivaji* for his full life.]

§3. *Shivaji's birth and infancy.*

Shahji Bhonsle's first wife Jijā Bāi bore him two sons, Shambhuji and Shivāji. As the elder one worked far away from Mahārāshtra and died in early youth, this history is not concerned with him. Shivāji, their second son, was born in the hill-fort of Shivner, which towers over the city of Junnar, in the extreme north of the Punā district. His mother had prayed to the local goddess, Shivāi Devi, for the good of her expected child, and she therefore named him after that deity.

Of the exact date of his birth* there is no reliable contemporary record. Even his courtier, Krishnāji Anant Sabhāsad, writing in 1697, is silent on the point.

Of the two different dates of his birth given by two different groups of writers, I am inclined to prefer Monday, 10th April 1627.

The stories told in the later Marathi *bakhars* about the history of his parents during the year preceding his birth and the events of his life up to the age of twenty, are in many points contrary to authentic history, and in others improbable, or at all events unsupported by any evidence.

* The question of the true date of Shivāji's birth has been fully and fairly discussed by V. S. Wākaskar in his edition of the *91 Qalmi Bakhar*, pp. 27-28 *n*, and V. K. Rājwādé and B. G. Tilak in *Shiva-charitrapradip* (reprint). They accept the month and year April 1627, while those who pin their faith to the mutually-inconsistent *Jedhe Shakāvali* and *Suryavamsham* hold it to be 19 March 1630. See also *Shivaji Souvenir* (ed. G. S. Sardesai), Marathi section ; ch. 5.

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We know from the contemporary Persian histories that during much of the period from 1630 to 1636 Shahji led a roving life, subject to frequent contests with diverse enemies and change of residence. Under these circumstances, he would naturally have left his wife and infant son for safety in a stronghold like Shivner. But in reality they seem to have both fallen under his neglect. It is a fair inference from the known facts that by the year 1630 or thereabout Jijā Bai lost her husband's love, probably with the loss of her youth, and Shahji forsook her and her little son Shivaji and took a younger and more beautiful wife, Tukā Bai Mohité, on whom and whose son Vyānkoji he henceforth lavished his society and all his gains.

It is expressly stated in the contemporary Persian history *Pādishāhnāmah* (i. B. 150) that in March 1636 Shahji's family was living at Shivner. As Shivner was one of the seven forts ceded by Shahji to the Mughals in the terms of the treaty of October 1636, Shivaji could not have continued to live in that fort after the end of that year. Shahji himself immediately after his defeat went to Bijapur and entering the Ādil Shahi service was sent on campaign further south. He secured from that Government a grant of the Punā district from Chākan to Indāpur and Shirwal as his jāgir, and appointed Dādāji Kond-dev to administer the tract, telling him, "My wife Jijā Bāi is living in the fort of Shivner and has brought forth a son named Shivaji. Bring her and her son away and keep them in your charge [at Punā] and supply them with money for their necessary expenses."

Thus Shivaji took up his residence at Punā, probably at the end of 1637. He was, therefore, practically a stranger to his father for several years after his birth (if we leave out of our account Shahji's visits to Shivner in the intervals of his campaigns), and he became totally so after this removal to Punā.*

* About 1641 Jija Bai and Shivaji in the company of Dadaji paid a visit to Shahji at Bangalore, but were sent back to Punā with the same guardian. (Sabh. 3-4).

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Her husband's neglect drove the mind of Jija Bai inwards and deepened her natural religious spirit, which she imparted to her son. Shiva grew up in solitude, a mateless child, without brother, sister or father. The isolation of their life drew mother and son very close together and intensified his love for her till it became almost an adoration for a deity. From a very early age, he was naturally thrown on his own resources, and learnt to carry out his own ideas unaided, and to take the initiative without any sense of subordination or responsibility to some higher authority. In the condition of the homes of their boyhood, their early life and training, and the development of their character,—even as in the steps by which they mounted to the throne,—the forsaken son of Shahji Bhonsle was the exact parallel of the forsaken son of Hasan Sur. Shivaji and Sher Shah were not only alike in character and genius, but also grew up amidst like circumstances.

§4. *My reconstruction of the story of Shivaji's early life.*

In the absolute want of any contemporary evidence, and even of later records of a reliable character, it is impossible now to construct a narrative of Shivaji's early life with any degree of certainty as to dates and events. But by drawing inferences from certain known facts of the time and balancing probabilities against one another, I offer the following account as a fair approximation to truth.

When in October 1636 Shāhji was expelled from Mahārāshtra, he had to go to a distant scene, but not exactly to begin life afresh at the age of forty. He had rights to a medium-sized estate, earned by his forefathers and himself in the Punā district, and the command of a small but very efficient and devoted army and civil service, ready to follow him anywhere. He first of all secured from Ādil Shah (the now recognised heir of the extinct Nizām Shah) a formal confirmation of the grant of the Punā jāgir, (dated 25 February 1637). As he was not permitted to live there

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himself, he invited an exceptionally competent and honest manager, Dādāji Kond-dev, (a former *kulkarni* of Malthan) to administer his Punā jāgir for him, and also to bring his neglected wife Jijā Bāi and her son Shivāji away from their refuge in Shivner to Punā and maintain them there.

Punā had been a desolate place for several years past, with only a scanty pauperised migratory population and a few straw huts. Shahji's new land-steward probably *at first* resided in Khédé-bāré village, where he laid out a new hamlet, named Shivāpur, and gardens ; and here he lodged Jijā Bāi and her son, while a suitable house for them (the Lāl Mahal) and administrative offices were being built at Punā, and the country round was being reclaimed to cultivation by his far-sighted and tactful policy.

Thus Shivaji first came to Punā not earlier than 1638 ; and there is no evidence that the Punā jāgir of Shāhji was quite so early assigned to Shivāji as his heritage. The surviving papers prove that he and his mother were to get their subsistence allowance from this estate, but not *as yet* to exercise any authority over it,—for this latter purpose Dādāji was directly under Shāhji and officially *his* agent with *full* power (*mutāliq*).

There is no record of Shāhji's doings and status under the Bijapuri Government during 1637 and 1638. It was only in October 1638, when Ādil Shah began a series of annual invasions of Karnātak (Mysore and the East Coast) that Shāhji got the chance of his *second* rise, under his appreciative commander, Randaula Khan (now created Rustam-i-Zamān.) In the campaign of 1639, Bangalore was gained by the Bijapuris and it was granted to Shāhji to form the capital of his new jāgir. It took him some months to set up his establishments here ; but now (early in 1640) Shāhji after long wanderings since 1636, had at last found a *new home*.

Shivaji was then full twelve years old, past the usual age for the marriage of a Maratha noble's son, and Jijā Bāi wrote urging her husband to marry Shivā and make a

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regular provision for him worthy of a first-grade nobleman's son; he could not be left to vegetate on a mere "food allowance" like an illegitimate child. So, the mother and the son were called up to Bangalore (*not* to Bijapur as imagined by nineteenth century romancists misnamed *bakharkars*), in 1640 or 1641. A man with knowledge of the world can easily imagine the stormy scene in the harem of Shāhji, as the rival wives faced each other and fought for their respective sons.

Jijā Bāi rightly argued that all the new wealth and power of the lord of Bangalore would pass on the Tukā Bāi Mohité's son Vyānkoji, who lived with Shāhji, while her own son Shivāji had got nothing from his father; out of sight, out of mind. (Her elder boy Shambhuji lived with his father apart from his mother, and she gained nothing from him.)

A sensible compromise was made. The Punā jāgir (yielding 40,000 *hun* or about a lakh and a half of rupees annually, on paper), was *now* formally bestowed on Shivaji as Shāhji's agent while he lived, and as full owner after his death. At this time Shivaji was married at Bangalore to Sai Bāi Nimbālkar, and sent back to Punā with a set of four heads of the administrative departments to be created under him, though Dādāji Kond-dev, as the guardian of the minor, still controlled him. From this time Dādāji presided over the Punā "Cabinet" and Public Courts (*mahazar*) along with Shivāji and Jijā Bāi, (and latterly Shivā only). This new administrative arrangement came into operation in 1642 when Shivaji had just reached his 16th year. He was fully in the saddle as the master of the Punā jāgir only after Dādāji's death in 1647. Thereafter his career is well-known, though some of the dates are doubtful.

§5. *Condition of the Punā jāgir, 1637.*

Shahji's jāgir of Punā and Supā, formerly held under Nizām Shah and henceforth under Ādil Shah, included the

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Punā district from Chākan to Indāpur, Supā, Shirwal and the frontier of Wāi, or a tract bounded on the west by the Bhimā, and on the south by the Nirā river.

The Punā district that Dādāji took over was in a sadly ruined condition. Six years of warfare had desolated the land, and the work of the invading soldiery had been completed after their departure by robber chiefs who tried to profit by the anarchy. Indeed, the province had so recently passed from the Nizām-shahi ownership to that of Bijapur that the authority of the new Government had not yet taken root there. It was only the rule of a strong jāgirdār that could have given peace and prosperity to the district; but during the years 1630-1636 Shahji had been forced to lead a life of constant movement, danger and warfare. The Punā and Thānā districts at the extreme north-western corner of the kingdom of Bijapur, therefore, formed a No man's Land, with none to administer and defend them.

In 1630 Shahji had plundered and seized the Nizām-Shahi country round Punā. Soon afterwards a Bijapuri army had looted and burnt Punā, Indapur and other villages of Shahji and "totally desolated them". Next he had recovered possession of them by force. Then had followed the famine of 1630-1631, the most terrible in the sad history of the Deccan. The Junnar or North Punā tract was the scene of repeated Mughal invasions in 1634-'36. Khan-i-Zamān in the course of his campaign against Shahji (July—October 1636) penetrated to Punā, but there was probably nothing left for him to plunder or burn there. During the dissolution of the Ahmadnagar sultanate, a revenue accountant (*deshpāndé*) named Moro Tandev Honap, "a proud rebel, well acquainted with the country round the Bhimā, had raised a tumult and seized the neighbourhood of Punā. All these disorders had devastated the whole kingdom from Ahmadnagar to the boundary of Wāi and Shirwal".

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The desolation caused by man preying on his species favoured the growth of wild beasts. The Punā district, especially the Sahyādri hill-side forming its western border, was now infested by large numbers of wolves, which thinned the population and hindered cultivation. Dādāji Kond-dev offered rewards to the hillmen for killing the wolves and thus cleared the whole tract of these pests in a short time. He conciliated the hillmen and induced them to settle in the valleys and extend cultivation by offering very liberal terms. "Leases were granted to the effect that the new tenants should pay a rent of only one-twelfth of an anna per *bighā* in the first year, one-fourth of an anna in the second, half an anna in the third, three-fourths of an anna in the fourth, four annas in the fifth, eight annas in the sixth, one rupee in the 7th year, and at the rate of Malik Ambar's land settlement from the 8th year onwards. Thus the whole country was brought under tillage."* When Dādāji took charge of the Punā jāgir, its revenue on paper was only 40,000 *hun*, or Rs. 1,40,000, according to the current rate of exchange. But only a fraction of this amount was actually collected.

The memory of his able and beneficent administration was long preserved, and a later chronicle tells us, "He did such strict justice that the very name of robbers and usurpers disappeared from the district." An anecdote illustrates his punctilious sense of justice: "He planted a garden of fruit trees, named it after Shahji, and gave strict orders that if any one plucked even a leaf from the trees, he would be punished. One day Dādāji with his own hand plucked a mango from a tree. For this offence he was about

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* *91 Q. B.* sec. 21. The word *rukā* of the Marathi original which was mistaken for *rupee* by the translator of this *Bakhar* into Persian, really means one-twelfth part of an anna, or the British Indian copper pie. The Ādil Shahi *bighā* (which I suppose to have prevailed in Punā in 1637) was equal to 4383 sq. yards, or just a little over nine-tenths of an English acre (=4840 sq. yd.) Wilson's *Glossary*, 85. I have here corrected my earlier editions.

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to cut off the hand when the other people prevented him. To show his respect for the rules, however, he wore an iron chain round his neck", or according to another account, "kept the offending arm confined in a long glove!"*

§6. *Shivaji's Education.*

On the subject of Shivaji's education, Sabhasad is silent. The *91 Qalmi Bakhar,* 21, tells us that "Dādāji trained Shivaji and appointed an excellent teacher for him. In a short time Shiva became skilled in wrestling, riding and other accomplishments". The weight of evidence is in favour of the view that Shivaji was unlettered, like three other heroes of mediæval India,—Akbar, Haidar Ali, and Ranjit Singh. The many Europeans who visited him never saw him write anything; when they presented any petition to him the Rajah always passed it on to his ministers to be read to him. No piece of writing in his own hand is known to exist.

But though he may not have been able to read books, he certainly mastered the contents of the two great Hindu epics by listening to recitations and story-tellings. The noble examples of doing and suffering, of action and sacrifice, of military skill and statecraft, which the stories of Rāma and the Pāndavas afford, the political lessons and moral maxims with which these epics are filled, deeply impressed his young mind. He loved to distraction religious readings and songs (*kirtan*) and sought the society of Hindu and Muslim saints wherever he went. The want of book-learning, therefore, did not leave his mind a dull and sterile soil, nor impair his efficiency as a man of action in a world that was mediæval.

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* Shahji's Punā jāgir, extent, 91 *Q. B.* sec. 20; its revenue, *Sabhasad,* 104. Moro Tandev Honap punished, *91 Q. B.* 20; re-employed in revenue collection by Dādāji, *ibid.* 21. How Dadaji promoted cultivation, *ibid.* 21. Dadaji's character and reputation, *ibid.* 21 and 24. Previous desolation of Punā, *ibid.* 20, *Basātin S.* 287, *Abd. Ham.* i. A. 362.

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§7. *The Mavals occupied.*

The western belt of the Punā district, running along the Western Ghāts for a length of 90 miles and a breadth of 12 to 24 miles, is known as *Māval* or the Sunset Land. "It is extremely rugged, a series of table-lands cut on every side by deep winding valleys. . . . . From the valleys, hills of various heights and forms rise, terrace above terrace, with steep sides often strewn with black basalt boulders. . . . . Where the trees have been spared, they clothe the hill-sides with a dense growth mixed with almost impassable brush-wood. Here and there are patches of ancient evergreen forests. . . . The people in the northern valleys are Kolis and in the southern valleys Marathas. They have a strong strain of hill-blood and are dark, wiry and sallow. . . . The climate is dry and invigorating, the air is lighter, and the heat less oppressive than in most parts of Western or Southern India." (*Bom. Gaz.* xviii. pt. I, pp. 2, 13, 15.)

In popular speech, the valleys into which this western belt is divided are collectively known as the *twelve Māvals,* though their names end with the words *ner* and *khoré* as well as *māval,* and their number exceeds twelve. A Marathi ballad speaks of 12 Māvals under Junnar and twelve others under Punā.

The Māval country is a purely agricultural region with no city and little trade. Its common people differed from the Marathas and Kunbis of the plains only by being stronger built, hardier, simpler, and less enervated by luxury or vice. Their social organization was neither tribal nor patriarchal (as with the hillmen of Scotland and Rajputana), but that of the ancient village community of the Deccan, in which each village formed a miniature self-complete republic of various castes and professions. Every sub-division of the province was under a *deshmukh,* who might be called a landed baron or, more correctly, the king's local agent. He took from the peasants through the head-men (*patils*) of the different villages the royal revenue and

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his own remuneration in the form of a percentage on it, besides enjoying the produce of certain *de mesne* villages (or fields) which he owned free of rent.

These petty chieftains (*deshmukhs*) were mostly Marathas or members of the same caste as Shivaji. They entrusted the management of their affairs to Brahman stewards (*kārbhāris*) and the accounts and correspondence work to clerks of the Kāyastha (Prabhu) caste, as elsewhere in Maharashtra. Each Māval *deshmukh* had to maintain an armed force, almost entirely recruited from his tenants, for the defence of his charge against the encroachments of his neighbours and the incursions of robber bands. In addition, he was often requested by his sovereign to raise troops for the royal service in times of need, and for this extra duty he was rewarded with cash bounties and grants of fresh villages.

Thus, the rise of Shivaji opened a wide field of employment all over that region to the Māvlé landlords and their sturdy tenantry as instruments of his raids and conquests, and brought them wealth, power and honour far beyond what the plough could have yielded them at home. Their ambition became inseparably linked with his, and the tie was strengthened by Shivaji's frequent tours through this tract and good comraderie with its people,—till the Māvlés came to regard him almost as their Little Corporal, for whom they would do and dare to the point of death. The Māval country was the cradle of Shivaji's power and the Māvlés formed the backbone of his army.

Dādāji established complete mastery over the *Māvals* adjacent to the Punā district. The local chiefs (*deshmukhs*) were mostly won over by tactful handling and rewards. Those who defied his authority were attacked and forced to submit.* Thus peace and prosperity were established in

* Raj. xv. 316 and 383 records the story of one of his reverses: "Dadaji Kond-dev came to Shivapur. Among the 12 Mavals, Krishnaji Nayak Bandal, the deshmukh of Hirdas Maval, had seized another man's lands and refused to give them up. Dadaji marched against him, but

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that region and it became a source of wealth and strength to the owner of Punā, instead of being an unprofitable and even dangerous possession. From this region Shivaji drew his best soldiers, his earliest comrades, and his most devoted followers. Yesāji Kank and Bāji Pāsalkar were *Māvlé* chieftains of his own age; they gathered round him very early and were enrolled as his first captains. So, also, were Tānāji Malusaré and his brother Suryāji. Shivaji's earliest adherents were two Māvlé deshmukhs, Jédhé Nāyak of Kāri and Bāndal Nāyak of Hirdas Māval. They served him with such devotion that a popular ballad says, "As Angad and Hanumant were to Rāmchandra, so were Jédhé and Bāndal to Shivā." Among others who joined his banners were the Silimbakar Nāyaks of Gunjan Māval (title Haibat Rao) and the Maral deshmukhs of Kānad-khoré (title Jhujhār Rāo).

§8. *Social atmosphere in which young Shivaji worked.*

The social background on which Shivaji first worked, and which made his rise to kingship possible and easy, can be clearly pictured from the thousands of family papers of the village headmen of Maharashtra which have been now printed. The Punā district was covered with hundreds of petty masters, each holding a certain village by right or usurpation, and then fighting his neighbouring chieftains or robbing the peasantry around. In that dissolution of civil administration and social order which marked the twilight before the emergence of Shivaji as an independent king,—no justice could be had, and no legal right enforced by normal peaceful agency, because such agencies had perished. The strong alone could hold their own, but they did not stop with self-defence and usually turned into usurpers of other people's rights.

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was defeated and forced to retreat to Shivapur. He then sent Kanhoji Nayak Jedhe to persuade Krishnaji and other Maval deshmukhs to come for an interview." The *Jedhe Karina* gives an inner view of the state of affairs in one part of this tract. *Sabhasad*, p. 4.

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On this scene, first Dādāji on a limited scale and then Shivaji in a steadily expanding degree, appeared as the honest judge and strong magistrate. These two alone could be counted upon to give impartial legal decisions, after following the immemorial custom of consulting a fact-finding jury (*mahazar*) of local villagers, when disputes about the partition (*bāntni*) of ancestral landed property or right to official fees as hereditary revenue-collecting agents or servants of the village community, arose between one family and another, or between brothers and cousins in the same family.

In the numberless villages of Maharashtra the possession of land or of a hereditary office in the village administration (with its emoluments fixed by custom), was the highest ambition, and often the sole means of livelihood, of most higher class Maratha families; it was their pride, and their only means of rising in social esteem; and the striving to achieve it called forth all the best energies of a man. The family estate called *watan* (or home), even when limited to a single village, had an indescribable sacredness in the eyes of the Marathas. Shāhu Chhatrapati, when sending forth his conquering generals north and south, east and west into the Mughal empire, held his ancestral *deshmukhi* of Punā (*i.e.*, revenue-collectorship plus magistrate's fees of a single district) as dearer to him than the *chauth* of Malwa or Gujrat. Mahadji Sindhia, when acting as the Delhi Padishah's keeper and the maker of his wazirs, clung passionately to his hereditary patel-ship of the petty village of Jāmbgāon.

For their *watan* the Maratha deshmukh or patil's sons were ready to do and die,—and also to commit any crime. In each generation, with the growth of families it became necessary to split up this right to the village headman's lands and dues between brothers or cousins, (*nibād*). Such law-suits were fairly decided by Dādāji and Shivaji, and they were the only governors who had the will and the military strength to enforce their awards by crushing out

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defeated suitors when they tried to disburb the legitimate heir's possession.

Thus Shivaji came to supply a country-wide social need, and his successful rise was due to the moral support which he gained from the public around him. As the fame of his justice, firmness, and stand for the weak was noised abroad from village to village in Maharashtra, more and more people looked up to him as their protector and longed to come under his rule. His dominion spread first of all through the conquest of hearts which the honest and strong administrator alone can achieve among a simple rustic population. And then came his appeal to their individual ambition by providing them with undreamt of opportunities of advancement from the status of common soldiers to that of barons, under his banners. In the end, the corporate spirit of the Marathas was kindled and sublimated; they gloried in the evident fact that they were a nation at last rousing itself like a strong man after a long and painful sleep under Muslim tyranny, or like "an eagle mewing its mighty youth". Shivaji succeeded because he was his people's hero as king.

It was only a "great king" with a compact far-stretching dominion, a body of organised and able civil administrators under his watchful control, and an army strong enough to crush opposition, who could give that security to property and peace in rural society for which every man in Maharashtra was sighing in vain during the agony of the expansion of the rival Muhammadan sultanates of the Deccan or the still greater agony of the dissolution of government during their dying years. That king was Shivaji.

This high praise, however, is due to the full-blown Shivaji, but the hero in the bud was of no such immaculate character. During Dādāji Kond-dev's life time, he was being a little initiated in administrative work, but was still in his teens, a lad too young and too little charged with responsibility to take a serious view of his future position. The

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Robin Hood type of life fascinated his youthful heart. When he found time hanging heavy on his hands, he loved to roam about in the country round with young Māvlé chiefs of his own age, and now and then levy forced contribution by raiding some petty village outside his own estate or to 'hold up' some Government revenue officer in transit,—which he considered fair game. But there is no contemporary evidence that he robbed innocent travellers on the highway. The total disappearance of law and order in that region with the extinction of the Ahmadnagar dynasty, tempted daring souls to undertake such adventures ; it was so easy and safe. We can well believe the story of his servants who wrote his earliest biography, that these activities of Shivaji moved his guardian Dādāji to grief and condemnation,—probably not so much on account of their illegal character, as for their being beneath the dignity of a first-grade nobleman's son and heir. (*91 Q.B.* sec. 24.)

§9. *Shivaji's choice of a career.*

With his Māvlés young Shivaji wandered over the hills and forests of the Sahyādri range, and along the mazes of the river valleys, thus hardening himself to a life of privation and strenuous exertion, as well as getting an intimate knowledge of the country and its people. During his residence at Punā his plastic mind was profoundly influenced by the readings from the Hindu epics and sacred books given by his guardian and other Brahmans, and still more by the teaching of his mother. The deeply religious, almost ascetic, life that Jijā Bāi led amidst neglect and solitude imparted by its example, even more than by her precepts, a stoical earnestness mingled with religious fervour to the character of Shivā. He began to love independence and loathe a life of servile luxury in the pay of some Muslim king. It is, however, extremely doubtful if at this time he conceived any design of freeing the Hindus in general from the insults and outrages to which they were

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often subjected by the dominant Muslim sect.* An independent sovereignty for himself he certainly coveted; but he never posed as the liberator of the Hindus all over the country, at all events not till long afterwards.

The inconstancy, intrigue and bloodshed which stained the Court of Bijapur in those days foreboded for it a downfall like that of Ahmadnagar. Mughal service was a no better alternative to Shivaji. The imperialists had killed Kheloji Bhonslé, his uncle, and their superior resources and organization made it unlikely for the Hindus of the Deccan to enjoy greater toleration or power under them than under the weaker and smaller sultanates close at hand. Moreover, to the Deccanis, both Hindu and Muhammadan, Delhi was a far off city, with an alien speech and an alien ruling race, who would pitilessly discard their southern instruments after service had been taken from them. A career of independence was no doubt risky to Shivaji, but it had undreamt of advantages to compensate for the risks, if only he could succeed.

Dādāji died at a great age, on 7th March 1647 and Shivaji became his own master at the age of twenty.

As heir to the regent of the last Ahmadnagar Sultān, Shivaji felt that he had the best right to hold what Shāhji had held in 1634 in agreement with the Bijapuri Government. In that year the Nizām Shāhi kingdom lay partitioned thus: Out of its total territory yielding a revenue of 84 lakhs of hun, the Mughals had seized 21 lakhs worth, and Ādil Shah 20¼ lakhs worth (besides Sholāpur and Ausā, worth 7 and one lakhs respectively, held by two of his independent nobles), while Shāhji held 20¾ lakhs worth. Shāhji's possessions then included Junnar (three lakhs of hun), Shāhgarh (one lakh), Nāsik Trimbak (one lakh), Chākan (one lakh), Chamārgondā (75,000), nearly three-fourths of Konkan (eleven lakhs), and minor places (3 lakhs),

* *Basātin-us-Salātin*, 350—355, frankly describes in detail how the Hindus were depressed as a deliberate policy of the State of Bijapur in the palmy days of Muhammad Ādil Shah.

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but *not* Punā (75,000), nor Indāpur (50,000), nor Nilang (one lakh), which then lay in Ādil Shah's share. Of Konkan about a quarter yielding three lakhs of hun and including Chaul, had been ceded by Shāhji to Ādil Shah. (*Diary* of the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa, recording the despatches of his Brahman spy in Bijapur. Pissurlencar's *Antigualhas,* vol. 1, fasc. 1, p. 52).

But two years later, the usurper from the north had coerced Ādil Shah and dictated a new partition treaty totally robbing Shāhji of his dominions and sharing them with the Bijapur Sultan. The sword alone supported this arbitrary award, and with the sword Shivaji decided to undo it.

Shivaji felt that he had as much legal right to seize the floating wreckage of the extinct Ahmadnagar kingdom and create an independent national State in his homeland as Ādil Shah had. Or rather more ; because his father had been the regent of the last Nizām Shah and reviver of his Government, while the Ādil Shahs had been the rivals and enemies of the Nizām Shāhi Sultāns throughout their history. Against whom can the young Shivaji be called a *rebel?* Not certainly against the ghost of a Nizām Shah now dead for ten years. Nor against the Bijapuri Sultan who was an intruder by force in Mahārāshtra.

§10. *Shivaji's early conquest of forts.*

The death of Dādāji Kond-dev found Shivā ready for his task. He had already been trained in martial exercises and civil administration ; he had familiarized himself with the troops of his father's western jāgir and the people he would have to govern. Initiative and power of command had been freely developed in him without check or interference from his guardian. Administrative orders had in some cases been issued in his name, as his father's representative. Shivaji had also taken part, with his mother or

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his guardian, in some judicial investigations and public decisions of legal disputes (*mahazar*).

The band of officers already gathered round him were men of tried ability and devotion to him. Shyāmrāj Nilkanth Ranjhékar was the Chancellor (*peshwā*); Bālkrishna Hanumanté was Accountant-General (*majmuādār*); Sonāji Pant was secretary (*dabir*), and Raghunāth Ballāl Kordé was paymaster (*sabnis*). These four officers had been sent to Punā by Shāhji about 1642. To them Shivaji now added Tukoji Chor Maratha as Master of the Horse (*sar-in-naubat*) and Nārāyan Pant as divisional paymaster. (Sabh. 3 and 4 : *91 Q.* sec. 24.)

The year 1646 marks a crisis in the history of Bijapur. The king fell seriously ill, and for some time his life was despaired of. Though he lingered on for ten years more, these years were by popular belief held to be a portion of the life of the saint Shāh Hāshim Uluvi, given away by that holy man to the king. During this time no serious business was attended to by Muhammad 'Ādil Shah. The expansion of territory in the Karnātak went on under some of the nobles, but at the capital the king was inert, and the administration fell into the hands of the queen Bāri Sāhibā. The official history of Bijapur is significantly silent about Muhammad 'Ādil Shah's doings from 1646 to his death in 1656. (*B.S.* 312.)

This was Shivaji's opportunity. Even before the death of Dādāji, he had begun his annexations. About 1646 he had taken Tornā fort from its Bijapuri commandant by some cunning device without fighting. Here he found Government treasure amounting to 2 *lakhs of hun*. The captured fort was newly named Prachandgarh, a name which it soon lost. Five miles east of it, on the crest of the same spur of hills, he built a new fort named Rājgarh and three walled redoubts (*māchi*) on the lower terraces of the hill-side. (Sabh. 6 ; *91 Q.* sec. 29.)

These acts of aggression were reported to Bijapur. But Shivaji secured friends at Court by bribing the ministers,

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and they sided with him against the local jāgirdārs whom he had dispossessed. (K. K. ii. 114.)

After the death of Dādāji Kond-dev it was naturally the aim of Shivaji to bring all parts of Shahji's western jāgir under his own control, so as to form a compact State ruled by one authority. But this was effected gradually and took years to complete, as it was not wise for him then to employ force on all sides.

The fort of Chākan, guarding the road to Punā from the north, had been entrusted by Dādāji Kond-dev to Firangji Narsālā. This officer was induced to profess obedience to Shivaji and was confirmed in his post. The petty officers of the *thānahs* of Bārāmati and Indāpur on the eastern margin of the jāgir, peacefully submitted to Shiva's authority. The fort of Kondānā, 11 miles south-west of Punā, was next secured by bribing its Ādil-Shāhi governor.*

§11. *Adil Shah imprisons Shahji, 1648.*

Shivaji's first small beginnings of territorial expansion were suddenly checked about the middle of 1648 by alarming news from the Karnātak. There on 25th July his father was arrested and all his property and contingent attached by the Bijapuri commander-in-chief, Mustafa Khan, then investing Jinji in the South Arcot district.

Zahur, son of Zahuri, in his *Muhammad-nāmah* written by order of Muhammad Ādil Shah, gives the following earliest and most correct account of the incident:— "When the siege of Jinji was protracted and fighting continued long, the cunning Shahji sent an agent to Nawab Mustafa Khan begging leave to go to his own country and

* *91 Q.* sec. 29. Sabh. 4-5. The dates of the acquisition of Chākan and Kondānā are not known. The *Shivāpur Deshpāndé Bahi* gives the year 1647 for the latter event, and names Bāpuji Pant as the agent who effected the transfer to Shivaji; but the *Jedhé S.*, from which most part of it is copied, is silent on this point. The year 1647 is indicated by *Muhammadnāmah*.

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give repose to his troops. The Nawab replied that to retire then would be equivalent to disturbing [the work of the siege.] Then Shahji sent to say that grain was very dear in the camp, that his soldiers could not bear the privation and labour any longer, and that he would retire to his own country without waiting for permission [from the commander-in-chief.] The Nawab, being convinced that Shahji meant mischief and would show fight, had him arrested with such extreme cleverness and good arrangement that no part of his property was plundered, but the whole was confiscated to Government." [Pp. 371-372.]

A later but very reliable Persian history of Bijapur, *viz., Basātin-us-Salātin,* supplies some additional information:—"Shahji, withdrawing his head from obedience to the Nawab Mustafa Khan, began to oppose him, till at last the Nawab decided to arrest him. One day he made Bāji Rao Ghorparé and Jaswant Rao Āsad Khani get their forces ready and sent them very early in the morning to Shahji's camp. Shahji, having passed the preceding night in mirth and revelry, was still sleeping in bed. As soon as the two Raos arrived and he learnt of their purpose, he in utter bewilderment took horse and galloped away from his house alone. Baji Ghorparé gave chase, caught him, and brought him before the Nawab, who threw him into confinement. His contingent of 3,000 cavalry was dispersed, and his camp was thoroughly looted. . . . Ādil Shah on hearing of it . . . . sent from his Court Āfzal Khan to bring Shahji away and an eunuch to attach his property." [Pp. 325-327.]

Shivaji was in a terrible dilemma. He could only resort to diplomacy for rescuing his father, and diplomacy pointed to only one path as open to a man in his position. The Mughal Emperor was the hereditary enemy of Ādil Shah, and every rebel against Bijapur was sure to gain the Emperor's patronage if he could hold forth the chance of strengthening the imperial cause in the Deccan by the adhesion of his followers. The Mughal Emperor alone was strong enough to intimidate Ādil Shah.

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Shivaji first wrote to Prince Murād Bakhsh,* the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan, entreating him to secure the Emperor's pardon for Shāhji's past conduct and protection for him and his sons in future, and offering to come and join the Mughal service if he was given a written assurance of safety (*qaul.*) To this Murād replied on 14th March 1649, telling him to send a trusty agent first to report his demands. This was evidently done, and Murād after reporting the case to the Emperor and getting his assent, wrote to Shivā on 14th August asking him to come to Court with his father and kinsmen, that he might be created a 5-hazāri, while Shāhji would get back the rank he had once held in the Mughal peerage. Still later, on 31st October, Murād wrote directly to Shahji to inform him that he had received Shivaji's appeal for his father's release and that as he was soon going back to the imperial Court, he would there report the prayers of Shahji to the Emperor and take his orders. He asked the Maratha chief to send his agent to Court to receive the Emperor's *farmān* and assurance of safety, and on his own behalf presented him with a robe of honour. In this letter Shambhuji and other sons of Shahji are spoken of as not yet released.

Shivaji then sent Raghunāth Kordé as his envoy to the Prince to ask for the *deshmukhi* of the Junnar and Ahmadnagar parganas. Murād, on 30th November, 1649, promised to try to secure these rights for him after reaching the Emperor's presence. Shah Jahan never consented to put pressure on Ādil Shah to release Shahji.

Shahji's release was brought about by other means than the Delhi Emperor's intervention. He was kept under detention in the camp before Jinji for six months; and when that fort fell to the Ādil-Shahi army on 28th Decem-

* Shivaji neither wrote nor sent any envoy to Shah Jahān. All his negotiations about his father were conducted with Murād, as the four original Persian letters of Murād in Parasnis's possession show. Rājwadé, viii. 2-3, wrongly represents these letters as coming from Shah Jahān, but he is quite correct in ix, last section. The Emperor never interfered for the release of Shahji.

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ber, he was conveyed to Bijapur in fetters, but with every care, by Afzal Khan, travelling slowly with the elephants and other spoils of Jinji.

Meantime, while Shahji was still under detention in the far off Karnātak, the Ādil-Shahi Government tried to make use of the opportunity and wrest Bangalore and Kondānā from him. Two forces were sent out from Bijapur against these two forts; but the main Ādil Shahi army being still entangled in the far-off Karnātak, only small detachments could be sent from the capital on these expeditions and they were made up of raw levies and half-efficient local militia. The two forts were impregnable and held by two youngmen of extraordinary capacity; and both the attacks were repulsed with heavy loss. Shahji's eldest son, Shambhuji successfully defended Bangalore against Farhād Khan and Tānāji Duré. Another army under Fath Khan with local Maratha helpers marched against Shivaji, who was living in Purandar. Fath Khan occupied Belsar (near the village of Khalad), while his ally Bālāji Haibat Rao advanced and set up his outpost at Shirwal; but Shivaji's general Kāvji attacked and drove the Bijapuris out of Shirwal after slaying their commander. Finally Fath Khan himself marched against Shivaji and arriving at the foot of Purandar attempted an assault, but he was defeated and his army put to flight.

Thus force having failed in both theatres of war, Ādil Shah had no help but to try persuasion for gaining his desires. The captive Shahji, on his arrival at Bijapur, was not cast into prison, but handed over to the care of a brother noble of first eminence, Ahmad Khan (? Mullā Ahmad Navāyat of Kaliān) with instructions to conciliate him by every possible means. Terms were soon settled. Shahji wrote to his two sons to restore Bangalore (along with Kandarpi, 40 miles east of Chittaldurg) and Kondānā to the Bijapuri officers. They obeyed at once, and on 16th May 1649, Shahji was called by Ādil Shah to an audience, invested with a robe of honour and set free with the restora-

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tion of all his estates and dignities. A son and heir had been born to Muhammad Adil Shah on 5th May 1649, and this joyous event was diplomatically used as a plea for the "pardon" of Shahji. (*Muham.* 389-395; *Jédhé Karinā; Surya-Vamsham,* cantos 13-15.)

§12. *Capture of Purandar fort, 1648.*

Mahādji, a Brahman bearing the family title of Nilkanth Rao, was the hereditary *nāyakwār* or headman of the country round the fort of Purandar, 18 miles south-east by south of Punā, under the Bijapuri Government, and enjoyed some rent-free villages there as his official remuneration. In the confusion caused by the extinction of the Nizām-Shahi dynasty and the decay of its successor the Ādil Shahi during Muhammad Ādil Shah's long illness, he asserted his independence, seized the fort whose defences were out of repair and garrison was reduced and starving through the neglect of the Sultan, and then began to levy contributions from the neighbouring villages which did not legally belong to him, or plunder them in case of refusal. When he died, his eldest son Niloji Nilkanth Rao began to administer the family estate.

About June 1648, Shivaji, foreseeing the storm coming upon his own house from the Bijapur Government, wrote to Niloji begging for an asylum for himself and his family during the monsoon season in the village under shelter of the fort. As Shāhji was an old friend of the family, the request was readily granted, and Shivaji cantoned for the rains in the village lying at the foot of Purandar, while his troops found quarters near about. Niloji delegated his youngest brother Shankarāji to look after their honoured guest.

Now, this Niloji was a hard grasping man, who denied his younger brothers, Pilāji and Shankarāji, any share of his power or of the income of their paternal estate. They resented this exclusion from their birthright, and appealed

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to Shivaji to arbitrate and right their wrongs. A friendship sprang up between Shivaji and Shankarāji from their close personal contact, and the latter opened his heart to Shivaji and begged for his help in ousting his eldest brother from the control of the fort, so that the other two brothers might enjoy their patrimony. Shivaji entered into the conspiracy. Through the treacherous contrivance of Shankarāji, he secured from Niloji an invitation to enter the fort with his family and escort and share in the Dewāli festivities, (the Feast of Lamps falling that year on 5th October.) But on the night of the 8th, Shivaji, guided by Shankarāji surprised the sleeping Niloji in his bed-chamber and threw him into chains. His own troops took possession of the fort gates and turned out the ragged retainers of Niloji.*

The two disloyal brothers soon had their reward; on refusing to give up Purandar to their ally, they too were imprisoned. But after a few days all the three brothers accepted their fate and were set free. The village of Chāmli was granted to them in perpetuity for their maintenance, and their descendants still enjoy it. The second brother, Pilāji Nilkanth, was employed by Shivaji in his army in the Konkan expedition and thus given a chance of advancement. Shivaji's Māvlés garrisoned the fort for him, and he settled some families of Rāmusis there, to strengthen his hold. Purandar henceforth became the haven of refuge of the masters of Punā whenever threatened with invasion.

Thus we see how a number of jackals came out of their holes and were grabbing at the dead body of the Ahmad-

* My account is based on a letter printed in *Shiva-Charita Sāhitya*, vol. 3 (letter No. 399), written by Hari Nārāyan Nilkanth Rao, Nāyak of Chāmli, and dated 29 Aug. 1674. It has been closely copied in the Wāqnis-Malkaré *Bakhar* (known as the *91 Qalmi*). From the family records studied by V. L. Bhāvé, it appears that the village of Chāmli was given to Shankarāji, while Niloji was left to inherit the ancestral *inām* village as Nāyakwār. *Sabhasad* (p. 5) briefly tells us—"Nilkanth Rao a Brahman, was the master of the Adil Shahi fort of Purandar. He died. His two sons began to quarrel between themselves. Shivaji went to Purandar for settling the quarrel. Then confining the two brothers, he took the fort for himself and set up his own *thānah* there".

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nagar kingdom, when a tiger appeared on the scene; the few jackals that dared to face him were struck down by his paw, a few fled away to foreign parts, but most others were glad to walk tamely behind his tail; and Shivaji was left in sole possession of the Nizām Shāhi carcase, tossing away a few morsels of it to his faithful followers.

§13. *Conquest of Jāvli and Rāigarh, 1656.*

At the extreme north-western corner of the Sātārā district lies the village of Jāvli, which was then the centre of a fairly large principality including nearly the whole of that district. The sub-division of Jāvli is "throughout hilly and thickly wooded with evergreen trees. . . . The narrow rugged and steep crest of the Sahyādris, rising 4,000 feet or more above sea-level, forms its western wall; and in the valleys the tree growth is luxuriant, forming high forests." (*Bom. Gaz.* xix. 3.) Within a length of 60 miles as many as 8 passes cross the range, two of them being fit for carts and now transporting a large traffic from the Deccan plateau to Mahād in Kolābā and Chiplun in Ratnagiri. There are, besides, countless gorges and foot-tracks leading from Jāvli to Konkan.

A Marātha family named Moré had received a grant of the State of Jāvli from the first Sultan of Bijapur early in the 16th century, and made the claim good by their sword. For eight generations they had conquered the petty chieftains around and amassed a vast treasure by raising forced contributions. They kept 12,000 infantry, mostly sturdy hillmen of the southern Māvals, and succeeded in getting possession of the entire district of Satārā and parts of Konkan. The head of the family bore the hereditary title of Chandra Rao, conferred by a Bijapur king in recognition of the founder's personal strength and courage. The younger branches enjoyed estates scattered through the villages of the district.

The State of Jāvli, by its position, barred the path of

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Shivaji's expansion in the south and south-west. Chandra Rao thwarted Shivaji's policy of drawing the various Māvlé headmen to his side, and tried to form in that locality an anti-Shivaji coalition in concert with the neighbouring Ādil Shahi governor, because the progress of Shivaji in that region would have naturally led to the loss of the Morés' power and independence. In other words, here was the inevitable clash between the newly-born dynamic force of Shivaji's ambition and the older, inefficient and static power of the Morés. Generations of the enjoyment of wealth and authority had turned the last Chandra Rao into a proud, indolent drunkard, whose affairs were left uncared for.

Shivaji told Raghunāth Ballāl Kordé (his *sabnis* or paymaster), "Unless Chandra Rao Moré is killed, the kingdom cannot be gained. None but you can do this deed. I send you to him as my envoy" The Prabhu went to Jāvli with a picked escort of 125 expert swordsmen, on the pretext of carrying some important diplomatic proposals from Shivaji to Chandra Rao. On the first day the envoy held the usual formal conversations. Finding out the ins and outs of the place and learning that Chandra Rao usually lived in a careless unguarded manner, Raghunāth formed his plan of action. The second interview with Chandra Rao was held in a private chamber. Raghunāth talked for some time, and then drew his dagger all of a sudden and stabbed Chandra Rao and his brother Surya Rao. The assassins promptly rushed out of the gate, cut their way through the alarmed and confused guards, beat back the small and hurriedly gathered band of pursuers and gained a chosen place of hiding in the forest.

Shivaji had kept himself ready to follow up his agent's crime. Immediately on hearing of the murder of the Morés, he arrived and assaulted Jāvli (15 Jan. 1656.) The leaderless garrison defended themselves for six hours and were then overcome. Chandra Rao's two sons and entire family fled to Rairi. But his kinsman and manager, Hanumant Rao Moré, rallied the partisans of the house and held a

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neighbouring village in force, menacing Shivaji's new conquest. Shiva found that "unless he murdered Hanumant, the thorn would not be removed from Jāvli." So, he sent to him a Maratha officer of his household named Shambhuji Kāvji with a pretended proposal for the hand of Hanumant Rao's daughter. Hanumant was then stabbed to death at a private interview.

Shivaji himself remained at Jāvli for about six weeks, making arrangements for holding the newly-won kingdom, and then, on 30th March marched to invest Rāiri where the late Chandra Rao Moré's sons Krishnāji and Bāji and many women of the family had taken refuge. Rāiri was then a very lofty and almost inaccessible plateau, without the fortifications with which Shivaji later strengthened it when he named it Rāigarh. The siege was a short one ; want of a leader and exhaustion of provisions forced the young Morés to agree to a surrender through the mediation of two of Shivaji's Māvlé followers, (April 1656). Thus the whole kingdom of Jāvli passed into Shivaji's undisputed possession, and he was free to invade South Konkan with ease or extend his dominion southwards into the Kolhāpur district.

The two Moré boys, the elder of whom (Krishnāji) had assumed the title of Chandra Rao after his father's death, were taken to Punā and kept in confinement. After some months this Chandra Rao was beheaded by order of Shivaji, on the charge of having opened a secret correspondence with the Ādil Shahi Government for recovering his heritage,—which would be a quite natural and legitimate desire. The younger boy, Bāji, escaped (on 28th August, according to the *Shivāpur Daftar Yādi*), assumed the hereditary title of Chandra Rao, and in March 1665 joined Jai Singh for war against Shivaji. With him came Ambāji Govind Rao Moré. [*H. Anjuman*, Paris MS. 113*a*, 123*a*.]

The acquisition of Jāvli was the result of deliberate murder and organized treachery on the part of Shivaji. His power was then in its infancy, and he could not afford to be scrupulous in the choice of the means of strengthening him-

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self. In exactly similar circumstances, Sher Shah, his historic parallel, used similar treachery to gain forts in South Bihar as the first step to a throne.

The only redeeming feature of this dark episode in his life is that the crime was not aggravated by hypocrisy. All his old Hindu biographers are agreed that it was an act of premeditated murder for personal gain and not a pardonable homicide done in self-defence or in the heated blood of an open fight. Even Shivaji never pretended that the murder of the three Morés was prompted by a desire to found a "*Hindu swarāj*", or to remove from his path a treacherous enemy who had repeatedly abused his generous leniency.*

§14. *Shivaji's further gains.*

The annexation of Jāvli not only opened to Shivaji a door for the conquest of the south and the west, but brought a very important accession to his strength, in the form of many thousands of Māvlé infantrymen from among the subjects and former retainers of Chandra Rao. In short, his recruiting ground for these excellent fighters along the Sahyādri range was now doubled. The Morés had accumulated a vast treasure in eight generations of undisturbed and expanding rule, and the whole of it fell into Shivaji's hands.

Two miles west of Jāvli he built a new fort named Pratapgarh, and here he set up an image of his patron goddess Bhavāni, as the more ancient Bhavāni of Tuljāpur was beyond easy reach. On her he lavished his wealth in costly ornaments and trappings, and to this shrine he made repeated pilgrimages. (Sabh. 23.)

Shivaji followed up his conquest of Jāvli (15th January 1656), by taking from Chandra Rao Moré in April his last refuge, the stupendous hill-fort of Rāigarh, which

* For the desperate and fantastic special pleading of Mr. C. V. Vaidya, LL.B., the reader is referred to the *Mahratta* (31 Aug. 1924).

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was destined to be the capital of the Maratha king. On 24th September of the same year he acquired Supā about 35 miles s. e. of Punā, by one of his usual *coups d'etat*. Shambhuji Mohité, the brother of Shahji's second wife, had been left by that chief as his agent in the Supā sub-division, in independence of the administrator of Punā. But Shivaji paid him a friendly visit on a Hindu holy day of rejoicing, overpowered his guards by a surprise attack and attached all his property. The displaced officer was packed off to Shahji with his personal effects, as he refused to serve under his nephew. Thus, the Supā sub-district was annexed. (Sabh. 4 ; *91 Q.* 28.)

The possession of Supā, Bārāmati and Indāpur rounded off the south-eastern corner of the Punā district, while the acquisition of Purandar, Rājgarh, Kondāna and Tornā secured Shivaji's territory by a strong chain of hill-forts on the south. Another fort in that quarter was Rohidā, gained on some unknown date. North-west of Punā he acquired the forts of Tikonā, Lohgarh, and Rājmāchi,—the last of which stood on the Sahyādri crest (6 miles north of the Bhor pass) and overlooked the Konkan plain on the west.

On 4th November 1656, Muhammad Ādil Shah died, and a new scene opened in which Shivaji greatly profited, as will be described in the next chapter.

APPENDIX I.

THE MORÉS OF JĀVLI.

Jāvli was the earliest territorial conquest of Shivaji and it was gained at a time when his power was in its infancy. Naturally the details of this affair were soon forgotten and got confused in the public memory amidst the numberless victories and far-flung acquisitions of his rapidly expanding new kingdom. But the main outline of the story is clear, though the extant sources differ as to minor details. The slaying of the four Morés really took place at different places

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and at different times, and this part of the story is confused. I follow the *Sabhāsad Bakhar* in the main, taking only a few details from the *91 Qalmi Bakhar,* (sec. 29-30). These two sources were the earliest and give the version of this affair as believed by Shivaji's Brahman and Prabhu officers in the generation immediately following his death. My dates and names are from the absolutely contemporary *Shakāvalis* (chronologies preserved by landed families) and despatches of Jai Singh I. These latter enable us to refute the traditions embodied in the anonymous, undated, unauthenticated *Moré Bakhar* and other gossipy sources on certain definite points, and thus prove the general untrustworthiness of such traditions. The Sanskrit poem *Surya Vamsham* also has to be rejected as merely legendary and in no sense a history.

We can easily believe the popular tradition that Chandra Rao Moré despised Shivaji as an upstart. It is known from inscriptions that a family named *Moria* ruled over Konkan at the end of the 5th century A.D. (*Bombay Gazetteer,* Vol. i, pt. 2, 282-284, 541.) They were almost certainly a branch of the historic house of Asoka *Maurya* and had declared themselves independent in that province where they had once been mere viceroys, when Asoka's empire broke up. A similar thing is known to have happened on the dissolution of the great Gupta empire in the 5th century A.D. It requires no stretch of the imagination to suppose that the *Morés* of Jāvli boasted of lineal descent from the royal Morias of Konkan and the still more ancient imperial Mauryas of Magadh. The first Moré to win the hereditary title of Chandra Rao, came of a line of barons who had fought under the Vijaynagar emperors in the central part of the Deccan plateau, in Telingānā, and later entered the service of Ādil Shah (or more probably that of Bahari Nizām Shah, as I hold).

In a legal document dated 23rd Dec. 1657 (only a copy of the original preserved), the three Chandra Raos who successively ruled Jāvli before Shivaji's conquest, are named "Bālāji, his son [or sons] Daulat Rao and Yesāji Sur Rao

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Chandra Rao". [*Shiva Charitra Sāhitya,* iii. No. 639.] Was the last-named Yashwant the *son* of Surya Rao Moré? Sabhasad (p. 6) says that Shivaji's agent first murdered "Chandra Rao [name not stated] and his brother or cousin [*bhāu*] Suryāji Rao both". In the traditional account preserved in the *Moré Bakhar,* the Chandra Rao Moré whom Shivaji killed is named Yashwant Rao (who had been adopted as a son by the preceding Chandra Rao's widow about 1648-49.) The Sanskrit poem *Surya Vamsham* states that Shivaji gained Jāvli after slaying in battle "Bāji-Rāj and Krishna-Raj and their father Chandra-Rāj," that he also "slew Chandra-Raj's helpers and relatives (evidently meaning Hanumant Rao Moré, the diwān), and that Pratāp Varmā, the *bāndhav* (brother, or more usually cousin) of Chandra Rao fled to the Ādil Shah" and later joined Āfzal Khan in 1659, (canto 18, v. 4-9). Now, we know definitely from Jai Singh's despatches that Bāji Chandra Rao was alive and present in Bijapur in 1665, and allied himself with Mirzā Raja Jai Singh. His father and brother (as well as the family diwān Hanumant Rao Moré) were, according to all accounts killed by Shivaji, but not Bāji Rao Moré. This Chandra Rao's escape from Shivaji's prison is dated 28 Aug. 1656 in the *Shivāpur Yādi ;* so he could not have been beheaded by Shivaji in Punā, as some stories allege.

That this Bāji is called *Pratāp* by Paramānand throughout, proves how unreliable the Sanskrit poem is.

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CHAPTER III.

RAPID EXTENSION OF TERRITORY AND FIRST WARS WITH MUGHALS AND BIJAPUR, 1657-1659.

1. Relations with Mughals to 1657.
2. Shivaji's first raid into Mughal Deccan.
3. Aurangzib's defensive measures.
4. Shivaji makes peace with Mughals.
5. Shivaji invades Konkan 1657.
6. Bijapuri plans: Afzal Khan sent.
7. Afzal Kh's plan of war and policy towards Shivaji.
8. Shivaji's danger and perplexity.
9. Plots and counter-plots.
10. Interview between Shiva and Afzal.
11. Afzal's army routed.
12. Legends about Afzal Kh.
App. Affair of Afzal Khan.

§1. *Relations with the Mughals up to 1657.*

For many years after his first assertion of independence, Shivāji carefully maintained peace with the Mughals. For one thing, his power was not yet secure, and it would have been the height of folly to provoke both Bijapur and Delhi at the same time. Secondly, from 1653 onwards Mughal Deccan was governed by Prince Aurangzib with singular efficiency and vigour, and his neighbours rightly dreaded giving him any offence. When Aurangzib was involved in war with Golkondā (January-March 1656), Shivaji was too busy organizing his conquests in Jāvli and the northern Ratnagiri district to raid Mughal territory during that Prince's absence from his charge.

On the death of Muhammad Ādil Shah (4 Nov. 1656), Aurangzib began active preparations for the invasion of Bijapur, and tried to seduce as many Ādil-Shāhi nobles and vassals as he could. Shivāji then wrote a letter to Multafat Khan, the Mughal governor of Ahmadnagar, offering to join the imperialists if his desires were granted. To this a conciliatory reply was given, in accordance with Aurangzib's

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instructions to "keep the path of correspondence with him open." (*Ādāb.* 144*b*.)

§2. *Shivāji's first raid into Mughal Deccan.*

Shivāji also wrote directly to Aurangzib. His envoy Sonāji reached the Prince's siege-camp before Bidar (in March 1657) and was assured that the Mughal Government would grant all the prayers of the Marātha chief, namely (*i*) a formal recognition of his right to all the Bijapuri forts and villages actually in his possession and (*ii*) the annexation of the port of Dābhol and the territory appertaining to it. A reply in these terms was also written to Shivāji by Aurangzib on 23rd April, 1657, when about to start for the siege of Kaliāni, and Shivāji was urged to prove his devotion by rendering armed help to the Mughal cause. [Parasnis MS., letter No. 5 ; *Ādāb.* 146 *a*.]

But long before this date, Shivāji had already decided on the different policy of fighting for his own hand. The vague promises of the Mughal Prince could not satisfy him. Even a less astute man than he must have known that such promises would amount to nothing in practice when the need of the imperialists would be over. He considered it more profitable to make a diversion in favour of Bijapur by raiding the south-western corner of Mughal Deccan while Aurangzib's forces were concentrated at the siege of Kaliāni, beyond his south-eastern frontier. He had cunningly prepared for action by quietly recalling his envoy from Aurangzib's camp, on the pretext of consultation, (about the middle of April) ; and he launched on war immediately afterwards.

Two Marātha captains, Mināji Bhonslé at the head of 3,000 horse and Kāshi, crossed the Bhimā and plundered the Mughal villages in the Chamārgundā and Rāsin subdivisions respectively. They carried devastation and alarm to the very gates of Ahmadnagar, the chief city of Mughal Deccan. [Kambu, 3*b* ; *Ādāb.* 148*a*.]

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A Marātha attempt to loot the city (*peth*) which nestled under shelter of the fort of Ahmadnagar was defeated, by a timely sortie of the garrison ; but so great was the alarm it caused that Multafat Khan, the *qiladār* of the fort, removed the property of the inhabitants for greater safety within the fort. (*Ādāb.* 148*b.*)

While Mināji was raiding the Ahmadnagar district in the east, Shivāji was busy looting the Junnar sub-division in the north. In the dark night of 30th April, he silently scaled the walls of Junnar city with rope-ladders and after slaughtering the guards, carried off 300,000 *hun* in cash, 200 horses, and much costly clothing and jewellery. The success of the Marātha raiders was due to the negligence of the local Mughal officers (as the Delhi historian Kambu asserts) and probably also to their military weakness. Aurangzib, on hearing of these disturbances, censured the *thānahdārs* and poured reinforcements into the Ahmadnagar district. (Sabh. 5 ; *Adāb.* 153*b.*)

§3. *Aurangzib's defensive measures.*

Nasiri Khan, Iraj Khan and some other officers at the head of 3,000 cavalry were ordered there. Rāo Karn, who was coming from Aurangabad to Bidar, was diverted from the way to the same place. Shāista Khan was ordered to detach 1,000 men from his contingent there. But Nasiri Khan's movements were provokingly slow. On 30th April he entered the pargana of Bir and four days later marched towards Āshti.* Thus, there was a great delay in his going to Ahmadnagar and Junnar, expelling the enemy, and ravaging Shivāji's territory, as ordered by Aurangzib. (Kambu, 3*b* ; *Ādāb.* 147*a*, 153*a*, 154*b.*)

Meantime, Multafat Khan had issued from the fort of Ahmadnagar and relieved the beleaguered outpost at Chamārgundā by defeating Mināji, (28th April.) But the

* *Bir* (orBid) is 68 m. e. and *Ashti* is 35 m. s. e. of Ahmadnagar. Chamargunda (or Shrigunda) is 33 m. s. of Ahmadnagar. (*Ind. At.* 39 N. E.) Raisin is 20 m. s. e. of Chamargunda.

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Marāthas continued to rove about the pargana for some time longer. However, the retainers of Multafat and Mirzā Khan followed up their victory and at last cleared the Chamārgundā sub-division. (*Ādāb.* 110*b*, 153*b*, 154*a*.)

Shivāji had stayed in the Junnar sub-division for some time, robbing the villages, as the Mughal reinforcements were late in arriving there and he found the field clear. But, at the approach of Rāo Karn and Shāista Khan, he fled from the neighbourhood of Junnar city and wandered over the district for some time, as he could not be caught and crushed. But when the pressure became too great, he slipped away to the Ahmadnagar district and began to plunder it. By this time (end of May), however, Nasiri Khan had reached the scene. By a forced march he surprised Shivā's army and nearly encircled it. Many of the Marāthas were slain, many wounded, and the rest put to flight, (4 June.) But there was no pursuit, as the Mughal horses were too tired. (Kambu, 4*b*; *Ādāb.* 110*b*, 111*b*, 112*a*, 154*a*, 156*b*.)

Aurangzib's letters to Nasiri Khan and other officers breathed fury and revenge; they must beat the raiders back from the imperial dominions and make reprisals by entering Shivā's land from all sides, "wasting the villages, slaying the people without pity, and plundering them to the extreme"; Shivāji's possessions, Punā and Chākan, must be utterly ruined, and not the least remissness shown in slaying and enslaving the people; the village headmen and peasants of the imperial territory who had secretly abetted the enemy, must be slain without pity. (*Ādāb.* 147 *a* and *b*, 148*a*.)

Aurangzib's new dispositions for guarding his south-western frontier showed excellent combination and judgment. Kār Talab Khan was posted near Junnar, Abdul Munim at Garh Namunā, and Nasiri Khan and Rāo Karn at Panda "opposite Parendā fort," to guard the Chamārgundā, Kara and Āshti parganas.* These officers stood

* *Panda* (in Pers. text, *pandeh*) is 16 m. n. w. of Parenda and 8 m. s. of Karmālā. *Kara* is 9 m. n. w. of Ashti. I have followed Aurangzib's

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facing the frontier and barring every path of the enemy's advance, so that the imperial ryots behind them might enjoy safety. The officers were further bidden to make a dash forward across the frontier, whenever they got an opportunity, ravage as much of the enemy's territory in front of them as they could, and then quickly return to the defence of their respective posts. (*Ādāb.* 147*b*, 148*b*.)

After Nasiri Khan's victory over Shivā in the Ahmadnagar district, he was ordered by Aurangzib to "pursue the Marāthas and extirpate them." But this could not be done. The rains now set in with the full violence of the monsoons, and the campaign had to be closed. Shivā retreated to his own country and the Mughal officers fell back on their appointed stations, watching the frontier. "There was peace in the whole district." (*Ādāb.* 156*a*, 149*a*.)

June, July and August 1657 passed in enforced idleness for the imperial troops. In September the situation was complicated by the illness of Shah Jahan and the preparations for a War of Succession among his sons. Bijapur made peace with the Mughals. But throughout the month of September Aurangzib continued to urge his officers not to relax their vigilance, but hold the s. w. frontier in force, lest Shivā should renew his raids. About the middle of October he wrote to the governor of Ahmadnagar to take care of the city and keep his troops in readiness, lest when Nasiri Khan went back, Shivā finding the field clear should begin to plunder again. (*Ādāb.* 149*b*, 157*b*.). At this very time (mid October 1657), Muhammad Yusuf, the Mughal faujdār of Junnar, made a forced march from Kalīān, defeated and beheaded Habsh Khan, a rebel sardār of that region, and came up against a small band of Shivāji's horsemen, who had arrived too late to aid that Abyssinian. After a stiff fight in which he lost many men

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letters (in *Adab*) above ; but Kambu omits Garh Namunā and says that Abdul Munim was posted at Chamārgundā. I have failed to trace *Garh Namunā*, unless it was a name given to the old and ruined outpost at *Pedgāon*, 8 m. s. of Chamārgundā.

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in killed and wounded, Yusuf was forced to retreat to Junnar. Immediately afterwards (on 24th October) the city of Kaliān was taken by Shivāji. (*Ādāb.* 199*b* ; *Jedhe S.*)

§4. *Shivāji makes peace with the Mughals.*

When his liege-lord, the king of Bijapur, made peace with the imperialists in September, Shivāji found it useless and even ruinous to himself to continue the war with the Mughal empire single-handed. He must try to save his patrimony. So, he wrote to Nasiri Khan offering submission, and the Khan replied in a conciliatory tone. Then Shivā, as requested, sent a trusty agent to the Khan to state his demands. These were reported to Aurangzib ; but no definite agreement followed. Shivāji now sent Raghunāth Pant to Aurangzib directly. The Prince was just then starting on his march to Northern India (25 Jan., 1658) and wrote to Shivā in reply, "Though your offences do not deserve pardon, I forgive you as you have repented. You propose that if you are granted all the villages belonging to your home [*i.e.*, Shāhji's old jāgir] together with the forts and territory of Konkan, after the imperialists have seized the old Nizām-Shāhi territory now in the hands of Ādil Shah,—you will send Sonā Pandit as your envoy to my Court and a contingent of 500 horse under one of your officers to serve me, and you will protect the imperial frontiers. You are called upon to send Sonāji, and your prayers will be granted."*

But while Aurangzib received Shivā's submission with outward pleasure, his mind was not really composed about him. He omitted no precaution to maintain peace in that quarter by force, for he felt convinced that the young Marātha chief was a raider whose daring was only equalled

* This letter, dated 24th February 1658, was not actually sent to Shivaji till after the battle of Dharmāt (15 April), as a postscript reports Aurangzib's victory there. (Parasnis MS., letter No. 6). *Ādāb*, 156*b*, 157*a*.

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by his cunning, and an ambitious adventurer who would place self-interest above fidelity to his plighted word or gratitude for favours received. He wrote to Mir Jumla (December, 1657), "At Nasiri Khan's departure that district has been left vacant. Attend to it, as the *son of a dog* is waiting for his opportunity." Ādil Shah was thus urged by the Prince: "Protect this country. Expel Shivā who has sneaked into the possession of some forts of the land. If you wish to entertain his services, give him jagirs in the Karnātak, far from the imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them." (*Ādāb.* 92*a*, 163*a*.)

Aurangzib, therefore, left the Deccan without granting peace and pardon to Shivāji. The Mughals also repaired and garrisoned the old and ruined fort of Pedgāon, as a convenient outpost for operations against Punā. But Shivā was freed from all fear of the Mughals by the War of Succession which kept Aurangzib busy for the next two years, 1658 and 1659. [*Ādāb.* 157*b*].

§5. *Shivāji invades Konkan, 1657.*

In the second half of the year 1657, the northward retreat of Prince Aurangzib, the likelihood of a civil war for the throne of Delhi, and the wrangles among the Bijapuri nobles about responsibility for their ill-success in the recent war with the Mughals (which culminated in the murder of the *wazir* Khan Muhammad),—all combined to remove the only checks on Shivāji's ambition, and he now launched forth on a fresh career of conquest and plunder unhampered by any fear or caution.

On 31st July he despatched Raghunāth Pant to reinforce his attack on the Siddis of Janjirā. And when the rains ceased and the dry season for campaigning began again (in October), he himself hastened to a new field. Crossing the Western Ghāts he burst into Konkan. The northern part of this coast-strip formed the Kaliān (modern

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Thānā) district and was then held by an Arab named Mullā Ahmad of the Navāyat (emigrant) clan, one of the leading nobles of Bijapur. The protracted illness of Muhammad Ādil Shah had detained this governor at Bijapur for a long time, and during his absence the defence of his jāgir had grown slack and inefficient. A considerable amount of disaffection and disorder seems to have prevailed among the petty chieftains of the district, which was a recent acquisition from the Nizām-Shahi State and where the authority of the new Government sat loose. [*A.N.* 576. *91 Q.* sec. 36.]

He easily seized the rich towns of Kaliān and Bhivandi (24 Oct. 1657), which were then without walls, and there took much wealth and costly merchandise. The fort of Māhuli, which had once been the last refuge of Shāhji, was next captured (8 Jan. 1658). The Kaliān sub-division with some other parts of the Thānā district, thus passed into Shivā's possession, and he got a firm footing in Northern Konkan, which he rapidly improved in the course of the year. His progress southwards into the Kolābā district seems to have been assisted by the petty local chiefs who were eager to throw off Muslim yoke and wrote inviting him to come. Surgarh (8 miles east), Birwādi (5 miles west), Talā (10 miles south), Ghosālgarh (5 m. s. w.), Bhurap or Sudhāgarh (15 miles east of Rohā town), Kāngori (12 miles east of Mahād), and above all the impregnable fortress of Rāiri (Rāigarh) which was to be his future capital, all passed into his hands, and thus the Abyssinians of Janjirā lost the eastern half of the Kolābā district to him. At Birwādi and Lingānā (5 miles east of Rāigarh) he built strong forts. From the base of Kaliān, his troops plundered the neighbouring Portuguese territory (belonging to the province of Dāman, called "the North" in their records), and established themselves in the fort of Aseri (midway between Māhim and Jawhār) as a permanent menace. The Portuguese are said to have bought his forbearance by promising an annual tribute. Kaliān and

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Bhivandi were immediately turned into naval bases and dockyards by Shivāji.*

After the capture of Kaliān, Ābāji Sondev was appointed to manage the whole district. He captured a beautiful Muslim girl and offered her to Shivāji as a present. But the Raja said to her, "If my mother Jijā Bāi had possessed your beauty, I too should have looked as handsome." He thus delicately removed her fear of dishonour by ranking her with his own mother, gave her ornaments and dresses, and sent her to her people in Bijapur under escort of 500 of his horsemen. She is said to have been the daughter-in-law of Mullā Āhmad Navāyat, the former Bijapuri subahdār of Kaliān. The orthodox Muslim historian Khāfi Khan praises Shivāji's chivalry and scrupulous regard for the honour of women. (*91 Q.B.*, sec. 30, K.K. ii, 272. In *Chitnis Bakhar*, "Maulānā Hāyāti" is a mistake for "Mullā Yahia", the younger brother of Mullā Āhmad.)

But he did not occupy Mahād or the country south of that town in this campaign. Ābāji Sondev was created viceroy of the province thus won in North Konkan, which included the eastern part of the Thānā and Kolābā districts. The history of the Marātha conflict with the Siddis of Janjirā in this province will be narrated in Chapter 11.

We may conveniently pause here and take note of the exact size of the infant Marātha kingdom. At the cautious outset of his independent career (1647-48), Shivāji's territory embraced most parts of his father's western jagir and his own early annexations from Bijapur. These together covered the southern half of the Punā district, and their northern boundary was the old Mughal frontier,—a line

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* *Jedhe S.* Shivaji's chivalry to a Muhammadan girl (the daughter-in-law of Mullā Ahmad) captured in the Kaliān campaign, *91 Q.* 30. Tavernier (ii. 205) reports the rumour that Shivā discovered buried treasure at Kaliān: *91 Q.* 30, says at Pradhāngarh.

On the Portuguese relations with Shivaji,—Pissurlencar, i. 4 (letter from Viceroy to King of Portugal, 15 May, 1658), also letter of 16 August, 1659. *Jédhé Karinā* unreliable.

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running diagonally from the north-western to near the south-eastern corner of that district and avoiding the Mughal forts at Junnar, Visāpur, and Pārner ; *i.e.,* for some distance the Ghod river divided the two dominions in the north ; Junnar and Chamārgundā belonged to the Mughals and Chākan to Shivāji. His southern boundary was marked by the outposts of Indāpur and Bārāmati, and the forts of Rājgarh and Tornā, (Kondānā was restored to Bijapur in 1649.)

The above was his position in 1648. But by the year 1659 he had extended his dominions in the uplands or *Desh* to the southern limit of the Sātārā district, and in Konkan from Māhuli to near Mahād. Thus he now became master of the whole of North Konkan except the ports and adjacent lands on the west coast (which belonged to Bijapur, the Siddis, and the Portuguese) and the extreme north of the Thānā district, while the country from Mahād southwards was yet to be won.

The greatly expanded Maratha kingdom was now organized on a stronger and more elaborate plan: Moro Trimbak Pinglé was appointed Chancellor (*Peshwā*) in the place of the incompetent Shyāmrāj Nilkanth, Nilo Sondev Accountant-General (*majmuādār*) *vice* Balkrishna Pant, and Netāji Pālkar as Master of the Horse (*sar-i-naubat.*) Two new posts, those of *Surnis* (Superintendent of Correspondence) and *Wāqnis* (News-writer) were created and given to Ābāji Sondev and Gangāji Mangāji respectively.* The cavalry now mustered 10,000, out of whom 7,000 were mounted on Government horses and the rest on the troopers' own ; the Māvlé infantry numbered 10,000 and their commander was Yesāji Kank. The forts, old and newly acquired, held by Shivāji in 1659 numbered forty.

* The reading of the Mahād MS. of Sabh. (7*n*) has been accepted here. *Jedhé S.* says that Narahari Anand Rao was created *Peshwā* on 21 Aug. 1661 (*91 Q.* 29), and Moro Pant *Majmuadar* on Jan. 1661 and *Peshwā* on 3 Apr. 1662, when Nilo succeeded him as *Majmuadar.* - *Sabh. B.* 7-8. *A.N.* 576.

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On 14 May, 1657 the newly-founded kingdom was blessed with the birth of an heir to the throne, the ill-fated Shambhuji.

§6. *Bijapur plans to subdue Shivāji ; Āfzal Khan sent.*

After the Mughal invasion of 1657 had rolled back and Aurangzib had marched away to Northern India, the Bijapur Government gained respite and some accession of vigour. True, the old prime-minister, Khan Muhammad, was murdered (11 Nov., 1657) on the false suspicion of collusion with Aurangzib during the late war; but his successor, Khawās Khan, was an able administrator. The Queen Mother, Bari Sahibā, who virtually ruled the State till her pious journey to Mecca (1660), was a woman of masterful spirit and experienced in the conduct of business. Freed for the time being from the constant menace of the Mughals on the frontier, the Bijapur Government now began to call its refractory vassals to account. Shāhji was asked to punish Shivaji, but he frankly repudiated all responsibility for the conduct of his disobedient son and left the Government free to punish him without any consideration for his father's feelings. Measures had, therefore, to be taken for crushing Shivaji by force.

This was, however, no easy task. Shiva's military strength was far from despicable; and the Bijapuri nobles shrank from the idea of a campaign among the hills and jungles of the Western Ghats. The command of the expedition against him went abegging at the Bijapur Court, till Afzal Khan accepted it. (Sabh. 9-10; *Jedhé S; 91 Q.* 31.)

Abdullah Bhatāri, surnamed Āfzal Khan, was a noble of the first rank, who had risen to power and honour under the late Sultan of Bijapur. As a general he was of the highest standing in the kingdom, being the peer of Bahlol Khan and Randaula Khan, and he had fought with conspicuous bravery and skill in the recent war with the Mughals. But the resources of Bijapur had been crippled by that war and the disorder and impoverishment natural

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in a regency under a veiled woman. Only 10,000 cavalry* could be spared to accompany Afzal, while popular report had raised the strength of Shiva's Māvlé infantry to 60,000 men as the result of his conquest of Jāvli, and he had also enlisted a regiment of valuable Pathān mercenaries from the disbanded soldiery of Bijapur. Afzal Khan, therefore, shrank from an open contest of force with Shiva. Indeed, he was instructed by the Dowager Queen to effect the capture or murder of Shiva by "pretending friendship" with him and offering to secure his pardon from Adil Shah.†

The Bijapuri general had accepted the command in a spirit of bravado, and even boasted in open Court that he would bring Shiva back a captive in chains without having once to dismount from his own horse. But his mind must have been oppressed by the heaviness of his task. He planned to effect his purpose if possible by diplomacy and raising the Māval chiefs against Shivaji.

As early as April, the Bijapur Government had sent a circular letter to all the *deshmukhs* of Māval to join Āfzal Khan with their contingents and help him in subduing Shivaji. As vassals of Ādil Shah, they were bound in law to obey his orders, if they did not wish their hereditary land (*watan*) and office to be forfeited. The letter had some effect. Khandoji Khopdé, the *deshmukh* of Utroli and the rival of Kānhoji Jedhé (of Bhor) for the *deshmukhi* of Rohidkhoré, waited on Afzal at Wai and gave him a written undertaking to arrest Shiva on condition of being granted

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* This is the strength of Afzal's army as given by contemporaries, *viz.*, *Tarikh-i-Ali II.* 76 and the English letter quoted in the next note. The Maratha accounts, all very much later, put it at 12,000 cavalry besides infantry. *91 Q.* 32 ; Sabh. 9. In *A.N.* 577, *du hazar* is evidently a misprint for *dah hazar*. The letter in *Shed.* 25 is a fabrication.

† "Against Shivaji the Queen this year sent Abdullah Khan with an army of 10,000 horse and foot, and because she knew with that strength he was not able to resist Shivaji, she counselled him to *pretend friendship* with his enemy, *which he did*. And the other [*i.e.* Shivaji], whether through intelligence or suspicion it is not known, dissembled his love toward him &c." (Revington at Rajapur to Company, 10 Dec. 1659, *F. R.* Rajapur). Dismissed men from Bijapur enlisted, *91 Q.* 29.

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the coveted *deshmukhi*. He was placed with his strong Māvlé contingent in command of Afzal's vanguard. The other Māval deshmukhs were frightened and perplexed as to what they should do. But Shivaji won seven of them over to his side with solemn promises of protection and reward. [Raj. xvii. 31, xv. 393 and 317 ; *Jedhé S ; 91 Q.* 32.]

§7. *Āfzal Khan's plan of war and policy towards Shivaji.*

Āfzal Khan's first step was to raise money for his campaign. His ten thousand cavalry cost him Rupees two and a half lakhs every month in the troopers' pay and fodder allowances, besides the salary of the officers. And money was within easy reach of a general who was not restrained by conscience or pity. The famous Hindu temples were known to possess immense wealth of their own, besides having the residences of rich merchants and bankers around the holy precincts. Afzal determined to make war pay for war, by first of all carrying out rapid cavalry raids on these holy cities, sacking the temples, demolishing the sacred images, and holding the high priests to ransom.

Leaving Bijapur, as the dry season commenced after the monsoons at the beginning of September 1659, Afzal Khan first rode to the famous shrine of Vitobā at Pandhārpur on the Bhimā, some 65 miles north of Bijapur. Here he sacked the temple and demolished the images. Then continuing to march westwards, along the south banks of the Bhimā and Nirā rivers, he entered the Phaltan district and alighted at the village of Malvadi (*Malowri* of the Survey map), twelve miles south-west of Phaltan town, on the road from Phaltan to Wāi. This Wai was the head-quarters town of Afzal Khan's government, and here he had his allies and old officers. At Malvadi he made a halt, maturing his plan of campaign and collecting money. Here he seized Bajāji Nāyak Nimbālkar, the deshmukh of Phaltan, and threatened to have him trampled to death by elephants for

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his having been in concert with Shivaji. Nimbālkar ransomed himself by paying a fine of two lakhs of rupees.*

Encamped at Malvadi, Afzal Khan pursued his policy of frightfulness in the hope of cowing Shivaji into submission. He sent out strong detachments of his cavalry to rob and desecrate the famous Hindu temples of the country round. In this way Jejuri, Tuljāpur, and other holy cities were violated and their people put under forced contribution. At the same time the story of Afzal Khan's ferocity and religious bigotry spread around. As the Ādil Shāhi Court historian writes, "in a short time the Khan made the country seized by Shivaji the riding ground (*jaulān-gāh*) of his troops." "The dust raised by the horses' hoofs of our heroes blinded the eyes of the enemy. . . . Many of the latter were slain and the rest fled into holes". But these atrocities only served to stiffen the Maratha resistance to an enemy of man and the gods alike. Their war of political liberation was changed into a crusade.

Afzal's original intention was to march northwards to Punā and attack Shivaji in his home, while his Moré allies and friendly Māvlé headmen would wrest the southern Māval country from Shivaji's agents, so that the Maratha rebel would be pinned down to the level country near Punā and easily subdued. But on hearing of Afzal's movements, Shivaji quickly withdrew from the disadvantageous terrain of Punā and took post in the broken and jungly Jāvli district, where all his troops were now concentrated. Here he was joined by those Māvlé headmen whose adhesion he had secured by his wise diplomacy. This unexpected strategy of Shiva forced a change on Afzal's plan of campaign. When Shivaji annexed Jāvli, many members of the old

* This amount, 60,000 *hun*, was borrowed from two bankers by mortgaging the *deshmukhi* revenue of Phaltan, and it was repaid in 1675. Bajāji had been forcibly converted to Islām some years ago, but about 1657 Shivaji had helped him to be purged of his apostacy and made a Hindu again,—as Netāji Pālkar was to be in 1677. Shivaji gave his daughter Sakhu Bāi in marriage to Mahādji, the son of this Bajāji Nāyak (*Shiva Patra Sār Sangraha*, Nos. 796 and 1797).

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ruling family of that little barony took refuge in Bijapur, and these men had joined Afzal Khan's expedition promising to help him with their local knowledge and influence to wrest that district from Shivaji's hands. Afzal Khan had hoped to make an easy penetration into Shivaji's Māval territory in this way, and with the help of other loyal Māvlé headmen carry on a northward drive to the more open country around Punā.

But now, with the full force of Shivaji facing him close at hand, Afzal felt that the heavy cavalry who formed the spearhead of his army would lose their superiority among the hills and forests of Jāvli,* while Shivaji's infantry, fighting under cover or darting out of ambushes, could paralyse more than their own number of invaders. In numbers too, Shivā had a clear superiority.

Āfzal therefore wisely shrank from entering into this broken country to drive Shivā out by force. His policy now was to employ diplomacy and lure Shivaji into a trap and then seize or kill him. (Sabhāsad 14.)

That chief had taken up his residence at Pratāpgarh, some time before. Afzal sent his land-steward Krishnāji Bhāskar to Shivaji with a very alluring message, saying, "Your father has long been a great friend† of mine, and you are, therefore, no stranger to me. Come and see me, and I shall use my influence to make Ādil Shah confirm your possession of Konkan and the forts you now hold. I shall secure for you further distinctions and military equipment from our Government. If you wish to attend the Court, you will be welcomed. Or, if you want to be excused personal attendance there, you will be exempted." (Sabh. 10.)

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* The extremely difficult and broken ground which Afzal had to traverse before reaching the place of interview below Pratāpgarh, is described by Nurullah, p. 80 of my Ms.

† This was a false claim, as Shāhji belonged to the party of Siddi Raihān (Khan Muhammad) at the Adil Shahi court, and we know that Afzal Kh. was the mortal enemy of that minister. (Haidarabad, *Select Doc.*, Sh. J's reign, pp. 125 and 129.)

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§8. *Shivaji's danger and perplexity.*

Meantime, the news of Afzal's coming had caused great terror and perplexity among Shiva's followers. Hitherto they had surprised obscure forts, looted isolated convoys, or fought skirmishes with the small irregular forces of private jagirdars. Here was their first encounter with the regular forces of Bijapur, led by a famous general, and numbering 10,000 horsemen with artillery, transport, and all the other material of the best-equipped armies of that age. Moreover, Afzal's march from Bijapur to Wai had been an unbroken success; the Marathas had not ventured to oppose him in the open, and he had freely looted and laid waste the territory of Shiva that he had crossed. Tales of his irresistible strength and ruthlessness had reached the Maratha camp. Shivaji's officers naturally shrank from the idea of resistance. At the first council of war which he held, they urged him to make peace, as the enemy was too strong and hostilities would only cause a great loss of life to their side. (Sabh. 10.)

But would a tame surrender really bring him peace and safety? Afzal Khan's past career caused him to be dreaded like an ogre,—a bold bad man who would shrink from no act of cruelty or treachery. In 1639 he had faithlessly murdered Kasturi Ranga, the Raja of Serā, who had been invited to his tent under a promise of safety to make his submission.* Again, in November 1657, this Afzal Khan had contrived the murder of the Bijapuri wazir Khan

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* *Muhammadnamah*, p. 163, "At the time of the interview Kasturi Ranga manifested an improper conduct which was indicative of disturbance, and Afzal Khan at once put him to death". In exactly similar circumstances, Khan-i-Daurān, the Mughal governor of Orissā had (1660) murdered Krishna Bhanja (the Raja of Mayurbhanj) who had come to interview him and settle his peace terms, and then the viceroy had given out that the Raja had drawn his sword upon the Khan! But the Dutch factors of Balasore reported that this allegation was falsely made to cover the Khan's own act of treacherous murder. A defeated and submissive chieftian, away from his own army, does not attempt murder in his enemy's den; he humbly seeks peace by every means in his power.

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Muhammad. At the close of Aurangzib's invasion of Bijapur (1656-57) Afzal Khan had suddenly left the Ādil Shahi camp, returned to the capital and falsely denounced Khan Muhammad to the queen regent Bari Sahibā as a traitor in the pay of the Mughals. She had recalled the premier, and as he was coming to wait on her, he was stabbed to death in the streets of the capital. His murderer was not punished. Afzal Khan belonged to this Begam's party and was her favoured general. It was a legitimate inference from the known facts that he had engineered the plot for the murder of Khan Muhammad.

Could any reasonable man believe in the soothing assurances of such a double-dyed murderer? It was therefore Shivaji's business to find out the secret intentions of Afzal Khan through every available source, and take every possible precaution against treachery.

This was the most critical moment in the career of Shivaji. If he capitulated to Afzal Khan, all his hopes of independence and future greatness would be gone for ever, and he would have to end his days as a tame vassal of Bijapur, even if he escaped his sovereign's vengeance for his late rebellion. Yet, the open defiance of Bijapur authority now would for ever close the door to reconciliation with that State, and he must be prepared ever afterwards to defend his life and independence against the power of that kingdom and of the Mughals and other enemies, without a single friend or protector to turn to in the wide world. His ministers and generals advocated the more ignoble policy. Shiva himself was in a terrible dilemma. For a night he pondered on his life's choice and then chose the manlier part. A legend, dating from his lifetime, tells us that the care-worn chieftain's sleep was broken by a vision of the goddess Bhavāni who urged him to confront Afzal boldly and promised him victory and her full protection. (Sabh. 11.)

His mind was made up. Next morning the council met again. Moved by Shiva's manly words, appeal to their sense of honour, and report of the goddess's blessings, they resolved

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on war. He now made his dispositions for the contest with the utmost forethought and skill. He took counsel of his mother, who blessed him and foretold his success, and then he left minute instructions for carrying on the government in the event of his being killed. The armies under Moro Trimbak Pinglé and Netāji Pālkar were summoned from Konkan and the Ghāts respectively, and ordered to take post within easy reach of Pratāpgarh. (Sabh. 12.)

§9. *Plots and counter-plots.*

Then came Afzal's envoy, Krishnāji Bhāskar, with the invitation to a parley. Shiva treated him with respect, and at night met him in secrecy and solemnly appealed to him as a Hindu and a priest to tell him of the Khan's real intentions. Krishnāji yielded so far as to hint that the Khan seemed to harbour some plan of mischief. Shivaji then sent the envoy back with Pantāji Gopināth, his own agent, agreeing to Afzal's proposal of an interview, provided that the Khan gave him a solemn assurance of safety. Gopināth's real mission was to find out the strength of Afzal's army and other useful information about it and learn for himself what the Khan's real aim was. Through Gopināth Shiva vowed that no harm would be done to Afzal during the interview, and Afzal, on his part, gave similar assurances of his honesty of purpose. But Gopināth learnt by a liberal use of bribes that Afzal's officers were convinced that "he had so arranged matters that Shiva would be arrested at the interview, as he was too cunning to be caught by open fight." On his return, Gopināth told it all to Shiva and urged him to anticipate the treacherous attack on himself by murdering Afzal at a lonely meeting and then surprising his army. (Sabh. 12-15.)

Shiva, taking the hint from Gopināth, feigned terror and refused to visit Wai, unless the Khan met him nearer home and personally promised him safety and future protection. Afzal agreed to make this concession. By Shiva's orders a path was cut through the dense forest all the way from Wai to Pratāpgarh and food and drink were kept

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ready for the Bijapur army at various points of it. By way of the Radtondi pass (below 'Bombay Point' of the Mahābaleshwar plateau), Afzal Khan marched to Pār, a village lying one mile below Pratāpgarh on the south, and his men encamped there in scattered groups, deep down in the valley near every pool of water at the source of the Koynā.

Gopināth was sent up the hill to report the Khan's arrival. The meeting was arranged to take place next day. The place chosen for the interview was the crest of an eminence, below the fort of Pratāpgarh, and over-looking the valley of the Koynā. On both sides of the forest-path leading up the hill-side to the pavilion picked soldiers were posted in ambush at intervals by Shivaji. Here he erected tents and set up a richly decorated canopy with gorgeous carpets and cushions worthy of a royal guest.

Then he prepared himself for the meeting. Under his tunic he wore a coat of chain armour and below his turban he placed a steel cap for the protection of his skull. What offensive arms he had, nobody could see; but concealed in his left hand was a set of steel claws (*bāghnakh*) fastened to the fingers by a pair of rings, and up his right sleeve lay hidden a thin sharp dagger called the scorpion (*bichwā.*) His companions were only two, but both men of extraordinary courage and agility,—Jiv Mahālā, an expert swordsman, and Shambhuji Kāvji, the murderer of Hanumant Rao Moré. Each of them carried two swords and a shield.

As the party was about to descend from the fort a saintly female figure appeared in their midst. It was Jijā Bāi. Shiva bowed to his mother. She blessed him saying, "Victory be yours!" and solemnly charged his companions to keep him safe; they vowed obedience. Then they walked down to the foot of the fort and waited.

§10. *Interview between Shiva and Afzal.*

Meanwhile Afzal Khan had started from his camp at Pār, with a strong escort of more than a thousand musketeers.

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Gopināth objected to it, saying that such a display of force would scare away Shiva from the interview, and that the Khan should, therefore, take with himself only two body-guards exactly as Shiva had done. So, he left his troops some distance behind and made his way up the hill-path in a *pālki* accompanied by two soldiers and a famous swordsman named Sayyid Bānda, as well as the two Brahman envoys, Gopināth and Krishnāji. Arrived in the tent, Afzal Khan angrily remarked on its princely furniture and decorations as far above the proper style of a jagirdar's son. But Gopināth soothed him by saying that all these rich things were meant to be soon sent to the Bijapur palace as the first fruits of Shiva's submission.

Messengers were sent to hurry up Shiva, who was waiting below the fort. He advanced slowly, then halted on seeing Sayyid Banda, and sent to demand that the man should be removed from the tent. This was done, and at last Shivaji entered the pavilion. On each side four men were present,—the principal, two armed retainers and an envoy. But Shiva was seemingly unarmed,* like a rebel who had come to surrender, while the Khan had his sword and dagger at his side.

The attendants stood below. Shiva mounted the raised platform and bowed to Afzal. The Khan rose from his seat, advanced a few steps, and opened his arms to receive Shiva in his embrace. The short slim Maratha's head only came up to the shoulders of his opponent. Suddenly Afzal tightened his clasp, and held Shiva's neck fast in his left arm with an iron grip, while with his right hand he drew his long straight-bladed dagger and struck at the side of Shiva. The hidden armour rendered the blow harmless. Shiva groaned in agony as he felt himself being strangled. But in a moment he recovered from the surprise, passed his left

* Khafi Khan, ii. 116, states that both Afzal and Shivaji came to the interview unarmed. But *kamar wa karda*, 'with no sword girt on the waist', was the customary attitude of the defeated party, so often described in Persian histories, and Afzal was not in that humiliating position.

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arm round the Khan's waist and tore his bowels open with a blow of the steel claws. Then with the right hand he drove the *bichwā* into Afzal's side. The wounded man relaxed his hold, and Shivaji wrested himself free, jumped down from the platform, and ran towards his own men outside.

The Khan cried out, "Treachery! Murder! Help! Help!" The attendants ran up from both sides. Sayyid Banda faced Shiva with his long straight sword and cut his turban in twain, making a deep dint in the steel cap beneath. Shiva quickly took a rapier from Jiv Mahālā and began to parry. But Jiv Mahālā came round with his other sword, hacked off the right arm of the Sayyid, and then killed him, (10th November, 1659.)

Meanwhile the bearers had placed the wounded Khan in his *pālki,* and started for his camp. But Shambhuji Kāvji slashed at their legs, made them drop the *pālki,* and then cut off Afzal's head, which he carried in triumph to Shiva.*

§11. *Afzal's army routed and plundered.*

Freed from danger, Shivaji and his two comrades then made their way to the summit of Pratāpgarh, and fired a cannon. This was the signal for which his troops were waiting in their ambush in the valleys below. At once the armies of Moro Trimbak and Netāji Pālkar and the thousands of Māvlés rushed on the Bijapuri camp from four sides. Afzal's officers and soldiers alike were panic-stricken at the news of their chief's death and this unexpected attack, in that unknown region, where every bush seemed to be alive with enemies. But the way of escape was closed and they had perforce to fight. For three hours many of the entrapped soldiers made a desperate defence, evidently in isolated groups, without any common plan or superior

* The head was buried beneath a tower (called *Abdullah burj*) in an outwork on the south-eastern side of the lower fort. A short distance from it is the temple of Bhavāni built by Shivaji. (*Bom. Gaz.* xix, 546-547.) For illustrations, see Parasnis's *Mahabaleshwar,* 143 and 144.

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guidance. The Marathas fought on their own ground, in the full flush of their initial triumph, confident of succour close behind, and led by eminent chiefs. The carnage in the Bijapuri army was terrible. "All who begged quarters holding grass between their teeth [as a mark of humility] were spared, the rest were put to the sword." 3,000 men were killed, according to the report that reached the English factory at Rājāpur a few days later. The Māvlé infantry hacked at the fleeing elephants, "severing the tails, breaking the tusks, or chopping off the legs." Even camels were cut down as they crossed the path of the assailants.

The booty taken was immense: all the artillery, waggons, ammunition, treasure, tents and equipage, transport-cattle and baggage of an entire army, fell into the victors' hands. Among them were 65 elephants, 4,000 horses, 1,200 camels, 2,000 bundles of clothing, and 10 *lakhs* of Rupees in cash and jewellery.

The prisoners included one sardar of high rank, two sons of Afzal, and two Maratha chiefs namely Lambaji Bhonslé and Jhujhar Rao Ghatgé. All the captured women, children, Brahmans, and camp-followers were immediately released. One section of the beaten army, consisting of Afzal Khan's wives and eldest son, Fazl Khan, escaped round the source of the Koynā, under the guidance of Khandoji Khopdé and his contingent of Māvlé friendlies.*

A grand review was held by Shivaji below Pratāpgarh. The captured enemy, both officers and men, were set free and sent back to their homes with money, food and other

* Meeting with Afzal Khan: Sabh. 17-19; *Jedhe S.; 91 Q.* 34, *A. N.* 577; *Dilkasha* 19; K. K. ii. 116-118; Rajapur Factory Records; Fryer, ii. 61; *Powadas*, 12-18. Plunder of his army: Sabh. 20-21; *91 Q.* sec. 35; *Powadas*, 19-20. Escape of Fazl Khan: Sabh. 21. *Tarikh-i-Ali Adil Shah II.*, 76-81, contains a maximum of mere words and rhetorical flourishes but few facts. *B. S.* 370 is even more meagre in details, but concise. *Jedhe S. and 91 Q.* 35, say that Khandoji Khopde was caught and beheaded by Shivaji; but *J. Karina* (recent) alleges that he was only mutilated of one arm and one leg (by order of Shivaji). The *Akhbarat* proves that he was beheaded. The Khan's artillery is said to have been left at Wai and captured the next day.

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gifts. The Maratha soldiers who had fought so gallantly were rewarded; if the fallen warriors had grown-up sons, they were enlisted in their fathers' places; if otherwise, their widows were given pensions amounting to half their pay. The wounded received rewards from 25 to 200 *hun* according to the severity of their hurt. The officers were presented with elephants, horses, robes, jewellery and grants of land. (Sabh. 21.)

§12. *Legends about Afzal Khan.*

The tragic fate of Afzal Khan has most profoundly stirred the popular imagination in his own country and in that of his enemy. At his village of Afzalpurā, close to Bijapur city, the gloomy legend sprang up that before starting on this fatal expedition, he had a premonition of his coming end, and killed and buried all his 63 wives, lest they should share another man's bed after his death. The peasants still point to the height from which these hapless victims of man's jealousy were hurled into a deep pool of water, the channel through which their drowned bodies were dragged out with hooks, the place where they were shrouded, and the 63 tombs, of the same shape, size and age, standing close together in regular rows on the same platform, where they were laid in rest. Utter desolation has settled on the spot. Where his mansion once stood with its teeming population, the traveller now beholds a lonely wilderness of tall grass, brambles and broken buildings, the fittest emblem of his ruined greatness. The only form of life visible is the solitary bird, startled by the unwonted presence of a human visitor.* Other traditions tell us that

* This was the appearance of Afzalpurā when I visited it in Oct., 1916. The French traveller Abbé Carré, who visited the place in 1673, states that he found a large number of workmen engaged in cutting the stones which were to be used in the mausoleum of Afzal Khan, and he was "surprised [to note] that in the epitaph were mentioned the [200] women of his harem whose throats he had caused to be cut." [*Voyage*, ii. 76 and 11.]

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ill omens dogged his steps from the very outset of his campaign against Shivaji. (*Powadas,* 7, 11.)

Among the Marathas the destruction of Afzal Khan caused the wildest exultation ; it marked the dawn of their national independence. The defeat of Bijapur was complete: the chief had fallen, his army had ceased to exist, and the victory, both in respect of carnage and of booty, was the most complete possible. The incident caught hold of the public imagination of Mahārāshtra as the most glorious event in the history of the race. Ballads were composed by the wandering bards (*gondhālis*), in response to the popular demand, to celebrate the victory. The earliest and most valuable of them is lost (except for a single couplet.) Another, but much later and quite untrustworthy, poem has been preserved, which expands the contest into a Homeric duel with all its details and supernatural adjuncts. Every class of Marathas, from the officers of Shambhuji's Court to the soldiers in their camps and the peasants in their hamlets, welcomed the minstrel and crowded together to listen to this story of the first triumph of their national hero, set forth with graphic details which made the whole scene live before their eyes. The short ringing lines of the ballad (*powada*) almost reproduce the tramp of the soldiery, the journeys of the rival chiefs, their meeting, the exchange of abuse (quite in the style of the *Mahābhārat*!), the death-grapple, the battle at Pār, and the triumph of the Maratha army. As the bard's narrative passes rapidly from stage to stage of the whole contest, the audience follow him with breathless attention ; their blood courses in unison with the verses, and they are wound up to a high pitch of excitement as the spirit of the actual march or fight seizes them.

To the Marathas the fight with Afzal has always appeared as at once a war of national liberation and a crusade against the desecrator of temples. To them Afzal Khan typifies the bold bad man, who combines treachery with frightfulness, and defies God and man alike. Their

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historians from the earliest times have seen no element of murder in the incident, but always described it as a glorious example of the sagacity, courage and agility with which their national hero averted a treacherous plot against his own life, made the treachery recoil on the plotter's head, and avenged the outraged shrines of their gods.

Flushed with their victory over Afzal Khan (10 November, 1659) and the destruction of his army, the Marathas poured into South Konkan and the Kolhāpur district, capturing the fort of Panhālā, defeating another Bijapuri army, and making extensive conquests (December 1659—February, 1660),* which will be described in Chapter 10. But in the following March Shivaji was called upon to meet a dangerous attack on his own dominions by a combination of the most powerful of his enemies.

APPENDIX

Affair of Afzal Khan

Was the slaying of Afzal Khan a treacherous murder or an act of self-defence on the part of Shivaji? No careful student of the sources can deny that Afzal Khan intended to arrest or kill Shivaji by treachery at the interview. The absolutely contemporary and impartial English factory record (Rajapur letter, 10 Dec. 1659) tells us that Afzal Khan was instructed by his Government to secure Shivaji by "pretending friendship with him" as he could not be resisted by armed strength, and that the latter, learning of the design, made the intended treachery recoil on the Khan's head. This exactly supports the Marathi chronicles on the point that Shivaji's spies learnt, from Afzal's officers, about the Khan's plan to arrest him by treachery at the proposed interview, and that Afzal's envoy Krishnaji Bhaskar was also induced to divulge this secret intention of his master.

Who struck the first blow at the interview? The old Maratha chroniclers (as distinct from the English-educated 20th century apologists of the national hero) all assert that it was Afzal. These genuine old historians never shrink from charging Shivaji with murder or treachery whenever they know him to have been really guilty. They wrote long before Grant Duff's

* The *Shiva-bharat* gives a detailed and romantic description of these operations as well as the affray with Afzal Kh., which, from the character of this poem, I have been unable to accept as historical.

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book had roused public indignation against Shivaji's alleged murder of an invited guest. It is, therefore, impossible to contend that the story of Afzal having struck the first blow was an invention of the modern Marathas after English education had wakened their conscience to the wickedness of pre-meditated political murders. Sabhasad (1697) and Waqnis (? 1685) at least cannot be suspected of any design to whitewash their hero's character by falsifying history. In saying that Afzal struck the first blow, they truly record a genuine old tradition and not a modern nationalist invention.

Shivaji's elaborate protection of his person before going to the interview and his placing an ambush round Afzal's forces cannot be taken as proofs of a treacherous intention. Secret assassination is the favourite weapon of decadent monarchies, and many such murders had taken place in the sultanates of the Deccan before this time, as I showed in detail in the *Modern Review*, (Vol. I, 1907, p. 441). Shivaji was fully convinced—and with good reason, as we know,—that Afzal meant treachery. He would have been wanting in common prudence if he had not taken these precautions to save himself.

A friend (Prof. A. Rahman) has asked me, "If Afzal meant treachery why did he not keep his troops in readiness for delivering an assault or at least for defending themselves?" My answer is that Afzal believed that the death of Shivaji would lead to the immediate collapse of his upstart power and no attack on his leaderless troops would be necessary. He was, moreover, ignorant of the position and strength of the enemy's forces and did not know that two large Maratha armies had arrived by rapid marches in his immediate neighbourhood, under Netaji and Moro Pant. He expected to repeat his treacherous *coup* against Raja Kasturi Ranga of Sera with equal success. Nurullah, the author of the official History of Ali Adil Shah II., thus describes the Bijapur Government's instructions to Afzal Kh: "Ali Adil Shah, on seeing that the prevalence of the Muhammadan religion was not possible unless the bramble of Infidelity was burnt up in the fire of the enemy-consuming sword, appointed Afzal Kh. with 10,000 horsemen, to chastise and *extirpate* that wicked man Shivaji [*tambih wa istisāl-i-ān shaqi*] . . . . At the time of giving *conge* to Afzal Kh., Adil Shah had instructed him that in case Shivaji on being hard pressed by the Bijapuri forces, in his habitual deceptive manner offered to make a peaceful submission, the Khan must not listen to him but follow no other policy than that of flinging the fire of *death* on the harvest of his *life*." [My Persian ms. pp. 75-80.]

This is supported by the *farmān* issued by Adil Shah to Kanhoji Jedhé, on 16 June 1659, ordering him as a loyal vassal, to assist Afzal Kh., the newly appointed subahdar of Nizamshahi Konkan, in defeating and rooting out Shivaji, giving no shelter to Shiva's followers but slaying them outright. [*Shiva K. Patra Sār*, i. No. 774.]

Mir Alam, the famous minister of Nizam-ul-mulk and historian, tells the following story of the fatal interview:—

As soon as Abdullah Kh. stepped into the tent, Shivaji appeared for meeting him and made a *salam*. Abdullah, who did not know him, asked

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his diwān Krishnaji, "Is this man Shivaji?" On learning that it was so, he asked, "How is it that you have desolated the land and seized the forts of our sovereign?" Shiva replied, "Before this, the country and forts were occupied by lawless men and robbers, but I have swept them clean of disturbance, and by my good service and exertion caused them to prosper. In return for this good service I deserve praise and not rebuke and punishment." The Khan rejoined, "Very well, what is past is past. You must now deliver to me all the forts [in your possession] and go with me to have audience of His Majesty." Shiva replied, "If a royal letter (*farmān*) to that effect is issued in my name, I shall place it on my head and carry out the order."

At this diwān Krishnaji broke in, "You have now come under the protection of the Khan Sāhib; so, you should first get your offences pardoned by him and thereafter expect a royal edict in your own name." Shiva replied, "The Khan and I are both servants of His Majesty. How can the Khan grant a pardon for my faults? But as I cannot reject your advice, I shall lay my head in his lap." Saying this he embraced the Khan. The *Khan* who was strong-limbed and intoxicated *with the pride of being a hero* [*nishā-i-bahāduri dar sar dāsht*], *gripped Shivaji* very hard in the act of embracing *and struck him with his belt-dagger*. But as Shiva wore a coat of chain-armour, the blow failed of effect. Shivaji twisted himself and with a blow of his crooked dagger (*bichua*) ripped open the bowels of Abdullah, and released himself from his grasp. The Khan, bandaging his belly with his shawl, hit Shiva on the head with his sword, so hard that his helmet was cut into two and a slight injury inflicted on his skull. Shiva with a blow of his long sword (*patta*) cut the Khan into two.

On seeing this, Krishnaji struck at the head of Shiva with his own sword, when Yesāji, a comrade of Shiva, overthrew the diwān. In this scrimmage, two or three blows reached the person of Gopinath, but he was not harmed. [*Hadiqa-i-Alam, litho.*, ii. 226.]

The weight of recorded evidence as well as the probabilities of the case supports the view that Afzal Khan struck the first blow and that Shivaji only committed what Burke calls, a 'preventive murder'. It was, as I wrote in the *Modern Review* in 1907, "a case of diamond cut diamond."

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CHAPTER IV.

STRENUOUS WARFARE, 1660-1664.

1. Shaista Kh. sent against Shivaji.
2. Shivaji besieged in Panhala fort.
3. Shaista Kh. occupies Puna.
4. Shaista captures Chakan, 1660.
5. Shiva conquers Ratnagiri district, 1661.
6. Night attack on Shaista Kh., 1663.
7. Surat described.
8. Heroic defence by the English.
9. First loot of Surat, 1664.
10. Attempt to murder Shivaji.
11. How money was extorted.
12. Shivaji's doings in 1664.
Appendix. Sufferings of Surat citizens.

§1. *Shāista Khan sent against Shivaji.*

Among the administrative changes made by Aurangzib at his second coronation (July, 1659) was the posting of Shāista Khan to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in the place of Prince Muazzam. This able and spirited general had already governed Mālwa and the Deccan and had taken a distinguished part in Aurangzib's recent invasion of Golkondā. Chief among the tasks entrusted to him was the suppression of Shivaji. And in discharging this duty he was fortunate enough to secure the hearty co-operation of Bijapur, which forced the Maratha chief to divide his army into two and therefore to be defeated in both the theatres of war.

After Shivaji had followed up his victory over Afzal Khan's leaderless army by defeating the combined forces of Rustam-i-Zamān and Fazl Khan, and taking Panhālā in the Kolhāpur district and many places in Ratnagiri, Alī Ādil Shah II felt it necessary to march in person against the audacious rebel. But just at this time Siddi Jauhar, an Abyssinian slave who had usurped the fief of Karnul and defied the royal authority, wrote to Bijapur offering to

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make his submission if his position was recognized. The Sultān agreed, gave Jauhar the title of Salābat Khan, and sent him with an army to put down Shiva. Jauhar easily swept away the Maratha resistance in the open, and drove Shivaji into Panhālā (2nd March 1660), which he besieged with a force of 15,000 men.

§2. *Shivaji besieged in Panhālā fort.*

The siege dragged on for nearly five months; all the paths of ingress and egress were closed to the garrison. Shivaji found himself in a fatal trap. So, he wrote a secret letter to Jauhar, deceitfully begging his protection and offering to make an alliance with him. In order to negotiate for the terms he asked for a passport. Jauhar, "who was both fool and traitor," swallowed the bait; he assured Shivaji of his protection, gave him a safe conduct, and flattered himself that with Shiva for an ally he would be able to create a kingdom of his own in independence of Ādil Shah. Next day Shivaji with only two or three followers visited Jauhar at midnight, and was received in *darbār*. After oaths of co-operation had been taken on both sides, Shivaji returned quickly to the fort, and the pretended siege was continued.

But there was one relentless enemy of Shivaji in the Bijapuri army. Fazl Khan, the son of Āfzal, and his chief retainer Siddi Halāl, pressed the siege in earnest. A huge fort like Panhālā could not, however, be taken by 15,000 men, even if all of them put their hearts into the work. Shivaji had made some sorties and broken up the siege-trenches with heavy slaughter, forcing the Bijāpuris to remove their camp to a safe distance from the fort. But these night-attacks were not decisive; the siege was merely turned into a blockade in consequence of them. The Bijapuri army was terrified, and Fazl Khan henceforth avoided confronting Shivaji himself and directed his operations against the neighbouring fort of Pavangarh. Seizing

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a hillock near it, he mounted guns and with some Englishmen's help began to throw shells into the fort. The Maratha commandant of Pavangarh found his position untenable and pressed Shivaji for relief.

Shivaji found that further delay would ruin him by making his escape from that fatal trap impossible. With Pavangarh lost, Panhālā could be easily starved into surrender. So, one dark night (13th July), leaving a part of his forces to hold Panhālā as long as possible, he slipped out of it with the rest of his men, fell on the Bijapuri trenches below Pavangarh, and in the ensuing confusion took the road to Vishālgarh, 27 miles to the west.

His escape was soon detected and a strong Bijapuri force under Fazl Khan and Siddi Halāl set out in pursuit. The day broke while the fugitives were still at Gajapur, eight miles short of their destination, and it was discovered that the pursuers had kept up with them by marching all night with the aid of Bengal lights (*māhtābs.*) Shivaji was hopelessly outnumbered and his escort was worn out. Happily for him, the road here led through a narrow ravine which a few desperate men could hold against odds. Bāji Prabhu, the *deshpāndé* of Hirdas Māval, agreed to defend the mouth of the pass with half the troops till Shivaji should reach Vishālgarh with the other half and signal his safe arrival by gun-fire. The Bijapuris delivered three bloody assaults on the heroic rear-guard, all of which were beaten off. For five hours after dawn, the obstinate struggle was maintained, with a loss of 700 men to the defenders. Then the signal gun was heard, announcing Shivaji's safe arrival in his asylum. But Bāji Prabhu was lying down mortally wounded. The faithful servant had carried out his task, at the cost of his life, and the knowledge cheered his last moments. Karnātaki musketeers are said to have at last cleared the pass with their fire, and the remnant of the defending Māvlés fled to the hills with the body of their chief. The Bijapuris pushed on to Vishālgarh, but wisely

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gave up the thought of undertaking a siege in that terrible region. They fell back on Panhālā and thence on Bijapur.*

When the news of Jauhar's treacherous coquetting with Shivaji reached the ears of Ali Ādil Shah, that king burst into anger, and left his capital (on 5th August) for the Panhālā district in order "to punish both the rebels." He halted at Miraj and sent his vanguard towards Panhālā. Jauhar now found that his master could not be befooled any longer. So, he made the Marathas at last give up Panhālā to him (on 22nd September), and put an end to the long siege. The fort was soon afterwards handed over by Jauhar to the agents of Ādil Shah.

A month after Shivaji had been forced to quit Panhālā in the extreme south of his dominions, his arms met with another disaster in the extreme north. On 15th August, his fort of Chākan, 18 miles north of Punā, was captured by the Mughals. To explain how it happened, we shall have to trace the course of the war in that quarter from its commencement.

§3. *Shāista Khan occupies Punā.*

Early in 1660, Shāista Khan opened the campaign against Shivaji from the north, after arranging for an attack upon the Maratha dominions by the Bijapuris from the south at the same time. Leaving Ahmadnagar with a vast

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* Siege of Panhala, Foster, X. 251, 370-387; *Tarikh-i-Ali II*, 82-93; *B. S.* 371-376; *91 Q.* 37-39; *Jedhe* gives the dates thus: "2 March, Shivaji again comes to Panhala and is there besieged by Siddi Jauhar. 13 July, Shivaji descends from Panhala and goes to Khelna, pursued by Jauhar's forces, Bāji Prabhu being slain; 22 Sep., Shivaji cedes Panhālā to Jauhar and makes peace with him."

I accept the English factory numbers,—15,000 besiegers and five or six thousand besieged,—as against the Marathi exaggeration of eighty thousand Bijapuris and sixty thousand Mavles. *Dilkasha*, i. 37, says that Shiva had only 3,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry when besieged in Panhala. Jauhar established his head-quarters at Kolhapur. The English factor Revington tried to sell him some ordnance and ammunition and personally took a mortar and some shells to Jauhar's camp, early in April.

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army on 25th February, the Khan marched southwards along the eastern side of the Punā district, methodically capturing and garrisoning all the strongholds that guarded the approaches to Punā on the east and south.

The Marathas at first retreated before him without risking a battle. By way of Sonwādi (close to the Dhond railway station) and Supā (16 miles south-west of Dhond), he reached Bārāmati (18 miles south-east of Supā) on 5th April. At the last two places were mud-forts which the enemy had evacuated. He next worked his way westwards up the valley of the Nirā river, by way of Hol, reaching Shirwal, 26 miles south of Punā, on 18th April. Like a wise general, Shāista Khan left detachments at all these outposts, to guard his line of communication and hold the forts. A flying column sent from Shirwal sacked the villages round Rājgarh (22 miles due west.)

From Shirwal the Mughal army moved along the Nirā river 16 miles northwards to Shivāpur (near Khed), and thence due eastwards through Garārā, arriving at Sāswad (13 miles east of Shivāpur and 18 miles south-east of Punā) on 1st May.

Up to this point the Mughal advance had been unopposed, the Marathas only hovering at a distance to cut off supplies and skirmishing with the foraging parties. They made their first stand near the pass leading from Shivāpur to Garārā. On 30th April a body of 3,000 Maratha cavalry threatened the Mughal rear-guard under Rao Bhāo Singh, but were attacked and routed after a long fight.

From Sāswad a small Mughal detachment raided the villages at the foot of Purandar fort. They were attacked by 3,000 of the enemy, but held their ground by fighting desperately at close quarters, though they lost 50 in killed

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He promised that these shells "would undoubtedly be the chiefest disturbers of the besieged." But the mortar had not the desired effect at trial, and Jauhar refused to pay for the munitions, though the English traders continued to stay, some at Panhala, others at Kolhapur, as late as October 1660.

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and wounded. Reinforcements arrived, routed the enemy, and pursued them to the pass which was commanded by the guns of Purandar. The Mughals, flushed with victory, cleared the pass at a gallop, in the teeth of a hot fire from the fort-walls, and dispersed the enemy assembled beyond it. The victors returned to their camp at Sāswad in the evening. Thence, after a four days' halt at Rājwah, they entered Punā on 9th May.

§4. *Shāista Khan captures Chākan.*

Shāista Khan had decided to pass the rainy season with his army at Punā, then a small hamlet. But before his arrival there, the enemy had totally destroyed the grain and fodder in the country round Punā and Chākan and removed all traces of habitation. And now the many rivers between Punā and the Mughal frontier being in flood, no provision reached his camp, and his army had to undergo great hardship from scarcity. He, therefore, decided to remove his camp from Punā to Chākan, 18 miles northwards, as being nearer to Ahmadnagar and the Mughal dominion, whence supplies could more easily reach him. (*A. N.* 584-'5.)

Chākan is a place of great strategic importance. On the east it is separated from the imperial territory by the shallow upper courses of the Bhimā and Ghod rivers only, with no difficult mountain pass to cross. Its possession would have greatly shortened Shāista Khan's line of communication with his base of supplies at Ahmadnagar and also secured his camp against any attack from the north. Moreover, Chākan is only 31 miles due east of the Bhorghāt pass and commands the shortest route leading from Ahmadnagar to Konkan.

Leaving Punā on 19th June, the Khan arrived in the vicinity of Chākan on the 21st, reconnoitred the fort and distributed the lines of investment among his officers. The fort of Chākan is a square enclosure with bastioned fronts

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and towers at the four corners. The walls are high, with a ditch 30 ft. deep and 15 ft. wide all around. The only entrance is in the eastern face, and passes through five or six gateways. Beyond the walls there is an outwork of mud with a ditch, the remnant of a very old fortification. (*Bom. Gaz.* xviii, pt. iii, p. 121 ; *Ind. Antiq.* ii. 43, iv. 352.)

Shāista Khan, after throwing up defensive earth-works round the positions taken up by the four divisions of his army, began to run trenches towards the fort-walls, construct raised platforms at suitable points, and mount on them large pieces of artillery brought from the Mughal forts in the Deccan. Though the heavy showers of the rainy season hampered his work and the defenders kept up a galling fire, he pressed the siege vigorously. After 54 days of hard labour a mine was carried from his own position in the north to under the tower at the north-eastern corner, and it was exploded at 3 P.M. on 14th August, 1660. The work and its defenders were blown up ; the Mughals rushed to the assault, but found to their surprise that behind the breach the enemy had thrown up a high embankment of earth which they held in force and from the shelter of which they assailed the Mughals with rockets, musket-shots, bombs and stones. The storming party was checked with heavy loss, but clung to the blood-stained ground for the night.

Next morning (15th August) they resumed the attack, scaled the wall, and captured the main fort, putting many of the garrison to the sword and driving the rest into the citadel. In a short time even the last-named work capitulated. But the imperialists had to purchase their victory at a heavy price, losing 268 killed and 600 wounded. [*A. N.* 585-588 ; Tavernier, i. 409 confused.]

Firangji Narsālā, an old officer of the days of Shāhji, had been left by Shiva .in charge of Chākan, with orders to hold out as long as he could, but to surrender when driven to extremities, because it was impossible for Shiva, then battling with the Bijapuris near Panhālā, to divert

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any force for the relief of Chākan, 140 miles away in the north. For nearly two months Firangji had defended his post with tireless energy, "incessantly showering shots, bullets and rockets at the besiegers." He had disputed every inch of the ground on the two days of assault. And now, hopeless of aid, he capitulated with honour. Shāista Khan greatly admired the gallant *qiladār* and pressed him to enter the imperial service on high pay. But Firangji refused to prove false to his salt, and was allowed to go back to his master with his troops.

§5. *The fighting in 1661-63 and Shivaji's conquest of Ratnagiri district.*

Shivaji's defeat at Chākan and Panhālā was followed by a lull in the war during the last three months of the year 1660, which he spent quietly at Rājgarh, in planning how to compensate himself for these losses in the Desh country by transferring the war to another part of Bijapuri territory, namely Konkan, or the country west of the Sahyādri range, where the government was very weakly exercised by countless petty vassal Rajahs and Bijapuri city-governors. There was in that province no single powerful viceroy with an army of his own, able to unite the local feudatories under one central authority, exact loyal service from them, and thus successfully oppose an invader like Shivaji, who was his own master and could direct all his resources with absolute unity of command and policy.

Shāista Khan, too, on his return to Punā (end of August, 1660) after the capture of Chākan, spent the rainy season there in enforced inactivity. Nor was he eager to lay siege to any more Maratha forts, as even the small and comparatively weak castle of Chākan, situated in the plain, had cost him nearly nine hundred men to take it. He employed his time more usefully in inducing Ghālib, the Bijapuri commandant of Parendā, to surrender that fort to

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Aurangzib for a high price. The terms were approved by the Emperor, and large Mughal forces were detached from Punā to Parendā to take possession of it (20th November), overawe any opposition that might be made at the last moment, and occupy the district around it.

At the beginning of next year (1661), Shāista Khan turned his attention to the Kaliān district or North Konkan. Here a small Mughal force, only 3,000 strong, under Ismāil, had been operating since April last and had occupied a part of the country, though the important cities and forts (like Kaliān) remained unconquered. These gains had been placed under a faujdar named Salābat Khan Deccani, with a contingent of friendly Marathas, among whom Bābāji Bhonslé, Raghuji, Shambhuji Kāvji and Bābāji Rām (or Rānā) Honap,—a former *deshpāndé* of Punā,—are named. [*A. N.* 594 ; *91 Q.* 42.]

But local levies could effect little, and it was necessary to complete the Mughal conquest of Konkan and extinguish the last traces of Shivaji's power there by pouring into the country large reinforcements of imperial troops under a high commander. The general chosen for this purpose was Kār Talab Khan, an Uzbak, who had attained to the rank of a 4-*hazāri* as early as the battle of Dharmāt (1658), and had recently commanded a division in the Parendā district. With him Shāista Khān sent many of his own Rajput and Muslim subordinates and local allies (such as Rāi Bāghini, the heroic widow of Udāji Rām, the jagirdar of Māhur in Berār.)

Marching from Punā by way of Lohgarh, Kār Talab Khan descended into Konkan by a pass a little to the south of the Bhorghāt. While his soldiers, encumbered with artillery and baggage, struggled painfully and in alarm through the dense jungles, steep rocks and narrow broken roads on to Umbarkhind (about 15 miles due east of Pen), Shivaji by secret and rapid marches came up with them and cut off their lines of advance and retreat alike. Kār Talab had to offer battle under these adverse conditions and

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suffered heavy losses. His army seemed doomed to perish from thirst, without having the power to move. In despair he gave up all the property in his camp and paid a large ransom to Shivaji and thus bought a safe retreat for his army (3rd February, 1661.)

The victorious Shivaji now divided his forces; and while one army under Netāji was detached to act against the Mughals, he himself with the other invaded Bijapuri territory in Konkan, "to avenge the loss of Panhālā." The Kaliān district having been thus freed from the new enemies, Shivaji left it alone, and marched southwards, easily capturing city after city, till all the coast-strip from Dāndā-Rājpuri to Khārépatan was commanded by him, and the country further south, as far as Goa, seemed to lie at his mercy, when he would renew the campaign next dry season. His movements were so rapid, the local authorities were so divided and unprepared for defence, that no resistance was offered, but the Rajahs and city-governors fled in consternation before the oncoming flood of Maratha invasion. The wiser among them recognized resistance to him as futile and expectation of support from Bijapur vain, and so made their peace with him by offering him obedience and tribute.

Nizāmpur (22 miles due east of Janjirā) was raided, and then the port of Dābhol belonging to a chieftain surnamed Dalvé was captured and placed under an agent of Shivaji (Feb. 1661.) Jaswant Rao, the Rajah of Pallivana, who had loyally helped Jauhar during the Panhālā campaign, took refuge with Surya Rao, the Rajah of Prabhāvali, (its chief town being Shringārpur.)* The

* I take it that *Pallivana* is the Sanskritized form of *Palavna*, a town (giving its name to a district) situated 12 m.n. of Dapoli, while Mandangarh is 5 m.n. of Palavna. The fort of *Palgarh* (built by Shivaji) is in the Khed sub-division, 6 m.n. of Khed. *Sangameshwar* is a well-known holy city, 10 m.n.w. of Devrukh. *Shringārpur* is 8 m.n.e. of Sangameshwar, and is overlooked by *Prachitgarh*, 2 m. to its east; the Tivra pass being 4 m.s. of it. [Degree sheet 47 G.] *Prabhāvali* or Pravanvalli is just below Vishal-

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Muslim governor of Sangameshwar fled away, and so did all the inhabitants who had anything to lose. The town was thrown into the greatest disorder and alarm. Shivaji therefore sent Pilāji Nilkanth and Tānāji Mālusaré with a small force to take possession of it, while he ordered Surya Rao to support this detachment. He himself pushed on to Devrukh by way of Chiplun (where he performed the pilgrimage to the shrine of Parashurām and made large gifts to the Brahmans.) His victorious march was continued to Rājāpur, which he now sacked for the second time and finally occupied, on 3rd March,—and even further south to Khārépatan (on the Vāghotan river, 16·33 N.) Most of the cities of the Ratnagiri district saved themselves from plunder by paying him blackmail (*chauth*).

Meantime, under pressure from his sovereign Ādil Shah, the Rajah of Shringārpur had made a night-attack on Shivaji's detachment in Sangameshwar, but had been repulsed by the gallant Tānāji Mālusaré. Shivaji now turned back northwards and conquered the Palli-vana State, conciliated and recalled the fugitive population, and restored cultivation and trade. For protecting this conquest, he fortified Chirdurg and named it Mandangarh, and built a second fort, Pālgarh.

He was now free to settle accounts with Surya Rao, the Rajah of Shringārpur, who had tried to save himself by promising homage to Shivaji ever since the fall of Jāvli (1656) and repeatedly broken his faith in fear of his Bijapuri master. Punishment swiftly overtook the double-dealer. Shivaji now invaded Shringārpur by such a rapid march from Palli-vana that Surya Rao was taken entirely by surprise; he had not anticipated the blow and made no preparation for defence; even his captains were enjoying leave home! The Rajah had barely time to escape with his life, while Shivaji entered his city in triumph (29th April.) The

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garh to the s.w. In old records Dābhol and Prabhāvali are coupled together, though the two towns are far apart.

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rest of the small State was easily occupied and placed under Trimbak Bhāskar as governor, while the neighbouring hill-fort of Pratitgarh (= Prachitgarh) was put in repairs to protect the city.*

The ferocity and greed of the Maratha troops, no less than their valour and rapidity of movement, had spread the wildest terror among the people of the invaded districts and all who could had fled away from the path of the invaders. Shivaji now very wisely won over Shirké, the minister and virtual ruler of Shringārpur, enlisted him in his own service, afterwards marrying into his family,—made large gifts to the local Brahmans, and thus induced the population to return to their homes and usual occupations and submit to the new government.

But these successes were chequered by a great defeat. In May 1661 the Mughals wrested Kaliān from the Marathas, and though Shivaji mustered an army in Mahād to attempt its recovery, his efforts did not bear fruit and this capital city remained in Mughal hands for nine years more. So, late in June, Shivaji retired to his fort of Wardhangarh, where he spent the entire summer in quiet. The fort of Deiri, in the Pen sub-division, was besieged by a Muslim general named Bulāki, but a Maratha relieving force under Kāvji Kodhalkar drove him away after slaying 400 of his men (21 August 1661.)

Maratha activities were resumed at the beginning of 1662. Shivaji attacked Nāmdār Khan, at Mirā Dongar (6 miles south-east of Pen), and then raided the rich city of Pen. The Mughal defence was obstinate and Shivaji's forces suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded.

On the whole, throughout the year 1662 and the first quarter of 1663, some Mughal generals (especially Nāmdār Khan) showed great activity and success in attacking the Marathas, making reprisals into their territory, and spoiling

* Several details of this campaign in the Ratnagiri district have been taken from the *Surya-vamsham*. The dates are from *Jedhe S.*

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their raids by close pursuit. In March 1663 we find two large and mobile divisions of Mughal horse,—12,000 and 7,000 strong,—posted at Upper Chaul and Rahamatpur respectively for these duties, while Kaliān was held by a permanent garrison too large to be easily attacked.

The net result of the operations of these two years was that the Mughals kept their grip on the extreme north of Konkan, including the city and district of Kaliān,—barring occasional raids into that debatable land the Pen sub-division,—while Shivaji remained master of the southern part, namely the south-eastern corner of the Kolābā district and nearly the whole of the Ratnagiri district, or roughly 18° to 16°30 North latitude.

In March 1663, the Mughals gave a long and vigorous chase to Netāji, the Master of the Horse in Shiva's army. He had led his cavalry in a raid into the imperial territory, but a Mughal force of 7,000 horse pursued him so closely that "he was fain to travel 45 or 50 miles a day and yet [had] much ado to escape with a small [part of the] booty he had got. They left not the pursuit till they came within five leagues of Bijapur." But Rustam-i-Zamān met the Mughals and induced them to give up the pursuit, "by telling them that the country was dangerous for any strange army to march in and also promising to go himself and follow him, by which deceit Netāji got away, though not without loss of 300 horse and himself wounded." (*F. R.* Surat, vol. 103, Gyffard to Surat, 30 March, and 8 April 1663.)

But within a month of meeting with this reverse to his arms, Shivaji dealt a masterly blow at the Mughals, —a blow whose cleverness of design, neatness of execution and completeness of success created in the Mughal Court and camp as much terror of his prowess and belief in his possession of magical powers, as his *coup* against Afzal Khan had done among the Bijapuris. He surprised and wounded the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan in the heart

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of his camp, in his very bed-chamber, within the inner ring of his body-guards and female slaves.*

§6. *Shivaji's night-attack on Shāista Khan.*

Shāista Khan had, as we have seen, occupied Punā in May 1660 and retired there after the capture of Chākan in the following August. He took up his residence in what was then the best house of the future Maratha capital, the unpretentious home of Shivaji's childhood. His harem was with him, and around his mansion lay the quarters of his guards and attendants, the band-room and offices. Further off, across the road leading southwards to Singh-garh lay the camp of his lieutenant, Maharajah Jaswant Singh and his contingent of 10,000 men.

To surprise the Khan here was a task that required no less agility and cunning than bravery and dash. Shivaji picked out a thousand of his bravest and most expert soldiers and took them with him, while two supporting divisions of one thousand each (including cavalry and Māvlés) under Netāji Pālkar and Moro Pant the *Peshwā,* were directed to take post on the two flanks of the vast Mughal encampment, at a mile's distance from its outer side. Bābāji Bāpuji and Chimnāji Bāpuji, of Khed, accompanied Shiva as his body-guards and right-hand men in this enterprise.

The Maratha force, lightly equipped, set out from Singh-garh, covered the intervening eleven miles rapidly in the course of the day, and arrived at Punā after nightfall (Sunday, 5th April 1663.) With 400 picked men Shivaji entered the limits of the camp, replying to the challenge of the Mughal guards that they were Deccani soldiers of the

* Night-attack on Shāista Khan: the earliest records are Gyffard to Surat 12 April, 24 May, 1663 (*F. R.* Surat, vol. 103) containing Shivaji's own version; Bernier, 187; *A. N.* 819 (only one sentence!); *Storia,* ii. 104-106; Sabh. 35-37; *Dil.* 44-46. Khafi Khan (ii. 172-'5) reports the narration of his father, a servant of Shaista Khan, but he wrote after 1730. *Jedhe, 91 Q.* 46-47.

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imperial army going to take up their appointed posts. After resting for a few hours in some obscure corner of the camp, the party arrived near the Khan's quarters at mid-night. Shiva knew the ins and outs of the city and every nook and corner of the house where he had passed his boyhood and youth.

It was the 6th day of Ramzān, the month of fasting for Muslims. The servants of the Nawab's household had mostly fallen asleep after their day's abstinence followed by the heavy meal at night. Some cooks who had risen from their beds to make a fire and prepare the meal which is taken a little before dawn in the month of Ramzān, were despatched by the Marathas without any noise. The wall dividing this outer kitchen from the body-servants' room within the harem once had a small door in it, but the opening had been closed with brick and mud to complete the seclusion of the harem. The Marathas began to take out the bricks and make an opening there. The noise of their pick-axes and the groans of the dying awoke some of the servants, who reported the suspicious noise to the Khan, but that general only rebuked them for disturbing his sleep for a trifle.

Soon the breach in the wall was large enough for a man to creep through. Shivaji, with his trusty lieutenant Chimnāji Bāpuji, was the first to enter the harem, and was followed by 200 of his men. The place was a maze of canvas, screen-wall after screen-wall and enclosure within enclosure. Hacking a way through them with his sword, Shivaji reached the very bed-room of the Khan. The frightened women roused the Nawab, but before he could use his weapons Shivaji was upon him and severed his thumb with one stroke of his sword. It was evidently at this time that the lamps in the room were put out by some wise woman. In the darkness two of the Marathas tumbled into a cistern of water; and the confusion that followed was used by Shāista Khan's slave-girls to carry him away to a place of safety. The Marathas continued their work of

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slaughter in the darkness for some time, killing and wounding many of the Khan's women, without knowing their sex.

Meantime the other half of Shivaji's force, the 200 men, evidently under Bābāji Bāpuji, who had been left outside the harem, had rushed the main guard, slaying the sleepers and the awake and crying out in derision, "Is it thus that you keep watch?" They next entered the band-room and ordered the bandsmen, as if from the Khan, to play. The loud noise of the kettle-drums drowned all voices, and the yells of the enemy swelled the confusion. The tumult in the harem, too, now grew so great that the Mughal troops became aware that their general was being attacked. Shouting "The enemy are on us," they began to take up their arms.

Abul Fath, a son of Shāista Khan, had been the first to hasten to his father's rescue without waiting for others; but the brave youth was slain after he had struck down two or three Marathas. Another Mughal captain who lodged just behind the harem enclosure, finding its gate closed from within by the wily Marathas, let himself down inside by means of a rope-ladder; but he was at once attacked and killed.

Shivaji, finding his enemies fully awakened and arming, delayed no longer, but promptly left the harem, called his men together, and withdrew from the camp by the direct route, while the Mughals, not knowing where their enemies were, fruitlessly searched all their camp.

This night-attack was a complete success. The retreat from the camp was unmolested and no pursuit was made. During the surprise the Marathas lost only six men killed and forty wounded, while they slew a son and a captain of Shāista Khan's, forty of his attendants and six of his wives and slave-girls, besides wounding two other sons, eight other women and Shāista Khan himself.*

* Gyffard at Rajapur wrote to Surat on 12th April 1663: "Yesterday arrived a letter from the Rajah written himself to Ravji [Pandit], giving

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The daring and cunning of the Maratha hero were rewarded by an immense increase of his prestige. He was taken to be an incarnation of Satan ; no place was believed to be proof against his entrance and no feat impossible for him. The whole country talked with astonishment and terror of the almost superhuman deed done by him ; and there was bitter humiliation and sorrow in the Emperor's Court and family circle at this disaster to his maternal uncle and the "premier peer" (*āmir-ul-umara*) of his empire.

This attack took place on 5th April, 1663. The morning following it, all the imperial officers came to Shāista Khan to condole with him in his loss. Among them was Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who had not raised a finger to defend his chief or to oppose the retreat of his assailant, though he had 10,000 horse under him and lay encamped across the road taken by Shivaji. Shāista Khan, with the polished sneer of a high-bred Mughal courtier, turned to Jaswant and merely remarked, "When the enemy fell upon me, I imagined that you had already died fighting against them!" Indeed, the public, both in the Mughal camp and throughout the Deccan, ascribed Shivāji's exploit to the connivance of Jaswant. Shivaji, however, asserted that this astonishing feat was performed by him under the inspiration of his God and not of any human counsellor. Immediately after his return from it, he wrote to Rāoji Pandit, his agent at Rājāpur, boasting how he had been

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him an account how that he himself with 400 choice men went to Shaista Khan's camp. There, upon some pretence, ... he got into his tent to salam, and presently slew all the watch, ... wounded Shaista Khan with his own hand, [one son was killed outright, two wounded, six women killed, eight more wounded, and 40 persons attending their general left dead in the place.] After all this Shivaji returns, losing but six men [killed] and forty wounded, 10,000 horse under Rajah Jaswant Singh standing still and never offered to pursue him ; so it is generally believed it was done with his consent, though Shivaji tells his men his Permisera (*Parameshwar*, the great God) bid him do it." The figures for the loss suffered by Shaista Khan given in this letter have been replaced, within square brackets above, by the corrections made in Gyffard's letter of 24th May.

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the chief actor in this business and had himself wounded Shāista Khan.

The Mughal viceroy, covered with shame and grief, retired to Aurangabad for greater safety. The Emperor heard of the disaster early in May, when on his way to Kashmir, and ascribed it to the viceroy's negligence and incapacity. As a mark of his displeasure, he transferred Shāista Khan to the government of Bengal (1 Dec. 1663), which was then regarded as a penal province, or in Aurangzib's own words, "a hell well stocked with bread," without permitting him even to visit the Emperor on his way to his new charge. The Khan left the Deccan about the middle of January 1664, on being relieved by Prince Muazzam.

§7. *Surat described.*

While this change of governors was going on at Aurangabad, Shivaji performed a feat of even greater audacity than he had ever displayed before. From 6th to 10th January he looted the city of Surat, the richest port of the west coast and "the gateway to the holy places of Arabia" for Indian Muslims, who here embarked for the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The *fort* of Surat stood on the south bank of the Tapti, 12 miles from the sea. It was impregnable to a body of light raiders like Shiva's troopers. But the *city* close to the fort offered a rich and defenceless prize. It had, at that time, no wall to protect it. Its wealth was boundless. The imperial customs alone yielded a revenue of 12 *lakhs* of Rupees a year (in 1666, according to Thevenot, v. 81.)

The city of Surat covered nearly four square miles, including gardens and open spaces, and had a population of 200,000 souls. The streets were narrow and crooked; the houses of the rich were near the river-side and substantially built; but the town was mainly composed of poor men's huts built of wooden posts and bamboo walls and

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with floors plastered with mud. "In the greater part of the town scarcely two or three brick-houses were to be seen in a street, and in some parts . . . not one for many streets together. The whole town was unfortified either by art or nature and its situation was upon a large plain of many miles' extent. They had only made against the chief avenues of the town some weak and ill-built gates [more for show than for defence.] In some parts there was a dry ditch easily passable by a footman, with no wall on the inner side. The rest was left so open that scarcely any sign of a ditch was perceivable." (*Bom. Gaz.*, ii. 301, 90-91; Letter from the English chaplain Escaliot to Sir T. Browne.)

Early in the morning of Tuesday, 5th January, 1664, Surat was suddenly alarmed by the news that Shivaji had arrived with an army at Gandavi, 28 miles southwards, and was advancing to plunder the town.* At once the people were seized with panic, and began to flee away with their wives and children, mostly across the river, to save their lives. Rich men found shelter in the fort by bribing its commandant. Later in the day a courier brought the intelligence that Shivaji had come still nearer, and at night it was learnt that he had halted only five miles from Surat. Ināyet Khan, the governor of the town—who was quite distinct from the commandant of the fort,—had sent out an agent to treat with Shiva for terms of ransom. But when he heard that the Maratha chief had detained the messenger and was approaching with all speed, he himself fled to the fort, leaving the town at the enemy's mercy. He used to draw from the Treasury the pay of 500 soldiers, but had so long appropriated the money without maintaining a

* First sack of Surat: The most minute details and graphic accounts are found in the factory records: Log of the *Loyal Merchant* (*Orme MSS.* vol. 263, pp. 23-24); *F. R.* Surat 2 (Surat Consult. 6 Jan. 1664), vol. 86 (Surat to Persia; Surat to Co. 18 and 28 Jan. and 4 April); *Dutch Records*, vol. 27, Nos. 711 and 719. Letter of Escaliot very valuable. Bernier, 188-190; *Storia*, ii. 29, 112, 120, 132, iv. 428. Ishwardas 52*a*. (*A.N.*, K.K., and Tavernier silent). For a good description of the city and fort, Kaeppelin, 52*n*, and Carré, i. 16-49.

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proper force. His cowardice also prevented him from organizing a defence or even from standing at his post.

The townspeople were sheep worthy of such a shepherd. A population composed mostly of money-loving traders, poor artisans, punctilious fire-worshippers and tender-souled Jains, cannot readily take to war even in self-defence. The richest merchants, though owning millions of Rupees, had not the sense to hire guards for the protection of their wealth, though they might have done so at only a twentieth part of what they were soon to lose through pillage.

§8. *Heroic defence of the English at Surat.*

The shame of this cowardice in high and low alike was deepened by the contrast afforded by the manly spirit of a handful of foreigners. The English and Dutch merchants resolved to defend their own factories at all costs, though these were open houses, not built to stand an attack. They might have sought safety by escaping to their ships at Swālly on the coast, 10 miles west of Surat ; but "it was thought more like Englishmen to make ourselves ready to defend our lives and goods to the uttermost than by a flight to leave money, goods, house to merciless people."

Sir George Oxenden, the English President, and his Council stood at their posts in Surat, and improvised a defence of the factory. They procured two small brass guns from a merchant in the town and four others from their own vessels. With the armed sailors promptly sent up from the English ships at Swālly, they mustered in the factory 150 Englishmen and 60 *peons,* a total of 210 defenders. Four of the guns were mounted on the roof to scour two broad streets and command the large and lofty house of Hāji Said Beg, adjacent to theirs. Two other guns were posted behind the front gate, in which port-holes were cut for firing into the passage leading to the factory. What provisions, water and powder could be got were hurriedly laid in. "Some were set to melt lead and make bullets,

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others with chisels to cut lead into slugs; no hand idle but all employed to strengthen every place. Captains were appointed and every man quartered and order taken for relieving one another upon necessity. To secure the approaches to the factory, the English went outside and took possession of a temple just under their house, and cleared it of its refugees, and also shut up a mosque on another side, whose windows looked into the outer court-yard of the factory. President Oxenden at the head of his 200 soldiers "drawn out in rank and file, with drum and trumpet," publicly marched through the town in the morning of the 6th, "declaring that he intended to withstand Shivaji with this handful of men."

The Dutch, too, defended their house, though its distance of a mile from the English factory made mutual aid between the two nations impossible. The example of the Europeans also heartened a body of Turkish and Armenian merchants to defend their property in their *sarāi*, close to the English factory.

§9. *First loot of Surat, 1664.*

Shivaji had been heard of at Bassein, twenty-four miles north of Bombay, only nine days before. But he had made a forced march to Surat with 4,000 men mounted on choice horses with such speed and secrecy that he was at Surat a day after his approach had been detected. His route lay by the forts of Nar-durg (6 m. s. e. of Murbād), Māhuli, and Kohaj and then across the zamindaris of Jawhār, Rāmnagar and Lakdar(?), north of the Thānā district. Two Rajahs had joined him on the way with their contingents in the hope of sharing the plunder, and his army now mustered 10,000.

At 11 o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, 6th January, 1664, Shivaji arrived at Surat and pitched his tent in a garden a quarter of a mile outside the Burhānpur or eastern gate. The night before he had sent two

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messengers with a letter requiring the governor and the three most eminent merchants and richest men in the city, *viz.*, Hāji Said Beg, Baharji Borāh, and Hāji Qāsim, to come to him in person immediately and make terms, otherwise he threatened the whole town with fire and sword. No answer had been given to the demand, and the Maratha horsemen, immediately after their arrival on the 6th, entered the defenceless and almost deserted city, and after sacking the houses began to set fire to them. A body of Shivaji's musketeers was set "to play upon the castle, with no expectation to take it, but to keep in and frighten the governor and the rest that had got in, as also [to prevent] the soldiers of the castle from sallying out upon them whilst the others plundered and fired [the houses.]" The garrison kept up a constant fire, but the fort-guns inflicted more damage on the town than on the assailants. Throughout Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, this work of devastation was continued, every day new fires being raised, so that thousands of houses were consumed to ashes and two-thirds of the town destroyed. As the English chaplain wrote, "Thursday and Friday nights were the most terrible nights for fire. The fire turned the night into day, as before the smoke in the day-time had turned day into night, rising so thick that it darkened the sun like a great cloud."

Near the Dutch factory stood the grand mansion of Baharji Borāh, then "reputed the richest merchant in the world," his property having been estimated at 80 *lakhs* of Rupees. The Marathas plundered it at leisure day and night till Friday evening, when having ransacked it and dug up its floor, they set fire to it. From this house they took away 28 *seers* of large pearls, with many other jewels, rubies, emeralds and "an incredible amount of money."

Close to the English factory were the lofty residence and extensive warehouses of another very rich merchant, Hāji Said Beg, who, too, had fled away to the fort, leaving his property without a defender. All the afternoon and night of Wednesday and till past the noon of Thursday,

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the Marathas continued to break open his doors and chests and carry off as much money as they could. Entering one of his warehouses they smashed some casks of quicksilver and spilt a great quantity of it on the floor. But in the afternoon of Thursday the brigands left it in a hurry, on being scared by a sortie which the English had made into the street to drive away a party of 25 Maratha horsemen who seemed intent on setting fire to another house in dangerous proximity to the English factory. In this encounter one Maratha trooper was wounded with a bullet, and two Englishmen with arrow and sword, but slightly.

The English merchants next day put a guard of their own in the house of Said Beg and thus he suffered no further loss. Shivaji was angry with the English at being balked of his prey, and in the afternoon of Friday he sent them a message calling upon them to pay him three *lakhs* of Rupees or else let his men freely loot the Hāji's house, and threatening that in case they refused to do either he would come in person, kill every soul in the English factory, and raze their house to the ground. President Oxenden took time to consider the proposal till next morning (Saturday), when he rejected both the demands of Shivaji and boldly defied the Maratha chief to come and do his worst, saying, "We are ready for you and resolved not to go away. But come when you please; and [as] you have, as you say, resolved to come, I ask you to come one *prahar* sooner than you intend." To this challenge Shivaji gave no reply. He was surfeited with booty and was too wise to run a needless risk by facing artillery concealed behind defences and served by resolute and disciplined men, for the sake of a few *lakhs* more.

§10. *Attempt to murder Shivaji.*

The cowardly governor Ināyet Khan, who had run into the fort on Tuesday night, formed an infamous plot from his safe refuge. On Thursday he sent a young

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follower of his to Shivaji with pretended terms of peace. These were so manifestly unreasonable that Shiva scornfully asked the envoy, "Your master is now cooped up in his chamber like a woman. Does he think of me too as a woman that he expects me to accept such terms as these?" The young man immediately replied, "We are not women; I have something more to say to you;" and whipping out a concealed dagger he ran full at Shivaji's breast. A Maratha body-guard that stood before the Rajah with a drawn sword, struck off the assassin's hand with one blow. But so great was the force of the desperado's rush that he did not stop but drove the bloody stump of his arm on Shiva's person and the two rolled on the ground together. The blood being seen on Shiva's dress, his followers imagined that he had been murdered, and the cry ran through the camp to kill the prisoners. But the same guardsman clove the assassin's skull; Shiva rose up from the ground and forbade any massacre. Then he ordered the prisoners to be brought before him and cut off the heads of four and the hands of 24 others from among them at his caprice, but spared the rest.

Mr. Anthony Smith, a servant of the English E. I. Company, was seized on landing at the Dutch jetty and kept a prisoner in the Maratha camp for three days. Along with other prisoners, his right hand was ordered to be cut off, at which he cried out to Shivaji in Hindusthani to cut off his head instead. But on his hat being taken off, he was recognized as an Englishman and spared. On Friday afternoon he was sent to the English factory with a message from Shiva, but President Oxenden detained him there. He was ransomed for Rs. 350.

§11. *How money was extorted.*

The plunder of Surat yielded him above a *kror* of Rupees, the city "not having been so rich [as then] in many years before." The looting was unresisted, and extended

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over fully four days and nights, and he "scorned to carry away anything but gold, silver, pearls, diamonds and such precious ware." (Log of the *Loyal Merchant*.)

On reaching Surat, Shivaji had publicly declared that he had not come to do any personal hurt to the English or other merchants, but only to revenge himself on Aurangzib for having invaded his country and killed some of his relations. But money was really his sole aim.* He had to make the most of his four days' free run at Surat and shrank from no cruelty to extort money as quickly as possible. As the English chaplain wrote, "His desire of money is so great that he spares no barbarous cruelty to extort confessions from his prisoners, whips them most cruelly, threatens death and often executes it if they do not produce so much as he thinks they may or desires they should ;— at least cuts off one hand, sometimes both."

At ten o'clock in the morning of Sunday the 10th, Shivaji suddenly departed from Surat with his army, on hearing that a Mughal force was coming to the relief of the town. That night he encamped twelve miles off and then retreated by rapid marches to Konkan.

For some days afterwards the fear of his return prevented the townspeople from coming back to their desolated homes. But the imperial army reached Surat on the 17th and then the cowardly governor ventured to return from the fort. The people hooted at him and flung dirt on him,

* An old merchant who had brought 40 ox-loads of cloth from near Agra but sold none, tried to propitiate Shivaji by offering it to him. But on his answering that he had no ready money, his right hand was cut off by Shivaji's order, he was driven away, and his cloth burnt by the Marathas. (Letter of Escaliot.) Bernier, 190, for the narrow escape of a Jewish ruby-merchant from the death threatened by Shivaji to extort his wealth. "Mr. Smith was present when he cut off more than 26 hands in one day, and as many heads ; whoever he was that was taken and brought before him that could not redeem himself, lost either his hand or his head; and his manner was first to plunder and then to cause the owner of the house to give him something over and above to redeem his house from being burnt, and yet that perfidious villain would fire it afterwards, though he had obliged himself to the contrary." (Surat to Co., 28 Jan.)

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for which his son in anger shot a poor innocent Hindu trader dead. Sir George Oxenden, the English President, won the people's praise and admiration for having made a gallant stand and saved not only the Company's property, but also the quarter of the town situated round the English factory.*

The Emperor showed his sympathy with the afflicted citizens by excusing the custom duties for one year in the case of all the merchants of Surat, and he rewarded the valour of the English and the Dutch traders by granting them a reduction of one-half per cent. from the normal import duties on their merchandise in future.

§12. *Shivaji's doings in 1664.*

The year 1664 that lay between the departure of Shāista Khan and the arrival of Jai Singh, was not marked by any Mughal success. The new viceroy, Prince Muazzam, lived at Aurangabad, caring only for pleasure and hunting. His favourite general, Maharajah Jaswant Singh, was posted at Punā. From this place he marched out and besieged Kondānā (Nov. 1663.) The Rajputs are proverbially inefficient in sieges, and Jaswant, after wasting six months before the fort, delivered a rash and fruitless assault, in which he lost many hundreds of his soldiers, chiefly owing

* As he wrote to the Company, 28th January 1664, (*F. R.* Surat 86): "The townspeople cry out in thousands for a reward from the King to the English that had by their courage preserved them. We were with the noblemen of the army that came to our relief, from whom we received great thanks for the good service we did the King and the country, whereupon your President, having a pistol in his hand, laid it before the chief, saying.....he now laid down his arms, leaving the future care and protection of the city to them; which was exceedingly well taken, [the general] telling the President [that] he accepted it, and he must give him a vest, a horse and gird a sword about him. But your President told him they were things becoming a soldier, but we were merchants and expected favour from the King in our trade."

The reduction of the import duty in favour of the English and the Dutch was withdrawn in Nov. 1679. [*Aurangzib*, v. ch. 60 §5.]

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to a gunpowder explosion. Then he quarrelled with his brother-in-law Bhāo Singh Hādā, evidently on the question of responsibility for the failure, and the two officers abandoned the siege (28 May 1664) and with their armies retired to Aurangabad to pass the rainy season. The campaign ended in absolutely no gain. (*Dil.* 47; *A. N.* 867; *Jedhe.*)

The field being clear, Shivaji ranged at liberty in spite of the height of the rainy season, and plundered Ahmadnagar. (Karwar to Surat, 8th August, 1664. *F. R.* Surat, vol. 104.)

On 26th June the English factors write, "Shivaji is so famously infamous for his notorious thefts that Report hath made him an airy body, and added wings, or else it were impossible he could be at so many places as he is said to be at, all at one time. . . . . They ascribe to him to perform more than a Herculean labour that he is become the talk of all conditions of people. . . . That he will lay siege to Goa we do hardly believe, in regard it is none of his business to lay siege to any place that is fortified against him, for it will not turn him to account. He is, and ever was, for a running banquet, and to plunder and burn those towns that have neither defence nor guard." (Surat to Karwar. *F. R.* Surat 86.)

And, again, on 26th November, "Deccan [*i.e.,* Bijapur] and all the South coast [*i.e.,* Kanārā] are all embroiled in civil wars, ... and Shivaji reigns victoriously and uncontrolled, that he is a terror to all the kings and princes round about, daily increasing in strength. . . . He is very nimble and active, imposing strange labour upon himself that he may endure hardship, and also exercises his chiefest men that he flies to and fro with incredible dexterity." (Surat to Co., *F.R.* Surat 86.) At the end of the monsoons, *i.e.,* in October, he burst into Kanārā. (See Ch. 10.)

On 23rd January, 1664, Shahji died as the result of a hunting accident on the bank of the Tungabhadrā, in the Bāsavapatan district. His younger son Vyānkoji

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succeeded to all his personal effects and territories in Mysore and the Eastern Karnātak.

APPENDIX

The eye-witness of the bloody reprisal in Shivaji's camp after the Muslim attempt to murder him by treachery, was Anthony Smith, an English merchant then detained there as a prisoner for ransom. (He was mistaken for an Armenian or Turk.) A modern writer has tried to discredit Smith's evidence on the ground that the President of the Surat English factory reported to the Company in London that Smith had injured the Company's interests by telling some lies to the Marathas during his captivity. Evidently the charge was disproved, for we find Smith still in the service of the Company three years after this date. (This information was traced by Sir W. Foster among the India Office records, at my request.) Therefore Smith's veracity as to what Shivaji did in his camp at the time cannot be questioned. These atrocities are inevitable in the sack of cities.

Smith's evidence is corroborated by Rustam Manakji, whose Persian life (the *Qissah*) by J. Kaikubad has been printed (Dr. J. J. Modi in his *Asiatic Papers*, Part IV, 281-309.) This Manakji was present in Surat during the sack, and he relieved the distressed Parsis of the city who had been robbed and whose houses had been burnt down, and also paid Rs. 10,000 to secure the release of the Parsis detained for ransom by the Marathas. The Zoroastrians in Surat were a helpless, unarmed and inoffensive people, and yet as the *Qissah* tells us (p. 290), "The two chiefs of Shivaji's army were enemies of all the Zoroastrians. They desolated all the *mauza* and country by their pillage. From every house they took away gold, ornaments, clothing, and grain, and then set fire to the houses. In them they killed some men, and carried away others with their hands tied behind them like convicts in chains."

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CHAPTER V.

SHIVAJI AND JAI SINGH, 1665.

1. Jai Singh sent against Shivaji.
2. Character of Jai Singh.
3. Jai Singh's anxieties and preparations.
4. Coalition of Shivaji's enemies.
5. Theatre of war described.
6. Mughals set up outposts.
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8. Purandar described.
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13. Purandar outworks stormed.
14. Death of Murār Bāji.
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16. Shiva interviews Jai Singh.
17. Treaty of Purandar, 1665.
18. Shivaji receives Mughal favours.
19. Shivaji assists Mughals in invasion of Bijapur.
20. Shiva fails against Panhala.

§1. *Jai Singh sent against Shivaji.*

The failure of Shāista Khan and the sack of Surat caused bitter mortification to Aurangzib and his Court, and he decided to send his ablest Hindu and Muhammadan generals to the Deccan. Among the promotions and transfers on his birthday, 30th September, 1664, the Emperor appointed Mirzā Rajah Jai Singh to put down Shivaji. Under him were deputed Dilir Khan, Dāud Khan Qureshi, Rajah Rāi Singh Sisodiā, Ihtishām Khan Shaikhzāda, Qubād Khan, Rajah Sujan Singh Bundelā, Kirat Singh (a son of Jai Singh), Mullā Yahia Navāyat (a Bijapuri noble who had come over to the Mughals), and many other officers, with 14,000 troopers. (*A. N.* 868; *Storia,* ii. 120.)

After making the necessary preparations, and collecting his subordinates, Jai Singh left Upper India and crossed the Narmadā at Hāndiā on 9th January, 1665. He pushed rapidly on, never wasting a day by halting, except when strong necessity compelled him. On 10th February he arrived at Aurangabad, where Prince Muazzam was holding Court as viceroy of the Deccan. In three days Jai Singh

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finished the work of waiting on the Prince, receiving and returning the visits of the local officers and nobles, and settling some points connected with his expedition. Then, leaving Aurangabad on 13th February, he arrived at Punā on 3rd March and took over charge from Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who immediately afterwards (7th) started for Delhi, as commanded by the Emperor. (*H. A.* Paris MS. 110*b*, 112*a*, 114*b*, 116*a*.)

§2. *Character of Jai Singh.*

Jai Singh's career had been one of the undimmed brilliancy almost from the day when he, an orphan of eight, received his first appointment in the Mughal army (1617.) Since succeeding to the throne of Amber in 1622, when only 13 years old, he had fought under the imperial banner in every part of the empire,—from Balkh in Central Asia to Bijapur in the Deccan, and from Qandahār in the west to Mungir in the east. Hardly a year had passed during the long reign of Shah Jahan when this Rajput chieftain had not seen active service somewhere and received some promotion for conspicuous merit. His marked ability had found recognition in his being given the command of the van or one of the wings in the Mughal armies led by princes of the blood in campaigns beyond India. Latterly he had commanded in chief. In diplomacy he had attained to a success surpassing even his victories in the field. Wherever there was a difficult or delicate work to be done, the Emperor had only to turn to Jai Singh . A man of infinite tact and patience, an adept in the ceremonious courtesy of the Muslims, a master of Turki and Persian, besides Urdu and the Rajput dialect, he was an ideal leader of the composite army of Afghans and Turks, Rajputs and Hindusthanis, that followed the crescent banner of the sovereign of Delhi.

Age and experience had cooled the impetuous ardour of his youth,—he had once led the forlorn hope, at the storm-

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ing of Mau,—and he now employed stratagem in preference to force, and bribe in preference to war. His foresight and political cunning, his smoothness of tongue and cool calculating policy, were in striking contrast with the impulsive generosity, reckless daring, blunt straightforwardness, and impolitic chivalry which we are apt to associate with the Rajput character.

And now this veteran of a hundred fights donned his armour at the age of fifty-six to crush a petty chieftain, who in less than ten years had grown great enough to baffle all the resources of Bijapur and to challenge the prestige of the empire of Delhi.

§3. *Jai Singh's anxieties and far-sighted preparations.*

It was, however, with no light heart that Jai Singh* set himself to the task of subduing Shivaji, against whom Bijapuris and rival Maratha chiefs, Shāista Khan and Jaswant Singh, had toiled in vain. The Deccan had been the grave of many a reputation, and he had the failures of his predecessors before him. Shiva had already established a name for stratagem, and his Māvlés had measured swords with the best regular troops on more than equal terms. Then, again, there was the likelihood that the arrival of a large Mughal force in the Deccan would alarm Bijapur and Golkondā and throw them into the arms of Shiva to make a common cause against the invader from the north. Jai Singh, therefore, could not give his undivided attention to

* My account of this war is based upon Jai Singh's copious letters (*Haft Anjuman*, Benares and Paris MSS., with a few extra letters in *Faiyyāz-ul-qawānin*), Aurangzib's letters (given in Paris MS. *Suppl.* 476, with two stray letters in a miscellaneous Delhi Ms.) and certain other letters given in *Khatut-i-Shivaji* (R.A.S. MS.). Some of these have been translated by me in the *Modern Review*. *A. N.* 887-907, though contemporary and authentic, has no independent value after the use of the above materials. *Storia*, ii. 120-125, 132-137, gives Manucci's personal experience of the war. The Marathi chronicles, Sabh. 36-44, and *91 Q.* 49, contain later and partly legendary accounts.

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the Marathas: he had to keep an eye on Bijapur too. The problem before him was no easy one. As he wrote to the Emperor, "Not for a moment, in day or night, do I seek rest or ease from being busy about the task on which I have been sent." We see from his letters how he employed every possible device for dealing with an enemy, how wide-awake and full of many-sided activity he was, how he looked far ahead, and how he handled his force so as to cause distraction to the enemy or deal a concentrated blow at a vital point.

In view of his two enemies, Jai Singh very wisely decided to take up a position between both, *i.e.*, in the eastern part of Shiva's dominion, whence he could also easily threaten Bijapur, instead of pushing the war into the Western Ghāts or the Konkan plains further west. So convinced was he of the wisdom of this plan that when Aurangzib urged him to make a descent into Konkan, he strongly objected and succeeded in carrying his point. He knew that if he could strike a fatal blow at the heart of the Maratha kingdom, its distant limbs would drop down of themselves.

§4. *Coalition of all the enemies of Shivaji.*

Secondly, he played skilfully upon the hopes and fears of the Sultan of Bijapur, holding forth the chance of a reduction of his tribute and the removal of the Emperor's displeasure, if Adil Shah aided the Mughals and thus clearly proved his want of connection with Shivaji. Thirdly, he arranged to combine against Shivaji all his enemies and distract his attention by attacks from all possible quarters. As early as January he had sent two Portuguese captains in his service named Francisco and Diogo de Mello,* to the

* Of the *Mello* family living in the Mughal country in banishment from Daman (Goa) for having caused two murders there. Manucci (ii. 144.) Also Pissurlencar, i. app.; Biker. iv. 126.

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western coast with letters to the chief of the Portuguese settlement at Goa, inviting him to co-operate with the imperialists in attacking Shiva, who had a fleet of his own plying on that sea. In May he wrote to the Emperor, "Now that Shiva is quite negligent and free from anxiety about the west coast, if our ships from Gujrat make a sudden descent on his maritime possessions much booty can be gained." He also wrote to the Siddis of Janjirā seeking their friendship. (*H. A.* Paris 114*a;* Ben. 78*a.*)

In January he had sent his Brahman emissaries to various Deccani chieftains, to stir them up against Shiva. The zamindars of Karnātak were asked to help the Mughals by threatening Bijapur from the south; and agents from two such chiefs, namely Shivāppā Nāyak and the zemindar of Bāsavapatan, reached Jai Singh's camp in April with offers of service.* Towards the end of January an envoy from the Rajah of Jawhār had met Jai Singh at Burhānpur with a proposal to join the Mughal side; he had been conciliated, promised a *mansab,* and asked to send his son or brother with a contingent of troops. Every one who bore a grudge to Shivaji or envied the sudden rise of the Bhonslés had been approached by the Mughal general's spies. Bāji Chandra Rao and his kinsman Ambāji Govind Rao Moré,—the family from which Shivaji had wrested Jāvli,—in response to Jai Singh's invitation, sent to him a Brahman named Mudhā, asking for a safe conduct and money help, (middle of February.) These were given, and they reached his camp, along with Mānkoji Dhangar, and were enlisted in the Mughal army (4th week of March). Similarly, Afzal Khan's son, Fazl Khan, solicited from Jai Singh a command and an opportunity of avenging his slaughtered father on Shivaji. The adhesion of the petty Rajahs of the Koli country north of Kalian was secured through Niccolao Manucci, then chief of Jai Singh's

* Shivāppā Nāyak, the Rajah of Bednur, had died in 1660, and his son Soma Shekhar was now on the throne, but the country was still called the realm of the great conqueror Shivāppā. Paris MS. 132*a.*

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European artillery. (*H. A.* Paris, 113, 123, 120*b*. *Storia*, ii. 132-133.)

Money and promises of high rank in the Mughal service were lavishly employed on Shivaji's officers to corrupt their loyalty, and with some success, as in February Ātmāji and Kahar Koli and two other brothers of the former, who commanded 3,000 cavalry and were posted by Shiva at the foot of Purandar in charge of his artillery, sent their agent to Jai Singh agreeing to desert to him. Rāmā and Hanumant, two captains descended from an ancient line of jagirdars of the Supā sub-division, were called away from the service of the Rajah of Chāndā and employed under Jai Singh on account of their familiarity with the seat of war and local influence. (Ben. 54, Paris 113, 122*a*.)

Above all, Jai Singh concentrated all authority in his own hands, as an indispensable condition of success in war. The Emperor had at first given him the command of the field-operations only, while all administrative work, like the promotion, punishment and transfer of officers, the payment of the troops, and the regulation of jagirs, was left in the hands of the viceroy at Aurangabad. Jai Singh rightly insisted that in war there should be only one head, and that the 'man on the spot' should be given full authority, or else the work would suffer. The Emperor yielded to the argument and Jai Singh gained absolute civil and military authority alike. The commandants of the Mughal forts at Ahmadnagar and Parendā were also placed under his orders.

In Western Mahārāshtra with its heavy rainfall, campaigning is impossible during the monsoons. It was already 3rd March when Jai Singh reached Punā, and if he was to effect anything it must be done in the next three months. From his despatches we learn how he utilized every day, how he struck swiftly and hard, and how he followed up every success to the utmost. The mariner does not scan the sky for the storm-cloud with more anxiety than did this general for the herald of the monsoons which must interrupt

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his work in the middle and drive him into the forced inactivity of cantonments.

§5. *The theatre of war described.*

The Western Ghāts form a long towering wall running north to south along the western side of the Deccan. They have thrown off a number of short spurs eastwards, every two of which enclose a valley, the bed of some stream rolling east to join its sisters and form the mighty rivers of the south, the Godāvari and the Krishnā. Towards the east the spurs end, the valleys widen out and merge in the vast plains of the kingdom of Bijapur. This land, almost locked among the hills, is the cradle of the Maratha kingdom. Open, and therefore vulnerable, on the east, it is almost impenetrable from the west on account of hills and jungles. And it is in the west that the historic forts of Shivaji are situated, almost every peak being crowned with the Maratha eagle's eyrie.

Going southwards from Junnar (which is 55 miles west of Ahmadnagar) and crossing the old Mughal frontier, we have first the valley of the Indrāyani, overlooked by the hill-forts of Lohgarh and Tikonā in the west and Chākan in the centre. Next comes the valley of the Bhimā, in which Punā stands. Further south, across a long range, lies the valley of the slender brook Karhā, with the cities of Sāswad and Supā in the plain and the forts of Singh-garh on the western hills and Purandar on its southern rocky barrier. Beyond these hills lies the valley of the Nirā, with the town of Shirwal on its bank and the forts of Rājgarh and Tornā in the west and Rohirā in the south-west.

Punā is roughly the same distance (about 28 miles) from Lohgarh in the north-west and Rājgarh in the south. Sāswad was admirably situated for attacking Purandar (6 miles south-west of it), Singh-garh and Rājgarh (18 and 24 miles in the west), and Punā (18 miles north-west of it), —while the widening plain east of it enabled cavalry to

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make an easy and rapid dash into Bijapur territory, or bar the path of reinforcements coming to Shiva from that side. Even now five main roads meet at Sāswad.

§6. *Mughals set up outposts.*

Jai Singh, therefore, with a true general's eye for the ground, made Sāswad his base. Punā was strongly garrisoned. An outpost was established opposite Lohgarh to observe and blockade it and guard the road leading north to the Mughal frontier near Junnar. A flying column was organized to ravage the Maratha villages embosomed among the hills to the west and south-west of Sāswad. On his eastern side he was quite secure from attack, from the nature of the ground, the position of Sāswad close to the boundary line between Shiva's dominion and Bijapur, and the existence of a Mughal advanced post at Supā.

After arriving at Punā (3rd March), Jai Singh spent some days in settling the country and establishing outposts, which he regarded as the "first of the pillars supporting the work of this expedition." Qutb-ud-din Khan was sent at the head of 7,000 cavalry with orders to guard the country from Junnar in the north to the lowlands (*pāinghāt*) of Konkan opposite Lohgarh, to set up one permanent outpost facing Lohgarh (to be garrisoned by 3,000 men), another facing fort Nar-durg with a strong force, and other outposts to bar the paths usually followed by the enemy, and to be constantly touring through his jurisdiction and inspecting his outposts. Ihtishām Khan with 4,000 cavalry was left to guard Punā and its surrounding district. Between Punā and Lohgarh, a distance of some 28 miles, is a difficult pass, where a guard of 2,000 cavalry was posted. Sayyid Abdul Āziz was appointed with 3,000 horse to hold the *thānah* of Shirwal and prevent aid from reaching Purandar from the south. With him went Bāji Chandra Rao, Ambāji Govind Rao (zamindars of Jāvli), and Mānkoji Dhangar who had joined the Mughals.

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There was already another *thānah* at Supā, in charge of Sayyid Munawwar Khan of Bārha, and some other Muslim and Hindu officers.

§7. *Jai Singh opens the campaign.*

Deciding, for the reasons given above, to take up his position at Sāswad and besiege Purandar, Jai Singh marched out of Punā on 14th March.

But he had immediately afterwards to make a long halt in its environs, as news came to him that Qutb-ud-din had gone to Junnar to escort treasure and Shiva had come to Lohgarh to make a dash into the imperial territory as soon as Jai Singh's back would be turned on Punā. Jai Singh quickly recalled Qutb-ud-din to his post opposite Lohgarh to watch Shiva's movements and resumed his march on the 23rd. Loni, some 12 miles east of Punā, was next reached; here a block-house or enclosure for sheltering the troops was built in 3 days, and a *thānah* established under Rāmā and Hanumant, with 300 cavalry and 300 foot-musketeers, to guard the line of communication with Punā and the two roads which led to the imperial territory.

Arriving on 29th March at a place one day's march short of Sāswad, he sent on Dilir Khan with the vanguard and the artillery to cross the pass lying in the way, advance four miles, and then halt.

Next day the Rajah crossed the hill and pushed on to Dilir Khan's camp, leaving Dāud Khan below the pass to see to the safe transit of the army up to noon. The rear-guard were to bring up the stragglers.

On this very morning (30th March) Dilir Khan went with the van to Sāswad in order to select a place for encampment. In this reconnaissance he approached fort Purandar. A large body of Maratha musketeers, who occupied an enclosed village in the waist of the hill—called *māchi* in the local language,—now came down and attacked the imperialists, who, however, routed them and captured

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the *māchi*. The houses there were burnt and the Mughal van very boldly improved their victory by at once pushing on as near Purandar as they could and entrenching just beyond the range of the fort-guns.

Jai Singh on hearing of it, at once sent up 3,000 of the troops of his command under Rāi Singh, Kirat Singh, Qubād Khan, Mitrasen, Indraman Bundelā and other officers at a gallop. He also despatched an urgent order to Dāud Khan to come to him, take charge of the camp, and enable the Rajah to go to supervise the siege. But Dāud Khan, on hearing the news, had hastened to join Dilir Khan, without coming to Jai Singh.

The day was far spent; there was no high officer left to guard the camp, and so Jai Singh had to stay there perforce. He had already sent forward a party of pioneers and water-carriers, shot, powder, gun munitions, and entrenching tools for the use of Dilir Khan.

Next morning (31st March), Jai Singh carefully escorted the baggage to a permanent camp serving as a base, between Sāswad and Purandar, only 4 miles from the latter. Then he reconnoitred the fort from the position of Dāud Khan and Kirat Singh. It was not a single fort, but a fortified mass of hills; hence, to surround and closely blockade it was impossible. (Paris MS. 125*b*.)

§8. *Purandar described.*

Six miles south-west of Sāswad rises the stupendous mountain mass of Purandar, the highest point of which towers 4,564 feet above sea-level and more than 2,500 feet above the plain at its foot. It is really a double fort, with an independent and very strong sister enclosure, named Vajragarh, on a ridge running out east of it. Purandar consists of an upper fort or citadel with precipitous sides all around and a lower fort or *māchi*, 300 feet or more below it. The latter is a ledge running round the waist of the hill with many a winding, the entire circuit being four miles.

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On the north side the ledge widens out into a broad terrace, containing the barracks and offices of the garrison. This terrace is bounded on the east by the high spur named Bhairav Khind, which starts from the base of the steep overhanging north-eastern tower (called *Khad-kalā* or the Skyscraper)* of the upper fort, and runs for about a mile eastwards in a narrow ridge, ending in a small table-land (3,618 feet above sea-level), crowned with the fort of Rudramāl, (now called Vajragarh.)

This Vajragarh commands the *māchi* or lower fort of Purandar on its northern and most important face, as the garrison has to live here. It was by seizing Vajragarh that Jai Singh in 1665 and the English in 1817 made Purandar untenable for the Marathas. Jai Singh, like a true general, decided to attack Vajragarh first. (*Bom. Gaz.* xvii. pt. iii, pp. 428-435.)

§9. *Mughals open the siege.*

Dilir Khan with his nephews and Afghan troops, Hari Bhān and Udai Bhān Gaur, entrenched between Purandar and Rudramāl. In front of him were the chief of the artillery, Turktāz Khan, and the party sent by Jai Singh. Kirat Singh with the 3,000 troopers of the Rajah and a few other *mansabdārs* made a stockade opposite the north gate of Purandar. On the right were the trenches of Rajah Narsingh Gaur, Karn Rāthor, Jagat Singh of Narwar, and Sayyid Maqbul Ālam. Behind Purandar and facing its postern gate (*khirki*) was the position of Dāud Khan, Rajah Rāi Singh, Md. Sālih Tarkhān, Rām Singh [Hādā?], Sher Singh Rāthor, Rāj Singh Gaur and others. To the right of this position were posted Rasul Beg Rozbhāni and his Rozbhāni followers. Opposite Rudramāl, Chaturbhuj Chauhān with a party of Dilir Khan's followers entrenched, and behind them Mitrasen, Indraman Bundelā and some other officers.

* Molesworth, 2nd ed., 192, explains *Khadkal* as 'a rocky plateau'.

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Jai Singh removed his quarters from the camp to the foot of the hill to be nearer the besieged fort, while the soldiers pitched their tents along the hill-side. He visited the trenches every day, encouraged his men, and supervised the progress of the siege. At first all his efforts were directed to dragging guns to the top of the steep and difficult hill. It took three days to raise a gun, named *Abdullah Khan,* and mount it opposite Rudramāl. In $3\frac{1}{2}$ days more a second gun, named *Fath Lashkar,* was taken there. A third, named *Haheli,* was painfully approaching the summit. The incessant bombardment of the Mughals demolished the bases of the tower in front, and pioneers were sent to its foot to dig a hole underneath.

§10. *Capture of Vajragarh.*

At midday, 13th April, Dilir Khan's division stormed the tower and drove the enemy into an enclosure behind it, leaving on the field seven slain and four wounded. Jai Singh reinforced Dilir Khan with a party of his own Rajputs. Next day, the victorious Mughals pushed on to the inner enclosure and tried to capture it by escalade. The garrison, oppressed by their fire, capitulated in the evening (14th April), left the fort, and were disarmed. But Jai Singh very wisely allowed them to return home in order to tempt the garrison of Purandar, by this example of leniency, to surrender instead of fighting to the last. The heroic leaders of the defence were chivalrously given robes of honour by Dilir Khan and Jai Singh alike. The imperialists lost 80 killed and 109 wounded, as the price of this success. (Paris MS 126*b*.)

§11. *Flying columns ravage Shivaji's villages.*

The possession of Vajragarh was the stepping-stone to the capture of Purandar, or in Jai Singh's own language, "the key that would unlock Purandar". Dilir Khan now turned to the latter fort, while Jai Singh organized raids

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into the Maratha country, in order, as he wrote to the Emperor, to convince Shiva and the Sultan of Bijapur that the Mughal army was large enough to be able to spare troops from the siege, and also to prevent any concentration of forces under Shivaji by creating constant terror and disturbance in various parts of his kingdom. (Paris MS. 133*a*.)

There was also a secret reason for thus sending away certain generals from the siege-camp. He had some disloyal officers under him, whose presence was worse than useless. Dāud Khan Qureshi was posted to watch the postern gate (*khirki*) of the fort; but after a few days it became known that a party of Marathas had entered the fort by that gate, without being opposed by him. Dilir Khan severely rebuked Dāud Khan for his failure, and a bitter quarrel broke out between the two. Jai Singh then transferred Dāud Khan to his own division and posted Purdil Khan and Subh-Karn Bundelā opposite the postern. But matters did not improve: "Subh-Karn did not at all give his heart to the work, but preferred above everything else to favour Shiva!" Dāud Khan, too, was a source of mischief in his new station. He constantly declared that the capture of Purandar was beyond the range of possibility, and that the siege was a waste of men and money. His intention in talking in this way was, as Jai Singh detected, to discourage the commander-in-chief from heartily supporting the siege-operations, so that Dilir Khan would have to retire with failure and disgrace. Jai Singh removed the mischief-maker from the camp by creating an independent flying column and sending him at its head, to make raids daily, or on alternate days, on different places in the district. (Ben. MS. 191*b*, *Faiyyāz*, 592.)

On 25th April, the flying column, six thousand strong under Dāud Khan, accompanied by Rajah Rāi Singh, Sharzā Khan (a Bijapuri general), Amar Singh Chandāwat, Achal Singh Kachhwā (the principal officer of Jai Singh's household troops), and 400 of Jai Singh's own troopers, marched out with orders to enter the region of Rājgarh, Singh-garh

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and Rohirā from two sides and 'not to leave any vestige of cultivation or habitation, but make an utter desolation." At the same time Qutb-ud-din Khan and Ludi Khan were ordered to harry the district from the north and thus distract and wear out Shivaji. (Paris MS. 133*b*.)

Dāud Khan's party arrived near fort Rohirā on the 27th and burnt and totally ruined about 50 villages. A body of Mughal skirmishers entered four populous villages hidden among the hills, which had never before been visited by an enemy ; the invaders soon received reinforcements, overcame the opposition, occupied the villages, razed them to the ground, and brought away many of the peasants and their cattle and other property as spoils of war. After a day's halt here, the Mughals marched towards Rājgarh on the 30th, burning the villages on the way. Without stopping to besiege the fort (for which they were not prepared), they sacked the villages around it,—the garrison watching the work of ruin from the shelter of the fort-guns, without venturing to make a sally.

The ground in the neighbourhood was hilly and uneven. So, the column retreated four miles to a level place, near the pass of Gunjankhorā, where they encamped for the night, and next day (1st May), reached Shivāpur. Thence Dāud Khan marched towards Singhgarh and harried its environs, returning to Punā on 3rd May, by order of Jai Singh.

Meantime Qutb-ud-din Khan, in the midst of his raids into the passes of Pur-khorā and Tāsi-khorā, near fort Kumāri, was urgently recalled to Punā, where he joined Dāud Khan. The cause of this new order was that Jai Singh had learnt that Shivaji had mustered a large force near Lohgarh, which required to be immediately broken up.

The two Mughal columns were, therefore, diverted to that side (the north-west). Leaving Punā they halted at Chinchwad (10 or 12 miles north) on the 4th and reached Lohgarh on the 5th. When the Mughal skirmishers arrived near the fort, 500 Maratha horse and 1,000 infantry sallied

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forth and attacked them. But the imperialists held their ground, and being soon reinforced routed the enemy with heavy loss after a severe fight. Then they burnt the houses on the skirt of the hill, taking many prisoners and cattle. The villages enclosed by the four forts,—Lohgarh, Visāpur, Tikonā and Tangāi,—were devastated, and much of Bālāghāt (highlands) and Pāinghāt (lowlands) harried. Thereafter they returned, Qutb-ud-din Khan and his party taking up an outpost near Punā, and Dāud Khan and his comrades rejoining the main army on 19th May.

§12. *Maratha efforts to raise the siege.*

Meantime the Maratha captains had not been idle, but tried hard to harass the Mughals and raise the siege. Early in April, Netāji Pālkar, Shiva's kinsman and cavalry leader, made a dash on Parendā, but a Mughal detachment from Supā hastened in pursuit, and the Maratha host melted away at the news and offered no fight. About the middle of May, Qutb-ud-din Khan had to advance up to fort Uravdā.* to break up a gathering of the enemy of which he had got news. The villages on the way were plundered, and the enemy dispersed wherever they assembled round any of their forts. The hill of Lohgarh was scaled, and a body of Marathas on the top slain or routed, Dāud Khan returning with 300 captives and nearly 3,000 cattle. Then, again, a body of 300 Maratha cavalry, who were sheltering at Narkot, were dislodged by a detachment sent by Qubād Khan, the new *thānahdār* of Punā (*vice* Ihtishām Khan deceased), the victors returning with the captured peasants and cattle. (*A. N.* 897-99.)

But the Marathas did not invariably fail. As Jai Singh admits, "sometimes we have failed to prevent the enemy from accomplishing their hostile designs." Khāfi Khan is more explicit: "The surprises of the enemy, their gallant

* The *Alamgir-namah* (897) gives *Ur-drug*, a mistake for *Uravdā*, 11 miles west of Puna. [Y. R. Gupté.]

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successes, attacks on dark nights, blocking of roads and difficult passes, and burning of jungles, made it very hard for the imperialists to move about. The Mughals lost many men and beasts." (ii. 180.)

After the capture of Vajragarh in the middle of April, Dilir Khan advanced along the connecting ridge and laid siege to the *machi* or lower fort of Purandar. His trenches approached the tower of Khad-kalā at the north-eastern angle of the fort. At first, the garrison made sorties to drive away the besiegers. One night they attacked Kirat Singh, who was quite prepared and repulsed them with slaughter. Another attack was made in a dark night on the trenches of Rasul Beg Rozbhāni: he was caught napping, the guns in his trenches were spiked, and 15 of his soldiers wounded. But reinforcements, attracted by the din of battle, poured in from the neighbouring trenches, and the enemy were repulsed with loss. Next day there was a sharp skirmish over the removal of the corpses, in which the Mughals lost 8 men.

But Dilir Khan sat down before Purandar like grim Death, his men "doing in one day what could not be achieved elsewhere in a month."

§13. *Outworks of Purandar stormed.*

When, in the course of May, the Mughal trenches reached the foot of the two White Towers, which had been dismantled by bombardment, the garrison began to throw down lighted naphtha oil, leather bags full of gunpowder, bombs and heavy stones, which effectually stopped the further advance of the Mughals. Jai Singh ordered a high wooden platform of logs and planks to be made, on which guns were to be mounted and parties of gunners and musketeers placed, to command the enemy's position. His first two attempts were frustrated: on the first occasion the upright posts had been just set up, on the second the cross-pieces had been joined, when the enemy burnt them down. On 30th May, however, the parts of the third tower were

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joined together in the rear and sent to the appointed place in front of the White Tower, in charge of Rup Singh Rāthor and Giridhar Purohit, with orders to set up a defensive wall in front first of all, and then plant the two rows of posts. Next some Rajput marksmen were to climb to the top and keep the enemy down with their bows and matchlocks while the tower was being completed. This was done two hours before sunset.

Then the general's hands were forced by the impetuosity of his men. Before artillery could be mounted on the wooden tower and the enemy opposite crushed, with only two hours of daylight remaining, some Rohila soldiers, without informing Dilir Khan, tried to storm the White Tower. The enemy crowded the wall in large numbers and checked them. But reinforcements rapidly arrived: the men of the trenches on both hands scaled the wall with ladders, and ran towards the enemy. Jai Singh's officer Bhupat Singh Puār, a commander of 500, was slain on the right side of the smaller White Tower, with several other Rajputs. On the left side Balkrishna Shekhāwat and some Afghans of Dilir Khan carried on the fight. Just then the line of supports, under Achal Singh and Kirat Singh, arrived on the scene of battle from their shelter behind the wooden structure. After an obstinate struggle at close quarters, the Marathas lost heavily, vacated the White Tower, retreated to behind the Black Tower (formerly known as Shah Burj or Royal Tower), and began to gall the Mughals by hurling down bombs, kettles full of gunpowder, rockets, stones, etc. Finding further advance impossible, Jai Singh was contented with the capture of the three bastions made that day and ordered his men to dig trenches exactly where they had reached and to hold the White Tower, without attempting to push on to the Black Tower.

In the course of the next two days the wooden structure was completed and two small pieces of cannon were mounted on it. The enemy, unable to reply to this fire from a superior height, evacuated the Black Tower and another

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bastion near it and took refuge in a stockade adjoining the wall of the tower. But they could not show their heads. The stockade was untenable, and they retired to the trenches behind it. Thus five towers and one stockade of the lower fort fell into the hands of the Mughals.

Purandar now seemed doomed. And, as if to complete its destruction, the Emperor had at Jai Singh's request despatched a train of very heavy artillery which were now on the way to the fort. The garrison had suffered heavy casualties during two months of incessant fighting.* Early in the siege they had lost their gallant commandant Murar Baji Prabhu.

§14. *Death of Murār Bāji Prabhu.*

Taking seven hundred select men with himself Murār Bāji made a sortie on Dilir Khan, who was trying to climb the hill with 5,000 Afghans and some more troops of other races. The Marathas dashed forward, mingled with the enemy on all sides, and there was severe fighting at close quarters. Murār Bāji with his Māvlés slew 500 Pathans besides many *Bahlia* infantrymen, and at the head of sixty desperate followers cut his way to Dilir's camp.

His comrades were slain by the overwhelming body of the Mughals, but Murār Bāji rushed straight on towards Dilir. The Khan, in admiration of his matchless courage, called upon him to yield and promised him his life and a high post under him. Murār indignantly refused, and was going to strike at Dilir when the latter shot him down with an arrow. Three hundred Māvlés fell with him, and the rest retreated to the fort. But the garrison, with a courage worthy of the mother of Brasidas the Spartan, continued the struggle, undismayed by their leader's fall and saying, "What though one man Murār Bāji is dead?

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* *Alamgir-namah*, 903, says that the fort had 4,000 combatants left in it at capitulation. Therefore Sabhasad's figure of 2,000 for the *original garrison* is wrong. Ben. MS. 187*a*-189*a*.

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We are as brave as he, and we shall fight with the same courage!" (Sabh. 41 ; *91Q.* sec. 51.)

§15. *Shivaji negotiates for submission.*

But at last the steady pressure of Jai Singh bore fruit. Purandar was closely invested, the garrison had been thinned by two months of fighting, and now the capture of five bastions of the lower fort made the stronghold untenable. Its fall was only a question of time. Shiva found it futile to prolong the resistance. The families of the Maratha officers were sheltered in Purandar, and its capture would mean their capitivity and dishonour. He had also failed to prevent the Mughal flying columns from ravaging his country. Defeat and ruin stared him in the face wherever he looked.

With his usual foresight, he had for some time past been sending envoys to Jai Singh to beg for terms, but the astute Rajput did not take him seriously.* Then, as the Mughal success became more and more evident, Shiva began to rise in his offer of tribute and forts as the price of peace ; but his terms were not proportionate to the military advantage gained by Jai Singh, and were therefore uniformly rejected.

The Mughal victory of 2nd June, and the impending fall of the lower fort decided Shivaji. He resolved to interview Jai Singh and offer fresh terms for peace with the imperialists, and if these were rejected he would make an alliance with Adil Shah by restoring Konkan and continue

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* "After the arrival of the imperial army near Pābal, Shiva's agents began to visit me, and by the time of my arrival at Punā they had brought two letters from him. But I gave no answer and sent them back in disappointment . . . . Then he sent a long Hindi letter with a trusted servant named Karmāji, who repeatedly entreated me to read the contents only once. In it Shiva offered to be loyal and to help us in a war with Bijapur as more likely to succeed than a war in his hilly and intricate country . . . In reply I asked him . . . to enter the Emperor's service if he desired his life and safety." (Ben. MS. 54*a*.)

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the war against the Mughals with renewed vigour. He had about 20th May sent his minister Raghunāth Ballāl Atré (Pandit Rao) on a secret mission to learn Jai Singh's terms, which were that Shiva must come in person and make an unconditional surrender, after which imperial mercy would be shown to him.*

Shivaji next demanded and secured from Jai Singh an assurance, confirmed with solemn oaths, that he would be allowed to visit Jai Singh and return home in safety, whether his terms were accepted or not. This visit was to be made in strict secrecy, as "the Emperor had forbidden Jai Singh to hold any negotiations whatever with Shiva."

§16. *Shivaji interviews Jai Singh.*

Raghunāth Ballāl returned to his master on 9th June. On the 10th he sent word to Jai Singh that Shivaji would come next day. On the 11th at 9 o'clock in the morning, while Jai Singh was holding Court in his tent at the foot of Purandar, Raghunāth came in and reported that Shivaji had arrived at hand in a *pālki* accompanied by six Brahmans only. Jai Singh immediately sent his secretary Udairāj and Ugrasen Kachhwā to meet him on the way and tell him that if he agreed to surrender all his forts he might come, otherwise he should turn back from the place. Shiva agreed to the terms in general and proceeded forward with the two officers. At the door of the tent he was welcomed by Jai Singh's Paymaster and ushered in. The Rajah advanced a few steps, embraced Shiva, and seated him by his side, while armed Rajputs stood around to guard against any treacherous movement on the part of the slayer of Afzal Khan!

Jai Singh had got up a little scene to conquer any lingering reluctance that Shiva might still have had. In anticipation of the Maratha chief's arrival he had sent

* Shiva's next move was to send the Pandit Rao back with an offer to send his *son* to make the submission. Jai Singh declined. (Ben. MS. 55*a*.)

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word to Shiva's not having made him the intermediary of the most adv's pardon. So he refused to move from his Purandar. Aftent to an armistice. The politic Jai Singh signal, the Mughahe him. On the 12th, as the public did part of the Khad-kalāva's arrival, he was mounted on an to check them, but wer Raja Rai Singh to wait on Dilir killed and many wounded. 's attention, presented him with seen from the interior of tlled dagger, and two pieces offered to surrender the fort in dan conducted Shiva back slaughter of his men. Jai Singh, sted him to the Rajah. Tuzuk, Ghāzi Beg, to Dilir Khan an robe of honour, a an order to stop the fight and allow the g for the turban. unmolested. An officer of Shiva was sent wg policy girt to order the garrison to capitulate. They beg saying, "I for the night. (*A. N.* 903.) narmed

§17. *Terms of the Treaty of Purandar, 1665.* t,

Shiva had travelled without any baggage or retinue, and therefore Jai Singh lodged him in his office-tent as his guest. Up to midnight the two sides higgled for the terms of a permanent peace.* But Jai Singh knew the strength of his position. As he wrote in his despatches to the Emperor, "I declined to abate a single fort. Gradually, after much discussion, we came to this agreement: (*a*) That 23 of his forts, the lands of which yield 4 *lakhs* of *hun* as annual revenue, should be annexed to the empire; and (*b*) that 12 of his forts, including Rājgarh, with an annual revenue of 1 *lakh* of *hun*, should be left to Shiva, on condition of service and loyalty to the imperial throne."

Shivaji, however, begged to be excused from attending the Emperor's Court like other nobles and Rajahs, and proposed to send his son, as his representative, with a contingent of 5,000 horse, (to be paid by means of a jagir), for regular attendance and service under the Emperor or the Mughal governor of the Deccan. This was exactly the

* *H. A.* Ben MS. 56*a*, 66*b*.

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favour shown to the Mahārānā of Udaipur. As he pleaded with Jai Singh, "By reason of my late unwise and disloyal acts, I have not the face to wait on the Emperor, I shall depute my son to be His Majesty's servant and slave, and he will be created a Commander of Five Thousand with a suitable jagir . . . . As for me sinner, exempt me from holding any *mansab* or serving in the Mughal army. But whenever in your wars in *the Deccan,* I am given any military duty, I shall promptly perform it."

In addition to the above terms, Shivaji made another and a conditional engagement with the Mughals: "If lands yielding 4 *lakhs* of *hun* a year in the lowlands of Konkan and 5 *lakhs* of *hun* a year in the uplands (Bālāghāt Bijapuri), are granted to me by the Emperor and I am assured by an imperial *farmān* that the possession of these lands will be confirmed in me after the expected Mughal conquest of Bijapur, then I agree to pay to the Emperor 40 *lakhs* of *hun* in 13 yearly instalments." He was expected to wrest these lands from the Bijapuri officers by means of his own troops.

Here we detect the shrewdness of Jai Singh's policy in throwing a bone of perpetual contention between Shivaji and the Sultan of Bijapur. As he wrote to the Emperor, "This policy will result in a threefold gain: *first,* we get 40 *lakhs* of *hun* or 2 *krores* of Rupees; *secondly,* Shivaji will be alienated from Bijapur; *thirdly,* the imperial army will be relieved from the arduous task of campaigning in these two broken and jungly regions, as Shivaji will himself undertake the task of expelling the Bijapuri garrisons from them." In return for it, Shiva also agreed to assist the Mughals in the invasion of Bijapur with 2,000 cavalry of his son Shambhuji's *mansab* and 7,000 expert infantry under his own command. (Ben. MS. 70).

§18. *Shivaji receives Mughal favours.*

Dilir Khan was greatly offended at this pacific end of the siege, which robbed him of the chance of military glory,

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and at Shiva's not having made him the intermediary of the Emperor's pardon. So he refused to move from his trenches or consent to an armistice. The politic Jai Singh now turned to soothe him. On the 12th, as the public did not yet know of Shiva's arrival, he was mounted on an elephant and sent with Raja Rai Singh to wait on Dilir Khan, who, mollified by this attention, presented him with two horses, a sword, a jewelled dagger, and two pieces of precious cloth. Then Dilir Khan conducted Shiva back to Jai Singh, took his hand, and entrusted him to the Rajah. The Rajah now presented Shiva with a robe of honour, a horse, an elephant, and an aigrette (*jigha*) for the turban. Shiva, who had come unarmed, with cunning policy girt on the sword for a short time and then put it off saying, "I shall serve the Emperor as one of his devoted but unarmed servants."

That day (12th June) according to the agreement, 7,000 men and women, (of whom 4,000 were combatants), left Purandar, and the Mughals entered into possession of it; all the stores, weapons, artillery, and other property found within were attached by the Government. Mughal officers were sent with Shivaji's men to take charge of five other forts to be surrendered by the Marathas.

Some time before this, while Shiva had been sending Brahman envoys to Jai Singh, the latter with his usual foresight had written to the Emperor begging him to send to him a gracious imperial *farmān* addressed to Shiva. This was to be delivered to Shiva in the event of his making submission. By a happy coincidence the *farmān* and a robe of honour sent by the Emperor arrived on the day following the surrender. By the Rajah's advice Shiva followed the Court etiquette, advanced six miles on foot to welcome the *farmān* on the way, and put on the robe of honour. (*A. N.* 904.)

On the 14th Shiva was presented by Jai Singh with an elephant and two horses, and sent away to Rajgarh with Kirat Singh, after paying a ceremonious visit to Dāud Khan.

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Reaching Kondānā at noon of the 14th, Shivaji delivered the fort to Kirat Singh and left for Rājgarh, where he arrived on the 15th. On the 17th he sent away Shambhuji from Rājgarh, in charge of Ugrasen Kachhwā and they arrived in Jai Singh's camp on the 18th. (Ben. MS. 57*a*.)

The Maratha forts surrendered to the Emperor by the treaty of Purandar (*A. N.* 905) were:—*in the Deccan*: (1) Rudramāl or Vajragarh, (2) Purandar, (3) Kondānā, (4) Rohirā, (5) Lohgarh. (6) Isāgarh, (7) Tanki, (8) Khadkalā near Kondānā, (9) Tikonā; *in Konkan*: (10) Māhuli, (11) Muranjan, (12) Khirdurg, (13) Bhandārdurg, (14) Tulsi-khul, (15) Nardurg, (16) Khaigarh or Ankolā, (17) Mārg-garh or Atra, (18) Kohaj, (19) Basant, (20) Nang, (21) Karnāla, (22) Songarh, and (23) Mangarh.

These terms were reported to the Emperor for ratification, together with a letter of submission and prayer for pardon from Shiva (but really drafted by Jai Singh's secretary Udairāj) and a despatch from Jai Singh recommending the acceptance of the terms and the granting of a robe of honour to Shiva. They reached Aurangzib at Delhi on 23rd June and he was pleased to accede to them all. [*H. A.* Ben. MS. 207*a*; *A. N.* 907; Parasnis MS. No. 8.]

Thus, in less than three months from the date when he opened the campaign, Jai Singh had succeeded in bringing Shiva down on his knees; he had made this haughty chief cede a large part of his dominions and consent to serve as a dependent vassal of the Emperor. It was a splendid victory. Shiva faithfully carried out his promises: in the war with Bijapur he with his contingent rendered distinguished service under the Mughal banner and was mentioned in the despatches.

§19. *Shivaji assists the Mughals in the invasion of Bijapur.*

The war with Shivaji having thus happily ended and the terms of the Treaty of Purandar been faithfully carried

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out, Jai Singh now began to make preparations for the invasion of Bijapur, in order to prevent his large army from eating its bread in idleness after its recent victorious campaign in Mahārāshtra. In September he received the Emperor's despatch accepting all his recommendations about Shiva together with a gracious *farmān* (stamped with the impression of his palm) and a robe of honour for the latter. Jai Singh invited Shiva to come and receive these marks of imperial favour with befitting solemnity. "Shivaji, then in Ādil-Shahi Konkan, immediately on hearing of it, travelled quickly and reached my camp on 27th September, 1665. On the 30th, I sent him, with my son Kirat Singh and my Paymaster Jāni Khan, to advance and welcome the imperial letter on the way."

A little mummery was acted on this occasion, to satisfy the etiquette of the Mughal Court: "As Shiva had worn no weapon on his person from the day when he had come like a penitent offender to wait on the Rajah up to this date, Jai Singh now gave him a jewelled sword and dagger and pressed him to put them on." The ceremony completed his restoration to the good grace of the Emperor. (*A. N.* 907.)

Jai Singh then dismissed Shivaji to enable him to assemble his contingent of 9,000 men and make the necessary preparations for the coming campaign, offering him two *lakhs* of Rupees from the imperial treasury for the purpose. Shiva promised to join Jai Singh the day before he started.

At last, on 20th November, 1665, Jai Singh set out on the invasions of Bijapur,* from the fort of Purandar. The Maratha contingent, 9,000 strong, under Shiva and his

* The invasion of Bijapur by Jai Singh and Shivaji: *Haft Anjuman*, (Ben. MS. 78*a*—94*a*, 138*b*, 172*b*—173*b*, 190*b*, 192*a*—193*b*, 201*b*—202*a*, 214*a*—215*a*, 231*a*—233*b*) ; *Storia*, ii. 141—142 ; *A. N.* 988—1021 ; *B. S.* 406—427 ; the narrative in *Tarikh-i-Ali II.* is useless, the sense being completely buried under the flowers of rhetoric. The Maratha writers are totally silent. For details about the war, see my *History of Aurangzib*, vol. iv. ch. xli. In Nov. 1665, Prince Muazzam left for the Court after handing over the viceroyalty of the Deccan to Jai Singh. (*A. N.* 924.)

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kinsman Netāji Pālkar,—"whom the Deccanis regarded as a second Shivaji,"—formed the left centre of the Mughal army.

During the first month of the campaign, Jai Singh's march was an uninterrupted triumph. From Purandar to Mangalbira, a fort 52 miles north of Bijapur, the invaders advanced without meeting with any opposition; the Bijapuri forts on the way were either evacuated in terror or surrendered at call to Shiva's troops, who had been sent ahead by Jai Singh to capture them. Phaltan, about forty miles south-east of Purandar, was entered on 7th December; Thāthvadā, 14 miles south-west of Phaltan, on the 8th; Khatāv (25 miles s. of Phaltan) about a week later; and Mangalbira itself on the 18th. For these services Shivaji received a letter of praise, a robe of honour, and a jewelled dagger from the Emperor. (Parasnis MS. letter No. 9.)

The invaders marched on, and then, on 24th December, they came into touch with the enemy for the first time. Next day, a Mughal detachment under Dilir Khan and Shivaji marched 10 miles from their camp and fought a Bijapuri army of 12,000 under the famous generals Sharzā Khan and Khawās Khan and their Maratha auxiliaries under Jādav Rao [Ghorparé?] of Kaliāni and Vyānkoji, the half-brother of Shivaji. The Deccanis evaded the charge of the cavaliers of Delhi, but harassed them by their "cossack tactics." dividing themselves into four bodies and fighting loosely with the Mughal divisions opposite. After a long contest, Dilir Khan's tireless energy and courage broke the enemy force by repeated charges, and they retired in the afternoon, leaving one general (Yaqut the Abyssinian) and 15 captains dead on the field and many flags, horses and weapons in the Mughal hands. But as soon as the victors began their return march to camp, the elusive enemy re-appeared and galled them severely with rockets from the two wings and rear. The Maratha rear-guard under Netāji bore the brunt of the attack, but stood its ground well. When the Deccanis hemmed Netā round and pressed him

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hard, he called for reinforcements from Kirat Singh and Fath Jang Khan, and with their aid repulsed the enemy. Jādav Rao of Kaliāni received a musket-shot, of which he died in five or six days. Shivaji and his brother Vyānkoji fought on opposite sides!

After a two days' halt, Jai Singh resumed his march on the 27th. The next day, after reaching the camping-ground in the evening, he detached a force to attack and expel the Bijapuri army from the neighbourhood. The fight soon became general, and Jai Singh himself had to charge the enemy's largest division. Shivaji and Kumār Kirat Singh, seated on the same elephant, led his van and dashed into the Deccani ranks. After a hard fight, the enemy were put to flight leaving more than a hundred dead and many more wounded.

On 29th December, 1665, Jai Singh arrived at Makhnāpur,* ten miles north of Bijapur fort. Here his advance was stopped, and after waiting for a week, he was forced to begin his retreat on 5th January, 1666, as he found his fondly hoped-for chance of taking Bijapur by a *coup de main* gone. He was not prepared for a regular siege, because, in his eagerness "to grasp the golden opportunity" of attacking Bijapur while undefended and torn by domestic factions, he had not brought any big artillery and siege-materials with himself. On the other hand, Ādil Shah had put the fort of Bijapur in a strong posture of defence; its walls had been repaired, large quantities of provisions and material laid in, its regular garrison augmented by 30,000 Karnātak infantry, and the country round for a radius of seven miles laid waste, drained of its water-supply, and denuded of its trees. At the same time he had sent a picked force under Sharzā Khan and Siddi Masaud to invade the Mughal dominions and make a diversion in Jai Singh's rear.

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* In the Persian MS. the name may be read either as *Makhnah* or as *Nāgthāna*. The latter is a village 8 miles n. n. e. of Bijapur.

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On 27th January, the retreating Mughal army reached a place 16 miles from Parendā, and there halted for 24 days. Here we shall leave it, as the historian of Shivaji is not concerned with its operations any further.

§20. *Shivaji fails at Panhālā, 1666.*

On receiving the unexpected check before Bijapur, Jai Singh looked round, to create a diversion. As he writes in a despatch to the Court, "At my request the Emperor had [on 25th Dec.] sent a robe of honour and a jewelled dagger for Shiva, who was ready to co-operate at the siege of Bijapur, but . . . . I did not deem it expedient. Shiva said to me,—'If you detach me, I can go and capture for the Emperor Panhālā, of which I know all the ins and outs, while the garrison are off their guard. I shall raise so much disturbance in that district that the enemy will be compelled to divert a large force from their army to oppose me.' As his words bore promise of action, I sent him away on his promised errand." (*H. A.*, Ben. MS. 84*b*.)

But there was a deeper reason for this step, as we learn from Jai Singh's secret correspondence. The unexpected failure before the fort of Bijapur gave rise to dissensions in the Mughal camp. The party hostile to Jai Singh, which was led by Dilir Khan,* ascribed his ill-success to the lukewarmness or treachery of Shivaji, and demanded that he should be imprisoned as a punishment. Jai Singh saw the danger in which Shiva stood among the defeated and sullen Mughal soldiery. To safeguard the liberty of the Maratha

* Manucci attests that Dilir Khan several times urged Jai Singh "to take Shivaji's life, or at least to give him (Dilir Khan) leave to do so. He would assume all responsibility, and see that the Rajah was held blameless." (*Storia*, ii. 137.) The English factory records state, "In a battle between the Mughals and this country people, Shivaji ran away, being afraid that Dilir Khan would put him to death, he having told the said wazir [Dilir] that he would take Bijapur in 10 days' time, upon which persuasion he set forwards with 20,000 horse, but to his cost he found the contrary, being forced quickly to retire." (Deccan News in *F. R.* Surat, vol. 104.)

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chief, and send him out of the reach of his enemies, he gladly accepted the proposal that the Maratha contingent should make a diversion in the western provinces of Bijapur. (*H. A.*, 195*a*, 84*b*, 192*a*; hints only.)

Shiva left Jai Singh about 11th January, 1666. Five days later he reached the environs of Panhala, and delivered an assault on it three hours before sunrise. But the garrison were on the alert and offered a stubborn defence. A thousand of Shiva's followers fell, killed and wounded. When the rising sun lit up the scene, Shiva at last recognized that it was madness to continue the struggle, and drew back sullenly to his own fort of Khelnā [Vishālgarh], about 27 miles westwards. But his troops continued to ravage that quarter and succeeded in drawing and detaining there a force of 6,000 Bijapuris under Siddi Masaud and Randaula Khan. (*H. A.*, 84*b*—85*a*; *A. N.* 1002.)

The news of Shivaji's failure at Panhālā reached Jai Singh on 20th January. The evil was aggravated by the desertion of Netāji. Taking offence with Shiva, Netā accepted the Bijapuri bait of 4 *lakhs* of *hun* and, deserting to Ādil Shah, raided the Mughal territory with great vigour and effect. Jai Singh could not afford to lose such a man; and so he lured Netāji back (20th March) with many persuasive letters and the granting of all his high demands, *viz.*, the *mansab* of a Commander of Five Thousand in the Mughal peerage, a jāgir in the settled and lucrative old territory of the empire (as distinct from the ill-conquered, unsettled, ever-ravaged recent annexations in the Deccan), and Rs. 50,000 in cash. (*H. A.* 193.)

The cause of Netāji's rupture with Shivaji in January 1666, will become clear if we correct an obvious error in the two earliest Marāthi sources. Sabhāsad (p. 57) says that Shivaji dismissed Netāji from the post of Master of the Horse (*sar-i-naubat*) and appointed Kartoji Gujar (with the title of Pratāp Rao) to that office, as a punishment for Netāji's absence from his assigned position when Shivā delivered a night-attack on Siddi Jauhar's siege-trenches

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before Panhālā fort, which failed in consequence of this act of negligence. The *91 Qalmi Bakhar* (sec. 38) repeats the same story with the variation that the defaulter was Netāji's brother-in-law, and that Shivaji in anger punished him by docking his pay for one month, against which order Netāji remonstrated with rude vehemence, so that Shivaji at once dismissed Netāji. This would place Netāji's dismissal in 1660, though Sabhāsad actually narrates the incident among the events of 1666. It is, however, an unquestioned fact that Netāji continued to command Shivaji's cavalry till January 1666; Jai Singh throughout 1665 speaks of Neta as "the second Shivā," and an English factory letter calls him Shivaji's *sar-i-lashkar* till January 1666. Therefore, the only correction needed is to date Netāji's dismissal in January 1666 and assign as its cause his failure to turn up punctually in the sector round Panhālā assigned to him in Shivaji's *assault* upon that fort on 16th January 1666, and not in his *defensive* sortie from it six years earlier. The Maratha assault of 1666 failed, as we can easily infer, from its having been delayed by reason of Shivaji having to wait long for Netāji's contingent, and thus the element of surprise (on which alone success against such a huge fort depended) was lost; the garrison took the alarm before the escalade was actually launched, withdrew from the side of the fort which there was no Netaji to attack, and turned the full force of the defence against Shivaji's sector. In the Marāthi records Pratāp Rao is not mentioned as having eclipsed Netaji Pālkar even once before 1666.*

Netāji's defection at the end of January, 1666, coming so soon after the recent reverses, greatly alarmed Jai Singh. If Shiva were to do the same, the entire Maratha army

* Sabhāsad is again grossly in error in saying (on page 44) that when Shivaji started for Agra in March 1666, he left Netāji at home in charge of his army. We know for certain that two months before that date Netāji had given up Shivaji's service and gone over to Bijapur, from which side he was lured by Jai Singh to the Mughal army (*not* to Shivaji's) in the second half of this month of March. See my *House of Shivaji*, Ch. 10.

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would join the enemy's ranks and the Mughal invaders would be crushed between the two. As he wrote to the Emperor, "Now that Ādil Shah and Qutb Shah have united in mischief, it is necessary to win Shiva's heart by all means and to send him to Northern India to have audience of Your Majesty." (94*a*.) The Emperor having consented to this proposal, Jai Singh set himself to induce Shiva to visit the imperial Court.

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